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ABSTRACT
This study examines the nature of the relationship between a superpower and a small state, 
using as a case study that of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the USA. The period 
covered is the lifetime of the YAR from 26 September 1962 when the Republic was declared, 
to 22 May 1990, when the YAR was united with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) to form the Republic of Yemen (ROY).
After a brief examination of pre-revolutionary North Yemen-US contacts, which provide the 
backdrop to the relationship inherited by the Republic, Chapters 2-5 adopt a chronological 
approach to the different phases in the YAR-US interaction. The sixth chapter focuses on the 
economic dimension of the relationship.
Beyond establishing a chronological account, this thesis analyzes several interrelated themes. 
It explores how the emergence of what was the first Republic in the Arabian Peninsula 
affected the balance of power in the Middle East and how this, in turn, affected US policy 
towards the region and towards Sana’a during the Cold War. In particular, it examines to 
what extent, if at all, the YAR benefitted from the bilateral relationship, and how this fitted 
in with the YAR government’s overall foreign policy. It investigates the extent to which the 
YAR was subjected to US Middle Eastern and global policies. It further examines how
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international strategic rivalries between the superpowers and other interested nations affected 
the YAR and how Sana’a attempted to exploit and benefit from these rivalries and 
intersections. Other themes include the role played by the Yemeni people in affecting regional 
and international relations and the effect of regional religious differences on the YAR-US 
interaction. This study also studies how the YAR as a small state experienced a degree of 
freedom of manoeuvre in determining its own foreign policy.
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
Except where names of places or individuals are conventionally rendered into English in other 
forms, the process of transliteration from Arabic used throughout the thesis is based on that 
of THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM.
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INTRODUCTION
This study covers the relationship between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the USA 
during the period between the Yemeni revolution on 26 September 1962 and the unification 
of the two Yemens on 22 May 1990 - when the YAR merged with the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) to form the Republic of Yemen (ROY). Despite unification, 
there is a great measure of continuity between earlier YAR-US relations and ROY-US 
relations today. While relations between what was South Yemen and the US were limited to 
the period between 1967 and 1969,1 Sana’a’s more continuous relations with Washington 
were inherited by the ROY since Sana’a became the capital of the former YAR and is today 
the capital in both law and reality of the new Yemen.
The Yemen possesses distinguishing if not unique features and characteristics: it is a highly 
populated country, was long supplied with Soviet arms, has a turbulent modem history, 
controls the southern mouth of the Red Sea and lies adjacent to sixty percent of the world’s 
oil reserves in what is supposedly an unchallenged sphere of Western influence. Its relations 
with the US therefore merit thorough and detailed study.
This thesis contributes additional knowledge to several distinct areas of existing research in 
international relations. Apart from contributing to research on the foreign relations of Third 
World states and on the contemporary history of the Arabian Peninsula, it also contributes 
to the literature on North-South relations. Although largely dependent upon US sources
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because of their availability, this detailed analysis of YAR-US interaction comes from a 
Yemeni perspective and is intended to make a significant addition to the available literature, 
provide a better understanding of this part of the Middle East, and add to existing research 
on some of the issues involved.
The Sources and Their Limitations
Before the background to the major themes of this thesis are outlined in detail, it is first 
necessary to state some of the problems that were encountered during the research due to the 
limitations of the source material.
Research on the Yemen and on the Arabian peninsula that followed the 26 September 
revolution in the northern part of Yemen and the ensuing Yemen crisis has involved several 
international scholars and institutions, such as the American Institute for Yemeni Studies in 
the US (AIYS). These scholars’ published and unpublished works2, the declassified 
documents of the US government, the US Freedom of Information Act facilities, and field 
work undertaken by this author in both the Yemen and the US, have provided the basis of 
this thesis.
This research encountered a number of difficulties, the main one being that the YAR’s 
relations with the US are, in many respects, not comparable to those with any other Middle 
Eastern state. Although North Yemen, which was never colonized by a Western power, 
achieved independence from Turkey in 1918, it was kept largely segregated from the outside
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world by its Zeidi rulers whose strict religious ideology sought to keep the country closed to 
foreigners or outside influence. After 26 September 1962, the YAR tried to develop contact 
with the modem world, including the US. This was only partly successful. Egyptian 
intervention and civil war, a close military relationship with the USSR, an alliance with the 
Arab nationalism movement, a commitment to fight colonialism, imperialism and Zionism, 
and a dispute with the KSA inherited from the Zeidi Imams affected the YAR’s interaction 
with the USA and with many other key Western countries. The YAR’s foreign policy was 
further affected in the late 1960s and the 1970s, when the pro-Soviet PDRY was established 
at its southern frontiers and the Republic became largely dependent upon the KSA, involving 
it in continuous internal struggle between forces loyal to either the KSA or the PDRY, and 
their respective patrons, the USA and the USSR. In the 1970s the YAR’s relations with the 
US mattered only in the sense that it existed as a buffer between the socialist PDRY, where 
the Soviet Union gained considerable influence, and the KSA, where huge US interests 
existed.
Another problem was presented by the fact that the details of YAR-US interactions are in 
some respects too recent to allow comprehensive research. There is only a limited amount 
of published material since most YAR-US contacts have always been kept secret. When a 
senior Yemeni official, for example visits Washington or receives an American envoy, the 
Yemeni press reports it only in general terms, with words such as: "the two parties have 
discussed the bilateral relations and means to develop these as well as the issues of mutual 
interest and concern."
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Finally, there is the relative insignificance of the country itself: during most of the period 
under the study, the YAR was unstable, poor, and had little military power to influence other 
States or affect the course of international relations. Even in Arab and Peninsula terms the 
YAR played only a marginal role.
These difficulties were compounded by a paucity of documentation and a lack of access to 
that which exists. In common with most countries, including the US and Britain, recent YAR 
diplomatic policy is subject to strict control. This author tried to find documents in Sana’a 
such as the YAR’s Washington Embassy despatches but was denied access. However, from 
March 1985 and until late 1987, the writer worked as the Director of Information to the YAR 
Prime Minister, ’Abdul-’Aziz ’Abdul-Ghani, and thus had access to some reports from 
Yemen embassies. It is not, however, possible to quote from these. In Sana’a, apart from the 
correspondence between the Foreign Ministry and the embassies, there is no substantial 
documentation nor any archives concerning the YAR’s dealings with the outside world. 
Moreover, most of the Yemeni officials this writer has interviewed refused to be quoted. In 
the USA the situation was, at the level of documentation, little better. Despite the Freedom 
of Information Act, access was denied to most of the documents needed, and most of the 
White House Central Files pertaining to the YAR were closed for security reasons. The 
Kennedy administration documents, in the Boston Kennedy Library, were also in closed files 
in early 1990.
This study was, however, able to make use of documentation from the following sources: the
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US Department of State correspondence with US embassies in the YAR, KSA and the UAR 
for the period 1962-1990, in addition to many US government and UK Foreign Office 
declassified despatches of the pre-1962 period; recent US congressional hearings; up-to-date 
USAID presentations to Congress; some White House Central Files; and a number of 
Congressional and Department of State official publications. Also available were official 
Yemeni and American statements which are cited in the YAR’s official news agency (Saba) 
bulletins, United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and British 
Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcast, Part IV, The Middle East (ME) 
transcripts, United States Information Service (USIS) daily reports, the American University 
of Beirut Bulletin, and other similar sources.
Oral interviews in Yemen and the USA were of special benefit to this research, as were 
interviews which had been conducted by or deposited in the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and 
Ford libraries. In addition, the YAR Central Planning Organisation (CPO) and the YAR 
Central Bank (CB) annual reports, and the reports of various international organisations and 
banks and funds proved to be an invaluable source. Although they needed to be used with 
caution, the research further benefited from unofficial publications such as newspapers, 
journals and books by journalists, academics, political commentators and several politicians 
and diplomats involved in the actual events. Journals and articles from the Royal Institute of 
International Relations, London, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, and 
the Middle East Institute, Washington, were also of use in charting the course of events.
13
A third category of sources was this author’s own observations from having worked in the 
media in both Northern and Southern Yemen and Kuwait since October 1966. During this 
period, especially during the last four years, the author interviewed a large number of 
influential Yemenis. Additional interviews in the US in early 1990 with numerous officials, 
ex-diplomats and scholars whose interest was or still is Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, 
were also valuable. In summation, these varied sources provided the basis for this thesis.
Structure and Themes
Since this study was written under the limitations of information availability and is about a 
stipulated period, it concentrates on the history of YAR-US bilateral interests. The chapters 
of this thesis are divided into broad thematic concerns but, within this framework, they 
therefore follow the most important events of the North Yemen-US interaction in 
chronological sequence. Chapter one is a survey of North Yemen-US contacts before 26 
September 1962 and provides the background to issues at the core of the thesis. The next four 
chapters cover in detail the different phases of diplomatic relations between the YAR and the 
US from 1962 to 1990. These relations fall into distinct phases: the initial YAR contacts 
which led to US recognition of the YAR on 19 December 1962 (Chapter Two); the first 
phase of relations, until diplomatic ties were broken in 1967 (Chapter Three); the five year 
period ending in the restoration of relations in 1972 (Chapter Four); the period of US 
protection which was followed by the discovery of oil in the YAR by a US company in 1984 
- this brought about a change in the whole nature of the relationship and marked the 
beginning of a period of more US interest in the country (Chapter Five). Chapter Six
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examines the economic dimensions of YAR-US relations. In the conclusion the relationship 
is brought up to 22 May 1990, the findings summarised, and the themes outlined earlier in 
this introduction addressed.
One of the themes examined in this study is that of policy interaction: how Arabian Peninsula 
problems affected US policy, how Yemeni policies affected the region, and how relationships 
in that region affected the superpowers. In particular, the study examines how the YAR’s 
relations with the USA fitted into the former’s overall policy especially as regards Saudi 
Arabia and South Yemen; the latter was at first a British protectorate and later controlled by 
the pro-Soviet National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). 
Relevant to this is an analysis of the extent to which the YAR benefitted from relations with 
the US. A major theme is the place of policy towards the YAR in the overall pattern of US 
policy in the Middle East3, regarding in particular the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the 
Arab Israeli question and Cold War rivalry with the Soviet bloc, as well as the extent to 
which the US had any distinctive interest in the YAR between 1962 and 1990. Related to this 
is an analysis of the reasons for US interest. A fourth theme is how global strategic rivalries 
and intersections affected the Yemen, and how it tried, in varying ways and at different times, 
to gain benefit from these rivalries. Other themes include the role played by the Yemeni 
people in affecting regional and international relations and the effect of regional religious 
differences on the YAR-US interaction. A key dimension is the superpower-small state 
relationship in a highly volatile region and how, within this, a small power maintained a 
degree of freedom of manoeuvre in deciding its foreign policy.
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Evolution of Yemeni Foreign Policy
Yemen’s policy towards the USA must be seen in the context of its policy towards external 
powers in general. After World War I Sana’a sought to counterbalance British pressure in 
Aden by obtaining international recognition for its government and territorial integrity. The 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (MKOY) formed in 1948 sought the same objectives 
especially when relations with the UK became strained and the inter-Yemeni opposition posed 
a threat to the Hamid al-Din ruling family. In the 1950s the ruling Imam sought a US 
diplomatic presence to counterbalance the Eastern bloc. He was not concerned to obtain US 
assistance since this would have benefited the Yemeni people rather than himself personally. 
In the late 1950s the MKOY monarchy appealed to the US to intervene on the border dispute 
with Aden and to establish a diplomatic legation and a USAID office. The Imam wanted to 
counterbalance the Soviet and Egyptian presence in the MKOY army, which followed the 
arrival of some Soviet military equipment. Washington took the situation seriously and in the 
light of the Eisenhower Doctrine4, decided to contain Soviet influence in the Yemen in order 
to safeguard Western interests and protect Saudi security.
North Yemen’s attempts to benefit from superpower rivalries first became evident after its 
independence in 1918: then Sana’a tried to exploit Italian-UK rivalry by attempting to obtain 
US support for its aims of liberating the southern areas from the British colonial rule and 
reuniting ‘historical’ Yemen. When Washington refused it turned to Italy, a rival of the 
British in the Red Sea region. In competition with Britain for control of this area, Italy had 
established a presence on the Asian shores of the Sea following its conclusion of a treaty with
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the Amir of ’Asir, al-Idrissi in 1911. In Yemen, Rome opened relations by establishing 
commercial ties with the Yemeni ports of ’Asir, Tihama and Aden. It then established a 
commercial centre in Sana’a. After three years of diplomacy, Italy signed a treaty with Imam 
Yahya of Yemen in 1926, guaranteeing freedom of trade between the two states. This was 
the first treaty the KOY signed with another state and Italy was the first European nation to 
recognise Imam Yahya as King of the Yemen. The Imam used the treaty to strengthen his 
position in the talks with the British delegation headed by Sir Gilbert Clayton held in Sana’a 
in 1926 which broke down just a few days before the treaty with Rome was signed.5 He also 
used it to put some pressure on Idrissi to surrender to Sana’a. Yahya gambled all his cards 
on Italy and challenged his rivals to the north and south, the Saudis and the British, before 
obtaining the necessary armaments and training. This led directly to the annexation of ’Asir 
by the KSA and to the weakening of the Imam’s position in the south.6
While Imam Yahya aimed at gaining international recognition of his rule and obtaining arms 
to strengthen his position against the rebellious leaders of ’Asir and against the British, Italy 
sought economic markets and a political position that would secure its interest in the Red Sea 
region and its position in its colonies in East Africa. For this reason the treaty with the Imam 
was seen to be for Italy "the first important step in the history of its penetration in South 
West Arabia for which it had waited so long."7 As well as a five-year gasoline concession 
this treaty opened up the Yemen for Italian arms, goods, and doctors, and even allowed Rome 
to influence the Imam’s foreign policy. The contrast between Imam Yahya’s policies with the 
ruler of ’Asir and the British before and after the signing of this treaty indicates that Italian
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influence lay behind the unexpected decision of the Imam in 1927 to terminate the activities 
of the Twitchell American engineering team which was attempting to build a harbour, a 
communication network and to explore for oil.
The Yemeni-Italian alliance must be assessed within the context of British-Italian competition 
for the control of the Red Sea. Yemen’s alliance with Rome was motivated by the wish to 
counter the British and to liberate the southern areas from their influence. But the flaw in the 
Imam’s policy was that he used one colonial power to get rid of another. Instead of 
strengthening his position against the British he only stirred up more vigorous British enmity 
against his rule, because London treated the Arabian Peninsula in terms of a British 
equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine.8 The region of ’Asir, which the Imam subsequently lost 
because of his treaty with the Italians, is a case in point. Italy even gained stronger influence 
in the Yemen following the renewal of the treaty in 1937, especially through the Imam’s 
personal Italian physicians. This continued until 1943 when the Axis bloc lost the war.9 In 
the second half of the 1940s, due in part to growing US interest in the Arabian peninsula, the 
Imam tried to exploit US-UK competition once again to enhance his rule, and to 
counterbalance pressure from the British in the south and the Saudis in the north. When this 
failed in the 1950s, the MKOY sought assistance (mainly military) from the Soviets, who 
responded positively. This aroused US concern and led to US-UK cooperation in the Yemen 
resulting in a US offer of development aid. Washington also tried to reconcile the British and 
the Imam.
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US Policy and its Evolution
Yet another theme of this study is that of US foreign policy and its evolution. After the end 
of World War I, American policy in the Arabian Peninsula was restricted and hard to 
implement. When the US became more closely involved in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states, its interest in Yemen grew.10 This thesis contains a chapter that examines formal and 
informal North Yemen-US relations, before September 1962, at both the private and official 
levels. In addition to its importance as historical background for YAR-US relations, this 
establishes a basis for comparison between US policies towards monarchical, conservative 
Yemen and towards the Republic.
After 1945 three aims shaped US foreign policy: to maintain active responsibility for the 
direction of international affairs; to use all power to combat the spread of the Communist 
"menace"; and to contain "Soviet expansionism and influence."11 In the Indian Ocean and 
the Gulf region, this meant the following: a British and a French military presence; US 
business investment in the region; increased Western demand for oil resources; a Soviet 
political and military presence; and involvement of the region in Arab-Israeli and Southwest 
Asian conflicts.
The US emerged from the World War II as a superpower at a time European dominance over 
its former colonies, protectorates and allies was declining in the region. Thus the US 
gradually became the most influential and powerful external force in the Middle East 
generally and in the Arabian Peninsula in particular. The combination of military and
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economic strength gave the US the capability to project its presence and influence to 
countries, many of which it had no previous relations. After World War II, finding there was 
no objection from London, the US responded to the Imam’s demands by a decision not to 
leave Yemen for other powers to penetrate. Washington also sought stability in the Arabian 
Peninsula to safeguard US business interests and the world oil reserves. This objective was 
to be achieved by protecting its KSA ally against any threat that might emerge from MKOY 
alliances and by reconciling the Imam with the UK. During this period Britain tried but failed 
to play a direct role in determining internal Yemeni politics. It finally came to rely heavily 
upon its influence over US officials in order to exert indirect leverage in determining the 
course of events in Southwest Arabia. This situation made it appropriate for formal relations 
between the US and the KOY to be established.
Arab Nationalism and Superpower Cold War Rivalries
1947 witnessed the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, a new principle in America’s foreign 
policy, which aimed to support those "who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures."12 In this year President Truman announced that his 
country would assist all countries that opposed Soviet ideology and policies.13 This led to 
the creation of economic and military aid packages, mutual defence treaties, regional pacts 
and alliances and, although the Doctrine was initially concluded with Greece and Turkey, to 
increasing US interest in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. As a result the US came to 
take its relationship with Yemen more seriously. Overall, this doctrine led to a policy of 
resisting and dislodging the USSR. Secretary of State John Dulles visited the area in 1953,
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one year after the Egyptian revolution, but achieved very little. On his return to Washington, 
Dulles confirmed that "many of the Arab League countries were preoccupied with their 
disputes with Israel, Great Britain and France, a matter which lessened their fear of 
Communism."14 The US Secretary’s statement indicated clearly that the Arabs were 
struggling to obtain their independence from the European colonialists and were feeling a 
concrete threat from Israel rather than from Communism. This meant a cool response to the 
plans of the US, which was already damned in the eyes of many Arabs for being the 
supporter of Israel.
In 1956 the crisis between Western colonial powers and Arab nationalism reached its climax. 
The US suspected that this movement might welcome the Soviet Union into a sphere of 
influence that the US had inherited from its European predecessors. The Eisenhower 
administration responded to this situation by pledging the US to exercise a more assertive 
policy in the Middle East, and to do so partly through bilateral relations with local 
governments which included most of those in the Arabian Peninsula. The USSR reacted by 
increasing its support to revolutionary and national liberation elements in the Arab world and 
by acquiring a foothold in the Middle East to confront "colonialism and imperialism." Their 
first chance came when President Jamal ’ Abdul-Nasser of Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal 
in 1956. The USSR promptly pledged political and military assistance to Egypt. Under the 
nationalist movement of the 1950s, Arab countries became hopeful of using Soviet support 
to free themselves from the vestiges of Western colonialism with Soviet support. This, of 
course, displeased American and West European policy makers. The Arab nationalist
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movement faced many difficulties in achieving independence from direct or indirect Western 
influence, partly because of Middle East dependency upon European economies, and also 
because of the lingering effects of decades of colonialism. This explains why, by the end of 
the 1950s, most Arab countries were either traditional or revolutionary regimes; the former 
placed their fate in the hands of the Western powers, while the latter found their interests lay 
in allying with the Eastern anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist bloc. Thus one of the side- 
effects of the Cold War was the Arab world’s dependence on either the US or the USSR.
In this period, the US continued to maintain military installations in Saudi Arabia intended 
to provide not only for the defence of the Middle East as a whole but also of the important 
oil reserves in the whole Gulf region which had become essential to the energy supply of the 
West. Behind this economic and military presence in the area was US concern at Soviet 
influence in the Yemen. It was also concerned about the Yemen’s continuing dispute with 
neighbouring KSA. Robert Stookey, the last US Charge d’Affaires in monarchical Yemen, 
pointed out that the ongoing British-Yemen dispute also worried the US more at the outbreak 
of the Cold War than any other time, since the British military base in Aden was used to 
underpin the Anglo-American position in the Gulf and the Peninsula.15
Conclusion
The above-mentioned themes reoccur throughout the text of this study and are summarised 
in the concluding chapter. Between 1918 and 1962 North Yemen’s relationship with the US 
was limited. It was affected negatively by the following factors: US lack of economic interest
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in the country; the US stance on the Palestinian issue and its role in creating Israel; Zeidi 
ideology and the Imams’ fears of exposing their subjects to the modern world; Yemen’s 
dispute with the UK over the southern areas of the Yemen (ie. Aden and the Protectorates) 
and its territorial dispute with the KSA; and the strong KSA-US relationship. Most of these 
factors were initially the source of only marginal aggravation to the US, but they became 
exacerbated after the formation of the YAR in 1962.
Four major issues dominated YAR-US relations in the following years: the Cold War, the 
relationship of both countries with the KSA; US policy in the Middle East; the nature of the 
bilateral interaction itself. This raises questions about the nature of US interest in the 
Republic between 1962 and 1990; about whether the YAR’s relationship with the US helped 
or retarded Yemeni economic, political and social progress; about whether a small state like 
the YAR was able to experience a freedom of manoeuvre in determining its own foreign 
policy.
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CHAPTER ONE:
NORTH YEMEN-US CONTACTS BEFORE 1962
In the period leading to the 1962 revolution Yemen was not able to benefit from private and 
official American contacts, nor, due to its geo-political location between the KSA and the 
Western interests in the British colony of Aden and the surrounding protectorates, to develop 
cooperative relations with the US government. YAR-US relations were constrained by 1) 
Yemen’s rivalry with the UK over the southern areas and with the KSA; 2) Washington’s 
major interests in the KSA, its Arab and Middle Eastern policy and its fear of Communism; 
3) internal Yemeni resistance to relations with Washington, which came from Zeidi 
isolationism and the belief of the Free Yemeni Party (FYP) that the US would provide a life­
line to the country’s ruling family.
Private, Informal, and Formal Ties
The early history of Yemeni-US relations is intermittent and often based on unofficial 
contacts. American vessels first called at the Yemeni port of Mocha in the late 18th century. 
Trade intensified with Yemen in the early 19th century as trade in coffee, gum and hide 
expanded.1 By the end of the century American missionaries, Dr Samuel Zwemmer and 
Charles F. Camp and their wives had settled in Yemen. The murder of Camp by the Turks, 
who were then occupying Yemen, brought the American Consul in Aden, Charles K. Moser 
to Sana’a in 1910, to investigate the incident.2
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In 1918 North Yemen gained independence and the monarch, Imam Yahya, requested US 
recognition. This resulted in a goodwill visit to the Imam from the American Consul in Aden 
in 1919. His aim was to lay the ground for some American business expeditions the following 
year.3 In 1920 the Standard Oil Company made a geological investigation for oil in the 
Kingdom.4 Amin al-Raihani, an American of Syrian origin, visited the Imam from 1921- 
1922, and returned with a letter which raised the recognition issue once again, from the Imam 
to the American Consul in Aden.5 In 1926 the American Vice-Consul in Aden introduced 
the first American businessman to the Imam, Niton Houlberg, representative of the Houlberg- 
Kidde Corporation of Aden and New York.6
Another American contact was made in 1926, when the American Consulate in Aden 
introduced the diplomat and entrepreneur Charles Crane to the Imam. Crane visited Sana’a 
several times in 1926 and 1927.7 When he left Sana’a in 1927 he carried with him an Arabic 
draft of a proposed treaty with the United States. No treaty was concluded but the US 
Government approved Crane’s activities and instructed its Consul in Aden to make an 
informal trip to the Yemen. Crane introduced to the Imam an American engineer, Karl 
Twitchell, who between 1927 and 1932 studied the geology and infrastructural needs of 
Yemen. He also provided technical assistance for the construction of roads and bridges and 
distributed farm and industrial machinery as gifts. Twitchell was responsible for connecting 
Sana’a with the port of Hudaidah by constructing bridges along approximately 350 kilometres 
of difficult mountainous country.8 Surprisingly, the Crane-Yahya relationship came to an
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end9, and in 1932 both Crane and Twitchell switched their interest to the KSA.10
In 1933 Carleton S. Coon, his wife, and Ralph Forbes made a short anthropological 
expedition into the country and in 1937 two American oil geologists landed at Hudaidah 
harbour, but "they found no oil."11 Ford Company representatives arrived in Sana’a in the 
1930s to offering to construct modem roads all over the country on condition that Yemen 
committed itself to buy only Ford cars for 20 years. Imam Yahya rejected the offer.12
During May 1944, Washington responded to the Imam’s request to intercede in Yemen’s 
border dispute with the UK and despatched its newly appointed Consul in Aden, Harlan B. 
Clark, to meet Imam Yahya in March 1945. Meetings between the two resulted in American 
recognition of Yemen as an independent state on 4 March 1946. A treaty of friendship and 
commerce was concluded on 4 May 1946, but diplomatic representation with the US was 
delayed.
After the failure of the 1948 revolution against the Yemeni ruling family and the success of 
Imam Ahmad in restoring the throne of his assassinated father, the US reconfirmed its 
recognition of the Yemeni government and a Yemeni Consulate was opened in 
Washington.13 Yemen, however, denied permission for the Americans to do the same in 
Sana’a, offsetting this refusal by permitting a number of American scientific missions and 
expeditions to enter the country. A US Navy medical mission was allowed to survey health 
conditions and undertake zoological studies, and a major expedition of the American
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Foundation for the Study of Man led by Wendell Philips, visited the Marib area and 
undertook archaeological and palaeographic investigations of the remains of the pre-Islamic 
Kingdoms as well as oil explorations.14 Because of a misunderstanding between Philips and 
the Yemeni authorities the expedition was asked to leave the country suddenly in 1952.15 
US diplomats were stationed in Yemen in 1959 and US AID operations started in 1961.16 
Against the background of this brief chronological survey, it is now possible to look in more 
detail at some of the underlying themes in Yemeni-US relations.
North Yemen Rivalry with the UK
After its independence from the Ottomans in 1918 Yemen sought to establish its authority 
throughout what it saw as ‘historic’ Yemen, including the southern areas occupied by the 
British since 1839. London therefore objected to and resisted all economic and political 
cooperation between Sana’a and Washington. As an influential power in the region the UK 
was largely able to contain Yemen-US relations throughout the period 1918-1962.
In 1918, when Imam Yahya requested American recognition, President Wilson took no 
action17 because the ’’U.S. Department of State followed Great Britain’s advice on matters 
related to the Peninsula."18 Despite signing treaties with many countries throughout the 
thirties, Imam Yahya continuously sought American alliance in order to use it against the UK. 
He understood that his task was difficult because he had been "a potential enemy of Great 
Britain, with which country the U.S. is friendly."19
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The Imam considered the private and informal contacts (i.e. Niton Houlberg, Charles Crane 
and Karl Twitchell) to be a personal success but none of them achieved what he really 
wanted, namely US recognition. The Imam encouraged American trade in order to obtain 
American arms and "the negotiation of a treaty," which were effectively blocked by the 
British and by Anglo-American friendship.20 American businessmen and diplomats insisted 
that the Imam should give up all claims on the British protectorates. This the Imam refused 
to do.21
The years following 1944 witnessed the rise of US influence and interest in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Washington realised that by neglecting Yemen, US long term interests in Saudi 
Arabia might be threatened. This led to the establishment of formal relations without British 
objection, because the latter wanted to stabilize the balance of power in the Arabian 
Peninsula.22 Imam Yahya, although desirous of obtaining aid and official recognition for his 
country and for his own position, did not facilitate the exchange of diplomatic representation 
with countries with which he signed treaties.23 This was due in part to British obstruction, 
who worked through influential officials inside and outside the palace.24
In 1947 Saif al-Islam ’Abd Allah, Imam Yahya’s son, returned to Sana’a from Washington 
bringing with him a draft of a supplementary agreement with the US, which proposed the 
Imam establish some infrastructural projects for roads and water. The British, as the Middle 
East Office of Great Britain in Cairo indicated25, protested since they considered the to be 
contrary to the spirit of the February 1934 Anglo-Yemen treaty whereby Yemen gave
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preference to the UK in all international dealings. Leading members of the Free Yemen 
Movement (FYM) in Sana’a discussed the situation and decided to launch a coup d’etat with 
Iraqi support, which might persuade the UK to support the change26 Influenced by Djamal 
Djamil, the Iraqi military advisor, the FYM believed Iraq could mediate with Britain to put 
Anglo-Yemeni relations on a friendly footing, if it agreed to give preference to the UK in 
international affairs.27 Yemeni officers, also influenced by Djamil considered the 
supplementary agreement to be "a Jewish plot directed against the Arabs."28 Thus relations 
between Sana’a and Washington once again failed to progress mainly due to British influence 
in the Yemen itself. Opposition forces in Yemen began to collaborate with some seeing the 
need to depose the Imam before an American life-line enabled him to destroy them.
When Ahmad became the new Imam after the aborted revolution in 1948, he sought to 
maintain an even-handed policy towards the Communist countries and the US in order to 
secure armaments and to counterbalance the continuous pressure from the British. His 
initiative was welcomed by Washington which extended its recognition to his government. 
In early 1952, efforts were renewed between the Yemen and American governments to 
establish closer relations, but were resisted yet again by the British opposition. Between 1953 
and 1954 there were several American efforts to establish a permanent mission in Ta’iz; but 
the US Department of State thought there was little prospect of achieving this for several 
reasons, not the least being the Imam’s refusal to allow foreign Legations fly their countries’ 
flags over their buildings in Yemen. Congress would not follow the British example in 
allowing such a "derogation of sovereignty."29
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In 1955 there were signs of improved prospects for Yemen-US economic cooperation, but this 
was still strongly resisted by Britain which suggested "Britain and America should agree on 
spheres of influence in the Middle East."30 In 1957, the US decided to provide aid to Yemen 
despite the attitude of King Ibn Sa’ud of the KSA and the British. The Colonial Office in 
London wrote to its Legation in Taiz expressing the wish for the US to understand their 
difficulties with Yemen and therefore refuse to help a hostile regime. But it recognised that 
as "Yemen was considered a target for Soviet penetration, it had therefore been placed on the 
list of potential recipients of US economic aid."31 Washington assured London that "Yemen 
would not receive military aid, and would not be required to cooperate with the US in the 
military defence sphere."32 On this basis the British response was that they neither could nor 
should "attempt to influence the US against continuing their project of economic aid."33
American diplomatic representation in Ta’iz started on 16 March 1959. It was followed by 
economic assistance, not military or political as the Imam proposed. Yemen’s permission for 
the stationing of permanent American representation came out of weakness, resulting from 
the failure of negotiations with the British that took place in Ethiopia in July 1958 and which 
were followed by the proclamation of the new Federation of South Arabia in February 1959. 
After these negotiations had failed, Imam Ahmad found it necessary to turn to the US to 
intervene in his dispute with Britain. Washington did not aid him politically but used this 
opportunity to establish an International Cooperation Administration mission in Yemen (ICA). 
It also provided 15 thousand tons of American foodstuff, sent as relief after a serious fire in 
the city of Hudaidah.34
32
Yemen Rivalry with the KSA 
and Washington’s Arab Policy
From the early 1920s Imam Yahya competed with King ’Abdul-’Aziz Al-Sa’ud for influence 
in Arabian Peninsula affairs. The dispute between the Zeidi Hamid al-Din royal family in 
Yemen and the Saudi royal family had a religious basis: the Saudis are Sunni and the Zeidi 
imams are Shi’ites who believe they are descended from the Prophet Muhammad. Saudi 
Arabia saw the Imams who ruled the most populous country in the area as rivals who might 
destroy KSA security. Their rivalry was heightened in the 1930s when ’Abdul-’Aziz annexed 
the disputed border areas claimed by Imam Yahya.
In early 1934 the British defeated the Imam in a war on the southern borders; British air 
power created havoc in the Imamate army and alarmed the Imam. Weakened and defeated 
by the British, he engaged in another war with the Saudis which he also lost. Neither the 
Imam nor the Yemeni people were satisfied with the 1934 peace treaty of Taif, which was 
concluded at the end of the war to regulate Yemeni-Saudi relations and temporarily define 
the northern Yemen frontier, because it was negotiated and signed under duress.
Because of this Yemeni-Saudi rivalry and because of an open foreign policy towards the 
outside world, King ’Abdul-’Aziz welcomed the Crane-Twitchell overtures in the 1930s. He 
granted the Standard Oil of California the first concession to explore and develop his 
country’s oil resources "in exchange for relatively low payment even in his own terms while 
his dispute with Imam Yahya reached its climax in the 1934 war between the two
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neighbours."35 Various Yemeni sources suggested to this writer that King Ibn Sa’ud 
established stronger relations with the al-Wazir family, rivals to the ruling Hamid al-Din 
family, and encouraged the al-Wazirs to oppose the policies of Imam Yahya. During the 1934 
war, anxious to protect the huge interests of American companies in the KSA, Washington 
wanted stability and pushed for a peaceful solution. In July of that year Karl Twitchell stated 
that Charles Crane "had advised the peaceful settlement between the Imam and Ibn Sa’ud."36
Ibn Sa’ud was able to use the leverage of oil, military bases and even the Soviet danger, to 
ward off the Americans from his rival. In May 1949, for example, when Imam Ahmad 
initiated contacts with the Eastern bloc countries to obtain arms, Ibn Sa’ud warned the 
American representative in Djiddah, in an audience from which even interpreters were 
excluded, of the danger of Communism, "stating that he did not fear it at home but was 
concerned about its taking hold in some neighbouring Arab countries."37 He also demanded 
that the US restrain the Hashimites in Jordan and Yemen and stated that Yemen was flirting 
with Trans-jordan and Iraq and that Saudi Arabia might find itself encircled by enemies.38 
Since the major US concerns in the Arab world were the security of Israel, the containment 
of Communism, and the securing of oil resources for the industrial world, and since there was 
no American interest in the Yemen, the KSA was able to block any possible American 
assistance to the Yemen.
Inter-Yemeni Resistance to Relations with US
Cultural isolation and a foreign policy maintained by rulers who had no experience of the
34
outside world, were responsible for Yemeni backwardness and ultimately for the collapse of 
the Imamate itself. Behind the failure of the external policies of Imam Yahya was the Zeidi 
or Shi’ite, doctrine. For religious reasons the Imams and the Zeidi "’Ulama" (scholars), whose 
contemporary parallel were the Ayatollahs of Iran during the lifetime of Imam al-Khomeini, 
had never been interested in maintaining any sort of relations with foreigners, unless forced 
to simply in order to break a stranglehold by another foreign power. The Yemeni Imams 
largely succeeded in using one superpower against another, but they completely failed to 
benefit from this policy or to make real friends and allies either inside or outside the country; 
this failure led to their demise.
When Imam Yahya established formal relations with the US in 1946, his eldest son, Crown 
Prince Ahmad, played an effective role in delaying diplomatic representation with Washington 
for his own purposes. He was suspicious that any further contact with the Americans during 
the life of his father might deprive him of the throne, since his younger half-brother ’Abd 
Allah had better contacts with both the US and the UK.39 The numerous opponents of the 
ruling Hamid al-Din family, displeased by the establishment of formal Yemen-US and by the 
American medical care of the Imam whose death they had long awaited, also played a role 
in delaying a diplomatic relationship with the US. The Sayyids and Kadis, the two top tiers 
of the ruling Zeidi elite, who feared America would manipulate the ruling Hamid al-Din 
family by military force, played their part in preventing close Yemen-US relations. In 1946 
after welcoming the American recognition mission headed by Ambassador William Eddy, 
Kadi ’Abdul-Rahman bin Ahmad al-Sayyaghi, then Governor of Hudaidah, "gave the
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impression that he thought Yemen was doing all right the way it was and that any changes 
brought about by Westerners would be for the worse."40 Another example of internal 
obstruction tactics was the implacable opposition from the Minister of Defence, Prince Ali, 
and other leading officials, including the Foreign Minister, Kadi Muhammad Raghib Bey to 
the supplementary agreement brought to Sana’a by Prince Abd- Alla^n 194741
The official American approach to Yemen exacerbated hostility of both the internal and 
external enemies of the ruling family. The establishment of formal relations between Yemen 
and the United States, I think, was a factor behind the 1948 revolution and the assassination 
of Imam Yahya on 17 February 1948 since it played on this conflict. An influential Sayyid 
and the Special Secretary of Crown Prince Ahmad, al-Shami, has revealed to this author the 
following:
Sayyids, Kadis and Sheikhs plotted against the tradesmen and the peasants; Sayyids 
and Kadis plotted against the Sheikhs who lost part of their authority; and Sayyids 
then plotted with the Hamid al-Din family against the Kadis, who lost their high posts 
in the governing structure of the country. Because of this background we were sure 
that Yahya sooner or later would push us out of his way. We were very sure that 
Imam Yahya, who was the first Imam to violate Zeidism, was going to get rid of all 
other Sayyids because he wanted to secure the rule of the country for his own sons. 
That is why we participated in the 1948 revolution and struggled for a constitution 
that might unite the opposition against the ruling family.42
"Although [it] never existed as [a] coherent and organized entity but rather manifested itself 
through a number of organisations"43, the Free Yemeni Movement (FYM), was an effective 
instrument in limiting if not preventing co-operation between the Imamate regime and the US. 
The organisations of the FYM which were established between 1935 and 1960 opposed by 
all means available the ruling Hamid al-Din family. They believed the Imam had sought
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American assistance to strengthen his position against his subjects. That object was achieved
by warning the Imam of the disadvantages of relations with the Americans or by playing his
fear of foreigners. The FYM considered the Yemen-US connection a threat to its existence
and its plans for future revolution. It condemned the establishment of formal relations, and
accused the Imam of selling the country and its people to the most powerful country in the
world, the USA.44 For example Nu’man and Zubairi, the FYM twin leaders wrote to
President Truman, asking him not to support the Imam against his own people:
The Yemen population refuses all pacts made by the present Yemen Government 
which does not represent the nation’s will. We request you to remember your 
statements that you will not make any pacts with governments which do not represent 
their nations 45
The FYM was the prime mover of the 17 February 1948 revolution during which Imam 
Yahya was assassinated and Imam ’Abd Allah al-Wazir was installed as the new Imam to 
lead reform in the country. When the revolution failed the leaders of the Movement were 
either sentenced to death or jailed. Though secret and suspected members of the FYM were 
using all their powers to undermine the rule of the Hamid al-Din family they opposed a later 
military attempt to replace Imam Ahmad by, whom they believed was, his pro-US brother, 
’Abd Allah, because their objective was to rid the country of the whole family. On 24 March 
1955 a coup d’etat headed by Prince ’Abd Allah took place against Imam Ahmad in Ta’iz.46 
Although it failed, it provided the FYP with an opportunity to denounce the new Imam 
publicly: ’’The Free Yemenis denounced the coup d’etat and announced that the new Imam 
was one of the agents of American imperialism and that he would put Yemen in the US 
sphere of influence"47.
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In conclusion, despite the private, informal and formal contacts which occurred before 26 
September 1962, North Yemen was unable to develop or benefit greatly from its relations 
with the USA.
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CHAPTER TWO:
INITIAL YAR-US CONTACTS
On the eve of the Yemeni revolution Sana’a-Washington relations were no better than those 
between Sana’a and Moscow; Yemeni-American relations were minimal: American 
representation in the country simply reflected the desire of Imam Ahmad to achieve a balance 
between the two superpowers to prevent them from interfering in his Kingdom’s affairs. 
Despite the fact that since the Second World War the US has preferred to protect its interests 
by forming alliance with conservative and monarchical regimes in the area, there were six 
main factors that had prevented any real relationship for developing between the two 
countries: 1) US lack of an economic interest in the country; 2) the opposition of the Yemeni 
elites to the US policy towards the ruling family; 3) the alliance which existed between 
Washington and London which prevented the US from supporting Yemeni demands in the 
southern areas; 4) Washington’s support of Imam ’Abd Allah ibn Yahya Muhammad Hamid 
al-Din during the 1955 attempted coup d’etat; 5) the growing entente between the US and the 
KSA which the latter successfully used against its rivals, the ruling Zeidi Imams of Yemen; 
6) the reactionary religious attitude of the Zeidi Imams towards the outside world.
A Republic in the Monarchical Peninsula:
"Policy Problem" in Washington
On 26 September 1962 North Yemen witnessed a revolution, one which the CIA "did not
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forecast."1 The revolutionaries in Sana’a declared the first Republic in the Arabian peninsula. 
The birth of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was an outcome of "the long struggle of the 
revolutionary element in the country that had been led by the Free Yemenis Party [FYP] as 
far back as the 1940s [which had] come to a successful ending"2. The various forms of 
persecution from which the people of Yemen had suffered under the ruling Hamid al-Din 
family since Yemen independence in 1918, led to the outbreak of the revolution3 which 
opposed "a corrupt and despotic rule...against the sloth and indolence of life in Yemen, a 
sloth that has been responsible for Yemen’s failure to emerge from the dark ages. It was to 
leap forward in the life of the nation, after a long period of stagnation, from the dark ages 
to the progressive life of the twentieth century."4 In his study of the evolution of political 
awareness in North Yemen, John Peterson, an American specialist on the area, stressed that 
the roots of the revolution were contained in the pressures for change generated during Imam 
Yahya’s reign, and that its continuing progress "was marked by the unfinished search for a 
legitimate replacement for the old Imamate."5
Imam Ahmad died on 19 September 1962 from wounds received from the bullets of three 
members of the Free Officers Organization (FOO) who had attempted to assassinate him the 
previous year in the city of Hudaidah6. Muhammad al-Badr, the Crown Prince, became the 
new Imam of the country. In a speech at the Grand Mosque of Sana’a, al-Badr promised to 
follow in the footsteps of his father and his grandfather in ruling the Yemen. This statement 
contributed to his overthrow. The revolutionaries realised they had to depose the new King 
before he got control of the army and before he executed those whom he suspected were
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plotting against his monarchy; they decided "to eat him at lunch before he eats them at 
dinner" in the words of an Arabic proverb.
Although they opposed Washington’s support of the Hamid al-Din family and disliked US 
policies that favoured both the monarchical and reactionary regimes in the area and Israel, 
the leaders of the revolution were not hostile to the US and had no intention of running 
counter to US policy. The Republicans’ main concern was to change the political and social 
structure of their country and to improve the life of Yemeni people. They announced that the 
YAR revolution "believes in Arab reunification and Arab nationalism"7, but their aim had 
never been to interfere in external affairs or to threaten the interests of the US in the area.
The idea of a Yemen Republic was first discussed during the 1940s when four Zeidi Sayyids 
were consulted about replacing Imam Yahya if an attempted revolution in 1948 succeeded 
in overthrowing the Hamid al-Din family. ’Ali al-Wazir, one of the four candidates for 
successor, failed to fulfil all the fourteen Zeidi conditions8 for the Imamate because he was 
a one-eyed Sayyid. He therefore suggested to "make it a republic."9 But the idea of a 
republican Yemen only became serious after the failure of another attempted coup d’etat in 
1955 and as a result of the developing Arab nationalist movement led by the former United 
Arab Republic (UAR) President, Djamal ’Abdul-Nasser. Sheikh ’Abd Allah bin Hussein al- 
Ahmar, the dominant Sheikh of the Hashid tribes and the first President of the Republican 
Consultative Council, stated: "the idea of the republic sprang up after the failure of the 1955 
coup d’etat, when serious thinking in this matter started. It was the 1952 July revolution in
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Egypt that guided the Freemen Movement towards a better substitute, which is the 
Republic”10.
The Yemeni National Charter pointed out that the 1962 Yemen revolution, although it was 
encouraged by Egypt, arose from domestic motives and objectives. This Charter stressed that 
"the revolution was determined to change conditions in Yemen for people of all walks of life. 
Its aims were set out in the following six objectives: (1) Liberation from despotism and 
colonial rule and their consequences; the establishment of a just republican government; and 
the reduction of class distinctions and privileges; (2) The building of a strong national army 
to protect the country and to safeguard the revolution and its achievements; (3) The elevation 
of the economic, social, political and cultural standards of the people; (4) The creation of a 
democratic, co-operative and just society which shall base its laws on the true spirit of Islam; 
(5) To strive towards the fulfilment of national unity within the framework of an overall Arab 
unity; (6) To respect the United Nations Charter and to abide by the laws and regulations of 
International Organizations; to adhere to the principle of neutrality and non-alignment; to 
strive towards the establishment of world peace and to consolidate the principle of peaceful 
co-existence among the nations of the world."
Counter-revolution with Saudi Support
The new Imam’s uncle, Prince Hassan bin Yahya Muhammad Hamid al-Din, who was 
Yemen’s ambassador to the US and the UN, left New York on the 27th September. Assuming 
Imam al-Badr dead he declared himself the successor to the throne and sought British and
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Saudi support to regain the monarchy. Al-Hassan first contacted Faisal, the Saudi Crown 
Prince, who was in Washington when the YAR revolution broke out, and then stopped in 
London on his way to Saudi Arabia where he convinced King Saud to help reinstate the 
royalists because a Republic in Yemen "would be a real threat to Saudi Arabia."11 At the 
same time he initiated diplomatic efforts to win the support of the US government or at least 
to delay its recognition of the Republic until the counter-revolution became able to bolster 
its position inside the Yemeni arena. This effort which was supervised and encouraged by 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan can be detected in some telegrams by the self-proclaimed "Imam 
al-Watheq Billah al-Hassan bin Ameer al-Mumineen" to President Kennedy via the Yemeni 
legations in Amman, Djidda and Washington. These telegrams protested in the name of the 
Yemeni tribes against the Egyptian bombardments of their towns and villages and appealed 
to President Kennedy to help restore al-Hassan to the Yemeni throne. Al-Hassan’s telegrams 
also appealed to the US to discover "the truth about the present conditions in Yemen" and 
requested US support for the Yemeni people "in their resentment to any foreign intervention 
in order to allow them the opportunity to express their free will without any outside pressure 
which will guarantee their independence and integrity."12
It was subsequently confirmed that Imam al-Badr had not been killed but had reached Saudi 
Arabia: there he obtained political and military support for his counter-revolution from King 
Saud and the Crown Prince Faisal, who gave their support to the Hamid al-Din family’s 
claims to the Imamate. Yemeni royalist supporters, with their loyalty paid for in Saudi gold 
pounds, continued attacks on several pro-Republican towns. The first diplomatic activity of
46
Imam al-Badr was to contact the President of the United States. On 20 October 1962 "Ameer
al-Mumineen al-Mansoor billah Mohammad King of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen",
wrote to President Kennedy via the Yemeni Legation in Amman giving the story of his
survival, his own willingness to crush the rebels and informing him that his forces had started
their operations against Republican targets:
Our triumphant army has started moving victoriously. While we are informing you of 
this we are sorry to state that some states have started moving and supplying the 
rebels with weapons, ammunitions, experts, and planes to fight our peaceful citizens 
who did not commit any [crime] but are defending their honour and freedom. These 
acts are a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of an independent state thus 
violating the United Nations charter which prevents any country from interfering into 
internal affairs of another state. We appeal to you that standing by the side of the 
truth you will support our delegates whom we have instructed to protest strongly and 
present our just cause before the General Assembly of the United Nations...13
British Support to the Royalists
The British decided to give support to the Royalists because they saw that a YAR allied with 
the UAR would provide a base for political and military activities aimed at undermining the 
Saudi regime and challenging the British presence in Aden. For London, the YAR revolution 
took place at the worst possible time, that is, immediately prior to Aden’s accession to the 
Federation of South Arabia, a project which Britain was promoting to protect its own 
interests. Nasser’s involvement in Yemen was too deep for Britain to ignore: "Her Majesty’s 
government would not be happy to see the Aden colony absorbed into a Yemen [which was] 
Cairo dominated."14
London decided to oppose Yemeni nationalism and counter the increasing Nasserite and anti-
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colonialist pressures, which were backed by nationalist and Communist movements 
elsewhere.15 On 31 October 1962 British Foreign Minister Edward Heath stated that no 
action had been taken on the issue of recognition of the Republic because of "the doubts we 
have about the situation in different parts of the Yemen, and about the control of the 
government over the whole country."16
This argument reflected London’s familiarity with internal Yemeni affairs. It thought the 
Zeidi17 warriors, if supported by money and arms, would produce "disastrous" results fftr 
Egypt. The British understanding of the situation was that "Yemen differs from all the Middle 
Eastern countries in the degree of preponderance of religion, conservative xenophobic and 
warlike Zeidi tribesmen...The Republic and Egyptians will never defeat the Zeidi tribesmen 
in their mountains. On the other hand, the Zeidi tribesmen might defeat the Republicans and 
the Egyptians in their towns and strongpoints. They surely can drag the war out at least as 
long as an Algeria-type war. And if the Egyptians withdraw, the royalist tribesmen will surely 
win"18. This British view was reinforced when Jordan and Saudi Arabia assured the UK they 
would support Imam al-Badr with arms, ammunition and money for as long and as best as 
they could. Thus both the British19 and the Saudis, who held talks on the issue in London 
on Prince Faisal’s way home from Washington in October 1962, made the survival of a 
Republican Yemen dependent upon UAR support.
UAR Protection for the YAR
To ensure the survival of the YAR, the revolutionary leaders were forced to turn to Nasserite
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Egypt for military and political aid. Yemeni revolutionary leaders, "who feared intervention 
from Saudi Arabia and the British, informed Egypt of their plans to gain assurances of its 
support to ensure the success of their attempt"20. Nasser and the UAR responded to YAR 
appeals for help "under the defence treaty of 1956. "21 On 1 October the YAR Deputy Prime 
Minister, ’Abdul-Rahman al-Baidani, warned the Saudis against making any attempt to cross 
into Yemeni territories in support of the deposed rulers, and stated that any such Saudi hostile 
action might force the YAR to extend the war into the KSA.22 Egyptian armed forces 
immediately started to arrive in Yemen. The first Egyptian ship, Sudan, reached the Yemeni 
port of Hudaidah on 5 October 1962 carrying arms as well as 100 officers and soldiers23. 
By the end of the third week of October the number of the UAR forces exceeded one 
thousand. Although this initial military action was limited, it reflected a high degree of UAR 
political support to act as a deterrent against Saudi aggression.24 When the counter­
revolution started its attacks from outside Yemen’s borders, Egypt announced its readiness 
to defend the YAR from any external offensive acts of aggression and more Egyptian armed 
forces were despatched to Yemen. By mid-October "Nasser was replacing UAR advisors with 
Soviet-equipped combat troops,"25 which exceeded twenty thousand. Nasser defended this 
intervention on the grounds that the Republican government was being threatened with 
subversion from outside - specifically Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the British. Egypt, which at 
that time was "embattled by world imperialism and threatened by Saudi Arabia"26 considered 
the revolution in Sana’a to be "a blow at these forces,"27 and, therefore, lost no time in 
taking advantage of the opportunity offered. During the following month hundreds of well- 
armed Egyptian forces, less well-trained and equipped Yemeni fighters, and the tribes of
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Sheikh al-Ahmai28 become engaged in a battle against the Royalist tribes in some northern 
and western areas of the country; "this was the start of a bitter Royalist-Republican civil war 
which ebbed and flowed across the northern and eastern parts of the country."29
UAR-KSA Encounter by Proxy
The arrival of Egyptian forces in Yemen made Egyptian-Saudi rivalry, which had begun after 
the 1952 revolution in Egypt, reach a climax. Parker T. Hart, the US Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia and Minister to the Yemen at the time of the birth of the YAR said that the Saudi 
government was very alarmed and saw the arrival of UAR forces in the Yemen as a threat 
to its integrity, "because for the first time in a hundred and thirty years or more Egyptian 
forces were deployed in the peninsula. They have a feeling about the peninsula, similar to our 
Monroe Doctrine feeling about Latin America, that outside forces don’t belong there...a 
foreign force coming in (and particularly under these circumstances) to support a republican 
revolution, with loud propaganda over every medium, Cairo and Sana’a calling for the 
overthrow of the ; and the overthrow of the monarchy in Saudi Arabia,
it couldn’t be regarded as other than a hostile act toward Saudi Arabia."30
What the US Minister did not mention was that the Saudi monarchy was afraid that the 
Yemenis, if they gained the necessary strength and opportunity, would want to liberate their 
three northern provinces, which King ’Abdul-’Aziz had annexed by force following the 
Yemeni-Saudi war in 1934. More important was the fact that a revolutionary and Republican 
Yemen at Riyadh’s doors was a serious threat to the rule of the Saudi royal family and the
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Sheikhdoms of the area. The YAR revolution and the advent of UAR forces on KSA territory 
shook the political foundations of the Saudi regime. Edgar O’Ballance observed that at the 
time the Saudi military appeared to be more loyal to Nasser than to the Saudi family, and that 
from 2-8 October 1962, "four Saudi aircraft crews defected to Egypt with planeloads of arms 
intended for the royalists."31 Some days later many high-ranking Saudi officials signed a 
memorandum urging the King to recognize the YAR.32 A few days after that, it was 
reported in Cairo that four Saudi Princes, Talal, Badr, Fawaz ’Abdul-’Aziz, and Sa’d bin 
Fahd, had arrived in the UAR capital and formed the Committee of Free Princes calling for 
reform and change in their country. To save the Saudi monarchy from collapse, the Saudi 
family quickly appointed Crown Prince Faisal as the Prime Minister; he agreed to form his 
government without any interference from the King.33
As the Yemeni revolution brought Cairo’s presence closer to the KSA and other Sheikhdoms 
of the Peninsula, US anxiety was aroused concerning its interests and strategic position in the 
area. Washington was particularly fearful lest the Saudi-Egyptian encounter expand outside 
the Yemeni stage,34 perceiving the situation in the context of "this business of the so-called 
progressive Arabs versus the reactionaries with a strong socialist overture."35 In an attempt 
to interdict the flow of money and military surplus to the royalists in the British colony of 
Aden and in Saudi Arabia, President Nasser ordered air strikes against towns which were 
serving as Saudi points of supply for the royalists as from 3 November.
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US Response
The US response to the YAR revolution was cautious. Initially there were contradictory 
statements made by senior US officials and Ambassadors within the Kennedy administration. 
Chester L. Cooper, a Liaison Officer to the National Security Staff with the CIA from 1961- 
1962, claimed that there was a tendency on the part of some in the White House to come out 
very strongly and very quickly in support of recognising the revolutionary Yemen regime. 
Others, however, felt that "either it wasn’t necessary to do it quite that fast, or maybe we 
didn’t need to do it at all."36 Parker T. Hart maintained that the question of recognition of 
the new YAR government "did not arise immediately" in Washington, because "the biggest 
concern was, what has happened to our own people37 and what are the status of those 
people?" He added: "Our earliest report made it quite clear that there should be no 
recognition until they treated us like a legation, gave us our security of communication, 
pouch, telegraph, protection to our personnel, diplomatic privilege. They were not giving 
them at first. They were trying to pressure us in to recognize as the price of giving us these. 
We said, ‘Nothing doing. You will give us those privileges, and then we’ll think about it.’ 
and we held firm on that."38
On the same point Robert Stookey, the US Charge d’Affaires in Ta’iz39 in 1962, has stated 
that since there were about a hundred American engineers and technicians building the road 
from Mocha to Ta’iz and Sana’a, his concern was the security of this American community 
for which he was responsible. He also revealed the real source of his worry over the 
American community:
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Since we were foreigners allied with the British, we were not on good terms with the 
new revolutionary government. There were no violent incidents but sort of incidents 
where Americans felt under threat from some force of some sort. So that was a 
preoccupation of mind throughout this uncertain period before our government 
decided to set up normal relations.40
Stookey went on to say:
There was one period, quite early after the revolution, when I was not sure of the new 
government’s ability and willingness to ensure the safety of our American community 
and I spent hours making out evacuation orders for the Americans all over the 
country, signing these orders if I decided that the time had come to order these people 
to leave. Then, I arranged for an American destroyer, a warship, to be just beyond the 
horizon of Mocha, and the general plan was that we would all pile into jeeps and rush 
to Hudaidah for evacuation hoping that no organized force would stop us. Of course 
I didn’t reveal the details of the plan to the leaders in Sana’a, but made it clear that 
I was concerned about the safety of Americans who would leave if they proved to be 
in danger.41
It was evident at the time that although American interests were not directly threatened by
the civil war in Yemen, Washington was concerned about the possibility of a more overt
confrontation between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. The US "had a clear interest in the
maintenance of a pro-American regime in Saudi Arabia."42 Confirming this, the US
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart formerly Minister to the Yemen in 1962, stated:
When the Egyptians came in with these troops and began supporting a 
Republic that was stridently anti-Saudi, frequently anti-American in its 
pronouncements, anti-British, calling for the expulsion of them from Aden, 
really beating the war drum, it began to be a changed picture.43
US concern was related to the presence of UAR troops in this strategically important part of
the world. A study based largely on the official record and the personal papers of
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and supported by interviews with Ambassador Parker T. Hart,
John S. Badeau, Ambassador to the UAR and the YAR after the Yemeni revolution, and
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Ambassador Talcott W. Seelye, then in charge of the Arabian peninsula affairs in the State
Department and who later assisted Bunker during the mediation mission of 1963, states:
While it was recognized that the presence of the UAR troops in the strategic 
southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula was not a direct extension of Soviet 
power to that area, it was felt, nevertheless, that given the close relationship 
between the U.A.R. and the USSR, it offered dangerous opportunities to the 
Soviets.44
Ignoring the obvious need of the Yemeni people to overthrow the repressive Imamate,
Washington judged the revolution only by its effect on its own economic, political and
strategic interests in the area and the YAR’s connections with the UAR and the USSR.
Ambassador Hart stated that the
Hamid al-Din family had thoroughly discredited itself in the Yemen. And God knows, 
they had. That was a regime which belonged to the Middle Ages, and there was no 
basis for supporting the return of that regime. Of course the Saudis claimed al-Badr 
would have been different. Well, maybe he would, but he had done very little before 
as Crown Prince to recommend him.45
The US was not specifically interested in the YAR as it made little difference to their
position whether Yemen was ruled by a monarchical government or a republican one. Robert
Stookey noted that "the revolution of 1962 and the ensuing civil war greatly stimulated
interest in Yemen’s politics,"46 especially since the political outlook of the government and
people of Yemen "has important implications for the security and prosperity of the region."47
He concluded that "the anxiety to promote stability in the region, rather than any direct stake
in the country itself, has shaped US policies toward Yemen."48
The encounter between Saudi-Arabia and the UAR was, in effect, one between US and Soviet 
interests. It happened when Washington was involved in the Cuban missile crisis, and in the
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Vietnam war, and when the Cold War was continuing at a peak. The US considered the 
revolution in Sana’a an integral part of the Cold War and it became "important that South 
Arabia...should be neither occupied nor dominated by unfriendly countries"49. This 
assessment of the YAR revolution by the US is revealed in a then secret memorandum to 
President Kennedy from his advisor for national security, R. W. Komer, dated October 4, 
1962:
...the Yemen revolt has brought to a boil all Saudi fears of Nasserism (the house of 
Saud well knows it might be next). Faisal wants US backing for the UK/Saudi 
counter-effort in Yemen... Our current Yemen policy is one of non-involvement. We 
can’t do much anyway, and the Imam’s regime was one of the most backward. 
However, Nasser clearly backed the revolt and his radio has been telling Saud he’ll 
be next. So the Saudis are compelled to react... Here the important thing is to reassure 
Faisal as to our firm backing of the House of Saud...our policy toward Nasser is 
designed (a) to turn him inward; (b) to increase US leverage on him so that we can 
encourage policies less-antagonistic to our interests and those of our friends. We do 
not think US aid (mostly food) is keeping Nasser in power. If we didn’t help, he’d 
turn more to the Soviets, which would be emphatically against [the] US... We think 
the Saudis themselves must press forward with modernization and development. 
Deliberate, controlled internal reform is the best antidote to Nasserism...50
As this memorandum reveals, the issue of the revolution in Yemen was complex for the
American administration: "the first thing to realise about the Yemen war, is that, like so many
crises in the Middle East, it came with practically no warning."51 This is why it took the
policy-makers in Washington as long as eighty four days, which was "a quite long time"52,
to study the novel situation of the first Republic in the Arabian Peninsula and to decide what
official stance to take.53
As the Yemeni revolution generated new tension between important Arab states, especially 
the UAR and the KSA, Washington was in a dilemma over whether to withhold recognition
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of the new government, as the British had been arguing, or to recognize the Republic as a 
means of curtailing the growth of Egyptian and Soviet influence over it. Of importance to 
note is that at that time US diplomatic policy was to moderate President Nasser’s anti- 
American feelings. The dilemma was heightened because the Kennedy administration had 
been trying to improve relations with Nasser in order to draw the UAR out of the Soviet 
embrace. To this end, Kennedy appointed a Middle Eastern expert and director of the 
American University in Alexandria, John S. Badeau, as the American Ambassador to 
Cairo.54 Badeau revealed that in respect to President Kennedy’s wish to mend fences with 
the Egyptian President, who was seen as a "progressive, non-Communist local counterweight 
to Soviet expansion,"55 he personally prepared the ground for Nasser’s visit to the USA. The 
Yemeni revolution and subsequent UAR involvement meant that US efforts to win Nasser’s 
understanding of the West were spoiled.56
The Kennedy administration was interested in a stable situation in the Gulf-Arabian Peninsula 
region and in forestalling any future revolutionary wave which might supplant the ruling 
families in the region and protect continued access to cheap oil.57 American concern was 
to prevent the war in Yemen from spreading to Saudi Arabia, counter a stronger Communist 
presence in the area, maintain stability in Jordan against the spread of a pro-Nasser element, 
and to protect Israel. Thus, the US saw that the new "situation in Yemen threatened the 
uneasy equilibrium between radical and monarchical forces in the area", and that if this 
collapsed, "it could have led to either a move for union, or domination by the UAR", which 
would create a serious threat to Israel and Western oil interests in the Arabian Peninsula.58
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As a result, the US decided to "stoop to conquer" by trying to remain on speaking terms with 
all parties involved in the dispute. However, the revolution and counter-revolution and the 
KSA-UAR-UK-USSR involvement created a "policy problem" in Washington: the Kennedy 
administration had to determine how to get the Egyptians to agree "to pull their troops out 
in return for the Saudis stopping aid to the royalists" as well as to get President al-Sallal "to 
quiet down his imprecations and his threats against the Saudis in return for recognition by 
us of the regime."59
Initial YAR-US Contacts
When the Yemen Arab Republic was proclaimed on 26 September 1962, the leader of the
revolution, ’ Abd Allah al-Sallal, sent President Kennedy a telegram that informed Washington
of what had happened in Sana’a. Due to the poor communications system in the Yemeni
capital it was not cabled from Sana’a until the 30th of the month. The Sallal message, which
was in Arabic but badly transcribed into a Roman script read as follows:
BAAEWNAH TAELI KED NAFZNA RAGHAMT ALSHAB FI TAGHIR 
ALAWDAEA ALBALIAH FI ALIMEN WKMNA BTATER NDAM ALHKM 
ALBAEID ALI NDM JAMHWRI DAIMW KRATI AESSRAY IHAFAD ALI 
KRAMATH ALANSAN WHKAWKAH WALI ALAEDLAH WALAJTMAEIAH 
WALMSAWAH BIN ABNA ALSHAIB WAELNA KIAM ALJAMHWRAIH 
ALAERABIAH ALIMNIAH ABTDAN MNIWMNA 27 RBAIAA ALTANISAH 82 
ALMWFAK 26 SEPTEMBER SANAH 62 WKDFAWDNA ALMAMTHLOUN 
ALHKIWIN LLSHAB BAN TSAR ALAMWR WNSATLM ZMAM ALHKAM 
RITHMAITM WD A A AU  AZAT ALJDID MWAD A A ALTAN AFIZ NRJWA SIAD 
TKOUN TAKHZWA ALMAN BHDA BANNA SNHFAD ALI JAMIAASSLAT 
ALS ADAKAH WALTAAEAWN ALKAEIMAH BIN SHABNA WDWALTNA MAA 
ALRAGABAH FI ZIADAT TWATHAIK ALSSLAE ALWDAHAH WTKBLWA 
AKHLASS TAMNIATNA WAWAMR ALHTRAM.60
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Ungarbled, Sallal’s cable stated that the revolutionaries in Sana’a had ousted the Imamate in 
response to the wishes of the Yemeni people and proclaimed a Republic on the same day, and 
that al-Sallal had been chosen to head the revolutionary cabinet until matters become settled; 
it was hoped that the US President would be helpful to the Yemenis.
The first mission of the YAR Foreign Minister, Muhsin al-’Aini, who was appointed to this
post while in Baghdad, was to meet President Jamal ’Abdul-Nasser of the UAR and to
contact the UK, Italian and US Ambassadors in Cairo. He met the US Ambassador on 1
October 1962. According to Ambassador Badeau, al-’Aini stated that past attempts by tribal
sheikhs and military leaders to depose the Imamate had failed because they were based on
factional support. The revolution, therefore, had been delayed until widespread supra-factional
support was assured. He informed Badeau that the new Republic was expecting "some
trouble" from the border "tribes with Saudi connections", but expressed his belief that the
YAR was strong enough to handle the problem. The YAR Foreign Minister also stated that
the objective of the new government was to bring about progress in Yemen; it did not intend
to "dabble" in foreign affairs, but hoped to maintain and continue friendly relations with
Western countries.61 Al-’Aini specifically requested that the interview be reported to
Washington.62 Twenty seven years later, al’Aini told this author:
I explained to him [Badeau] the story of the revolution, its motives, its objectives and 
our hopes in Yemen that the superpowers would welcome the change and hence 
recognise the republican regime. Ambassador John Badeau’s reply was "we are 
looking into the matter and we will inform our government of your wish." 63
The American Ambassador’s response was that Washington’s position would be one of
mediation, but he stressed US concern for stability in the Gulf region and to provide
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continued support for the British presence in Aden.64 This early contact with the US 
administration by the al-Sallal telegram and the YAR foreign Minister’s meeting with US 
Ambassador Badeau, preceded meetings between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the US 
Charge d’Affaires in Sana’a. They all indicated the naive hope that the republican United 
States would be of assistance to the republican Yemen in achieving its objectives for the 
welfare of the Yemeni people and for the mutual wellbeing of the two nations. But while 
waiting for a positive reply from the Kennedy administration to the Sallal appeal, the Yemeni 
leaders were disappointed to learn that it was an American citizen who first revealed that 
Imam al-Badr was still alive. Some of the revolutionary leaders considered this a bad sign 
despite the fact that this American who went by the name of ’Abdul-Rahman Conde65 was 
no more than an American adventurer and a friend of the Yemeni Royal family, especially 
Imam al-Badr.
According to the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Commanding Council, Dr al-Baidani, 
the Yemeni leadership was aware that the Cuban crisis affected the superpowers response to 
the Yemeni revolution and that the US might not favour a new involvement on another front 
against the Soviets for the sake of al-Badr, as long as the YAR demonstrated good intentions 
towards American interests in the area, and an awareness that Moscow was "interested in 
seizing a great opportunity to counter imperialism in a very sensitive arena such as the oil- 
rich Arabian peninsula."66 To avoid an East-West crisis or encounter in the Yemen, the 
Yemeni leadership decided to make contact with the US. Thus, in the first few days of the 
YAR revolution, the new government rejected Egyptian advice to close the US and UK
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diplomatic legations. The Yemeni Vice-President stated:
I received advice from Jamal Abdul-Nasser to close the American and British 
missions because their governments did not recognise the Yemeni Republican regime, 
but I apologised, arguing that their existence in our country during war time is more 
important than in peace and that through these missions we can convey to Washington 
and London our intentions directly... President Nasser asked me if I had ever heard 
of a similar event in the history of international relations, but I replied: why can’t this 
policy, if it succeeds, be a contribution to international law by the Yemeni 
revolutionists?67
In Sana’a, the Yemeni government conveyed the same message to the US administration in 
Washington through the US Charge d’Affaires, Robert Stookey. Recalling the content of these 
contacts, Stookey told this author that the YAR leaders were urging his government to 
recognise the YAR:
This took a long time, many trips by myself from Ta’iz where the legation was to 
Sana’a where the government headquarters was, before some formula was worked out 
that was formally satisfactory to us so that we could go ahead and recognise. Our 
government was concerned about the attitude of the government of North Yemen 
towards Saudi Arabia, what course had to be taken because the Egyptians were really 
in substantial control of the Yemeni government, because the Egyptians were not at 
all friendly with Saudi Arabia.68
Stookey recalled these contacts took place very soon after the declaration of the Republic:
"immediately after they took control of Sana’a, very early, within the first week," but that "it
took a quite long time for formal relations to be established between the US and the new
government", because "the principal preoccupations in Washington were the positions and
status of the British in the Arabian peninsula at least generally, as well as the security of
Saudi Arabia. And one principle issue was the claim of North Yemen to sovereignty over all
South Yemen."69
According to Stookey direct contacts between the YAR government and Washington were
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difficult at the time:
This...involved my travelling between Ta’iz and Sana’a every time to exchange 
telegrams between me and Washington on the subject of recognition. It was not a very 
comfortable situation for me because I had no faith in the ancient Yemeni planes that 
flew between Ta’iz and Sana’a, so I travelled back and forth by jeep every time and 
I was always received by the new leaders very cordially and the negotiations were 
very pleasant on both sides but it was an impediment to full cooperation on both 
sides.70
Stookey also mentioned that telegrams were the only way to contact Washington:
There was no aeroplane service into Yemen at that time. The department was worried, 
of course, about the safety of my legation and the American community and they kept 
urging me to report every day by telegram. But at that time, telegrams sent from 
Yemen were the most expensive in the world. A (TWo or three page telegram cost 
$1500 for just one message, and of course I was not paying by a cheque or paper 
money. Only the Maria Theresa dollars. A bag of one thousand weighed 65 lbs. A 
three or four page telegram cost two thousand of these dollars.71
He also mentioned that his important meetings were normally with President al-Sallal himself
but there was a huge lack of privacy:
I usually saw al-Sallal and my conversations with him took place either in his 
headquarters which was swarming with Egyptian advisors or at the hotel at night were j 
we could talk with very few other people around. And it was very apparent at me, 
how resentful al-Sallal was at the close control the Egyptians were attempting to 
maintain over him. At the end of one of our conversations in Sana’a, he accompanied 
me from his office to the front door, and one of the Egyptians was designated to 
interpret... Of course I was talking with him in Arabic and during our walk down to 
the door the Egyptian soldier attempted to interpret some remarks, so al-Sallal said 
to him "yetkallam ’Arabi ahsan minnak" (He speaks Arabic better than you do).
Although Stookey reported that apart from some border areas, the YAR was in full control
of the country, he urged for recognition.72 Some officials of the US Department of State,
in Washington, however questioned his advice pointing out that all communication was
through the Yemeni-controlled cable system and therefore could not be trusted and that the
British government was insisting on the strength of tribal support of the Imam’s opposition
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to the Republic.73 Despite this situation the Yemeni government pursued its contacts with 
the Kennedy administration. In October 1962 the YAR government sent two letters to 
President Kennedy to attempt to persuade him to recognise the new Republic. Several 
meetings74 between the Yemeni Vice President and Foreign Minister Dr al-Baidani, and 
Robert Stookey were held in Sana’a to promote the Republican argument for recognition.
While diplomatic efforts seemed likely to succeed, Washington used economic aid to induce 
apparently hostile regimes to create situations more favourable to US interests. To this end, 
on 18 October Stookey informed the YAR Foreign Ministry of Kennedy’s decision to present
Sana’a with 20 thousand tons of wheat.75 Stookey told an interesting story about' US present
i—
of wheat to the YAR:
The food supply was in a very crucial state at this particular time. Our bags [of 
wheat] arrived one month earlier than the Chinese food supply which arrived in one 
of their bulk ships. Yemeni officials in the port of Hudaidah filled our bags all 
stamped with the US AID emblem with the Chinese flour, so a lot of the Yemeni 
people thought it was still American wheat. The Chinese were a little put out by this. 
This was symbolic. It was ironical rather than amusing for me.76
There was another indication of the improvement in the relations between Washington and
Sana’a. During a meeting held on 18 November 1962, Stookey delivered to the Yemeni
Foreign Minister a list of 17 Yemeni Communists who were holding key posts in the
Republican government, and requested their removal. Stookey stated the list was delivered
because "we see Communists behind every bush and so forth."77 The Yemeni Minister
assured the American diplomat that there were more than 43 Communists in different
positions in the government, but that the government was not under their influence.78
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Muhsin al-’Aini79, by now the YAR Ambassador to the United Nations, was in New York
to urge friendly nations to recognize both his government and the Republican delegation in
the UN and found the official US attitude less forthcoming. He travelled to Washington to
try to arrange talks with Talcott Seelye, the director of the Arabian Peninsula affairs in the
US department. Al-’Aini told this author that it had not been easy to contact the Department
of State, and that when he finally succeeded in meeting Seelye he was only granted informal
talks (in a restaurant which stood where the Watergate complex now stands) "because they
wouldn’t meet officially before recognition." He added:
I used the opportunity of being in the UN to take this initiative. At this unofficial 
meeting, I tried to convince him, arguing "If the US wants stability in the Arabian 
Peninsula, it would be achieved by recognising the Yemen Arab Republic and that 
Saudi Arabia and Great Britain should do the same thing. That’s the only way avoid 
the escalation of struggle, dispute and the Egyptian presence." I also told Seelye "If 
the objection is to the Egyptian troops in the Yemen, which is surrounded by enemies 
from south and north, it is only natural to expect the YAR to do anything to protect 
itself and seek help from any source". That’s why the Americans found that by 
withholding recognition Sana’a was forced to seek the help of another power.80
As understanding of the Yemeni people’s cause slowly developed in Washington, the talks
between al-’Aini and Seelye concentrated on the conditions of US recognition for the YAR.
Seelye told this author:
I had informal talks with al-Aini about the conditions for recognition in November 
which were later outlined in the statement, and again in December when Ahmad 
Zabarah, the head of Yemen Legation in Washington, refused to give up the legation 
offices. We tried to disengage but the Saudis were not happy because they thought we 
were helping Nasser.81
In addition to the effective diplomatic efforts in Sana’a, Washington and Cairo, the Yemeni 
official statements were studied carefully by American policy makers, particularly the threat
63
by President ’ Abd Allah Al-Sallal in November that "our massed forces have orders from the 
Yemeni Supreme Command Council to march into Djizan and Nadjran to regain Yemen’s 
stolen territory"82 and his declaration a week later concerning the foundation of an Arabian 
Peninsula Republic.83
The UAR aerial bombardment which began on 3 November, in retaliation for the arms and 
money that the Saudis gave to a number of northern tribes which had entered the conflict 
when al-Badr returned to Yemen, had caused acute intensification of the tension between 
Cairo and Riyadh.84 By 6 November, when Faisal broke diplomatic relations with Cairo, the 
situation had reached the brink of open war. This immediately caused concern in Washington. 
In reaction to these developments the US administration decided to bolster Saudi Arabia 
which was threatened by internal and external forces stemming from the Yemen conflict. On 
14 November Washington ordered some of its jet fighters to make a display of air power over 
the Saudi cities of Jiddah and Riyadh.85 The military implications were clear to both the 
UAR and the YAR. At the same time, while the US declared its commitment to protect the 
Saudi Kingdom by all means, it tried to solve the problem by contacting the other parties of 
the conflict, in order to try to bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis. It also continued 
to implement its diplomatic policy.
On 17 November, President Kennedy wrote to President Nasser proposing a peace plan and 
sent identical letters to King Hussein, Prince Faisal and President ’Abd Allah Al-Sallal. 
Robert Stookey, the US Charge d’Affaires in Ta’iz, delivered Kennedy’s proposal on 18
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November to the YAR Foreign Minister. The main points of the proposal were as follows:
1. Saudi and Jordanian troops concentrated on the Yemeni border would "gradually 
but promptly" withdraw;
2. TTie UAR troops would "gradually but promptly" withdraw from Yemen;
3. Some neutral body or third party would be brought in to guarantee that these 
measures were carried out - the United Nations might play a role;
4. The YAR would recognize its international obligations and would negotiate with 
other elements in Yemen to stabilize the situation in the country; and
5. The United States would recognize the YAR government and extend aid to it.86
Kennedy also proposed direct contact between all the parties concerned, and a possible 
observation or supervision of the disengagement process by the United Nations.87
The Yemeni Royalists whom President Kennedy had neglected protested against this US 
proposal. Al-Badr wrote to Kennedy "I am surprised to learn that you have sent letters 
concerning my country to the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and also to 
the rebel Colonel Sallal, without consulting or even informing me or my government which 
is the legitimate government of the Kingdom of Yemen as recognized by the United States 
and eighty other nations. I must protest with utmost vigour against this unprecedented 
treatment of a friendly sovereign state, and can only suppose that you have been misinformed 
about the true situation in my country... I ask you as a matter of urgency to send a mission 
of enquiry to the Yemen to ascertain for yourself the true facts as outlined above, before any 
irrevocable decision is taken by your government which might prejudice the future of my 
country."88 In London The Guardian quoted US sources as saying that as President 
Kennedy had not written to the Imam, "presumably he would have to accept exile, or battle 
on in the mountains without the support of foreign money or arms."89
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In Washington there was fear that President Nasser might "have plunged into an all-out war 
against Saudi Arabia and presented the White House with a painful dilemma, whether to turn 
against Nasser or to betray the United States commitments to Riyadh."90 The essential 
American concerns in Yemen were outlined by the US Secretary of State, Philip Talbot, in 
a letter to Senator Hickenlooper:
1) To keep the Yemeni conflict and its repercussions from spreading and endangering 
vital US and Western interests in the Middle East, outside of Yemen, particularly in 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
2) To prevent the development by the Soviet bloc of a predominant position in 
Yemen.
3) To encourage the prospects for a relatively stable and independent Yemen.91
"Only by recognizing the regime could we play a useful role in preventing an escalation of 
the Yemen conflict, causing even more foreign interference", Talbot stated.92
The YAR government, which insisted upon a complete halt to every form of hostile activity 
on the part of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and the withdrawal of Egyptian troops in stages93, 
stated that it welcomed the US Administration’s offer of mediation, especially if Washington 
was prepared to use its influence to prevent aggression on the Yemeni northern borders. To 
encourage a friendly US stance, al-Sallal, emphasised "Yemen has no aggressive intentions 
against the Arab people in Hidjaz."94 It is noteworthy, however, that al-Sallal used the term 
‘Hidjaz’ rather than the official title of the country, Saudi Arabia.
Because of the UAR bombardments the diplomatic efforts in Cairo, Sana’a and Washington 
did not succeed in achieving US recognition for the Republic. On 14 December, the YAR
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warned that it would close the embassies and diplomatic missions of all countries which had 
not as yet officially recognised the Republic.95 The result was that the US administration 
decided to act without delay. The American Ambassador in Cairo, John Badeau, met 
President Nasser to seek his assurances that Yemen would not be used to export revolution 
to the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, nor to harass British positions in South Yemen. On 
December 16 the American Charge d’Affaires in Sana’a met the Yemeni Foreign Minister 
to assure him that Washington was going to recognise the Republic.
Nasser accepted the plan but said that clashes were inevitable unless Saudi Arabia abandoned 
its attempt to invade the Yemen. Nasser also said that King Saud "imagined the revolution 
in Yemen to be a battle between the monarchical and republican regimes," and "with that 
erroneous impression, he launched himself with all his power and resources into an attempt 
to invade Yemen." This was when the UAR had placed "some of our forces" at the YAR’s 
disposal, "to help it face the fierce assaults."96
The Saudis accepted the US peace plan only because they did not wish to appear to be 
swimming against the tide. This became quickly evident, because only two days before 
American recognition, reports reached Nasser of KSA preparations for further attacks on the 
YAR. In a letter dated 17 December to Field Marshall ’Abdul-Hakim ’Amer, the Commander 
of UAR Forces, who was then visiting Sana’a, Nasser stated that a plane loaded with arms 
and ammunitions had arrived in Nadjran on 16 December from Belgium, that a second would 
arrive on 28 December while the a third and fourth would arrive on the 30th97. On 18
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December, one day before the US recognition Nasser wrote:
’Ali Sabri met the American Ambassador at noon and it was agreed that we announce 
our statement at 11 pm tonight and that the American communique should be issued 
tomorrow... ’Ali Sabri had informed the American Ambassador of the developments 
in the Saudi territories near the Yemeni borders, especially in Nadjran, which showed 
that Saudi Arabia would not commit itself to the Kennedy disengagement plan, 
because they were still storing arms and ammunitions and pushing in infiltrators and 
paying money to the royalists. The American answer was that they would use their 
pressure to ease Saudi support to the Hamid al-Din family. However, after the 
American recognition.... In my opinion, we ought to re-try to stop the Saudi activity 
politically.98
President Nasser’s letter implied that the Saudis never intended to stop their support of the
Royalists and that their official acceptance of the plan was "for political expediency only."99
The US Minister to Yemen then residing in the KSA stated:
This was cooked up as formula between Washington and Cairo and agreed to, and 
then I was told to sell it to King Faisal. Well, he was absolutely furious; I ’ve never 
seen the man so angry in my life. Here we’d been a close friend of Saudi Arabia, and 
he was handed a fait accompli. He said, "You know what the Egyptians are going to 
do? They’re just not going to withdraw. They’ll take advantage of the stopping of aid 
to the royalists and liquidate the royalists." He said, "I won’t agree to it." And he 
refused to.100
It was evident that US recognition was part of a deal with Egypt, which agreed to withdraw
its forces from Yemen if the Saudis and the Jordanians ceased their aid to the royalists, US
recognition was a means to contain both the UAR and the YAR from within. A statement by
the US Ambassador in Saudi Arabia concerning the British diplomacy at that time, revealed
the true US intentions:
We’re not so worried about the East Aden protectorate or heaven knows with the 
West Aden protectorate. And they would be supporting forces of radical change that 
they thought would affect adversely their interests in South Arabia. So they never 
could bring themselves to go along with our formula for disengagement. We tried
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very hard to get them aboard....I question their judgement of the problem itself, 
whether it would have made any difference if they’d recognized the republic or 
not.101
US Recognition and Implications
As demanded by Washington the Republic declared it would honour Yemen’s international
obligations, including all treaties concluded by previous governments. The communique
which was issued in Sana’a on 18 December 1962 stated:
Since the first day of the Yemeni revolution, we have announced our sincere 
willingness to concentrate our efforts on improving the life of the Yemeni people and 
developing friendly relations with all countries. Yet, during the last few weeks we 
found ourselves obliged to defend our Republic against foreign invasion and against 
those persons who continued their contact with this foreign invasion and are obtaining 
its assistance and encouragement. These tragic events might have been due to the fact 
that some powers did not realise the factual principles of the Yemeni people and their 
objectives. Again, we announce that the YAR is still committed to this policy, which 
includes its respect of its international obligations including all the treaties signed by 
the late government. We are hoping to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours 
as far as they cherish this hope with us. Also, we call upon all our Yemeni brothers 
in the neighbouring areas to preserve law and order.102
Cairo responded by issuing a communique on the same day that stated:
The UAR confirms and supports the full contents of the communique released by the 
government of the Yemen Arab Republic. The UAR is proud of having extended full 
support to the Yemen revolution since the early hours of its outbreak, a support in 
consonance with existing agreements. Now that the Yemen Arab Republic has firmly 
established itself as the government of Yemen and inasmuch as we deplore the 
continuation of the bloodshed, the UAR hereby signifies its willingness to undertake 
a reciprocal expeditious disengagement and phased removal of its troops from Yemen, 
as soon as the Saudi and Jordanian forces’s support of the Yemen royalists is 
terminated, whenever the government of the YAR should make such a request. To this 
we pledge ourselves provided the foregoing conditions are met."103
The following day, the US formally recognised the YAR not because of any American
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intentions to cooperate with or to aid the new regime, but "as a part of its political and
strategic policies toward the events of the Yemeni arena"104 Chester L. Cooper subsequendy
revealed there had been mixed feelings in Washington:
On the very day that recognition was to be announced, I had gotten some intelligence 
to the effect that the fighting was not going along as well for the revolutionaries as 
we had thus far been led to believe. And I made a fairly strong pitch to at least 
postpone the announcement of our recognition of the revolutionary regime at least for 
a couple of weeks until we could assess the significance of some of the stuff that was 
coming in that indicated that for one reason or another- either because we didn’t 
really have a good feel for the situation up to then or because there had been 
significant changes in the capabilities of the loyalists— the royalists- that might 
indicate that it wasn’t a cut and dried affair that would be over in a month or so. 
Unfortunately we had gone pretty for down the line by them. It was one of these 
unfinished problems. I got this stuff in time for the 9 o’clock staff meeting, and the 
recognition was to be announced at noon. And I just wasn’t able to turn this thing off, 
or turn it around. And I am sorry I wasn’t. As it turned out, two or three years later 
the thing was still going on unresolved.105
However, Washington recognised the YAR on condition that the latter honour its international 
obligations including the treaties with the US, the UK and the KSA and that Egypt withdraw 
its forces as soon as external support to the royalists ceased. The US Department of State 
issued the following statement:
In view of confusing and contradictory statements which have cast doubt upon the 
intentions of the new regime in Yemen, the United States government welcomes the 
reaffirmation by the Yemen Arab Republic government of its intention to honour its 
international obligations, of its desire for normalization and establishment of friendly 
relations with its neighbours, and its intention to concentrate on internal affairs to 
raise the living standards of the Yemeni people. The United States is also gratified by 
the statesmanlike appeal of the Yemen Arab Republic to the Yemenis in adjacent 
areas to be law-abiding citizens and notes its undertaking to honour all treaties 
concluded by previous governments. This, of course, includes the Treaty of Sana’a 
concluded with the British government in 1934, which provides reciprocal guarantees 
that neither party should intervene in the affairs of the other across the existing 
international frontier dividing the Yemen from territory under British protection.
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Further, the United States government welcomes the declaration of the United Arab 
Republic, signifying its willingness to undertake a reciprocal disengagement and 
expeditious phased removal of troops from Yemen as external forces engaged in 
support of the Yemen Republicans are removed from the frontier, and as external 
support of the Royalists is stopped. In believing that these declarations provide a 
basis for terminating the conflict over Yemen and in expressing the hope that all 
parties involved in the conflict will cooperate to the end that the Yemeni people 
themselves be permitted to decide their own future, the United States has today 
decided to recognize the government of the Yemen Arab Republic, and to extend to 
that government its best wishes for success and prosperity. The United States has 
instructed its Charge d’Affaires in Yemen to confirm this decision in writing to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Yemen Arab Republic106.
Washington observed that most of the Arab and Communist countries, including China, 
recognised the Republic very quickly and that the Soviet Union had gained a considerable 
foothold in the area through the Yemeni revolution. The US could not neglect its allies in the 
area who were supporting the counter-revolution but the Kennedy administration was anxious 
to change world opinion about its associations with reactionary regimes for the sake of its 
interests.107 By recognising the YAR the US adopted a policy that would enable it to 
participate in shaping the future of the new Republic.
Dana Adams Schmidt, the author of Yemen: The Unknown W ar argues that the 26 
September revolution took place at "a time when the ’new frontiersmen’ were anxious to 
escape from the stigma of American association with reactionary, feudalistic and sometimes 
anachronistic regimes in various parts of the world" and that recognition of the new Republic 
was probably "an easy way to help restore mobility of American policy in the Middle East 
and identify the US with progressive and popular forces" since "if the US did not recognise 
the regime, there would be no major Western presence to offset the activities of the
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Communist bloc."108
Patrick Seale a British reporter in the Middle East stated at the time that the Kennedy 
administration was trying to associate itself with President Nasser, hoping to win his 
friendship because of his popularity and progressive reputation in both Asia and Africa. 
Recognising the YAR therefore was meant to satisfy Nasser and form a kind of association 
with the nationalist and anti-Communist element in the Arab world. He wrote:
President Nasser has been assigned a prominent role, partly because he has been tough 
with his local Communists and because he is thought to represent progressive, 
reformist trends which in the long run are the best defense against Communism, but 
more particularly because he is considered too important a figure in the Affo-Asian 
world..."109
James N. Cortada, the first US Charge d’Affaires in the YAR after US recognition, presented
a detailed account on the rationale behind US recognition:
The Soviets, who in the last year of the Imam Ahmad’s reign had been lurking in the 
wings, waiting for an opportunity to develop an effective position of influence, 
apparently felt that the revolution offered this chance. Accordingly they lent full 
support to the new Republic—arms, training, and economic assistance. They also 
swung the satellites under Soviet influence quickly in line in behalf of the republic. 
Communist Chinese and other Communist regimes in the Far East likewise recognised 
the republic quickly, and lent at least moral support, and later Communist China 
contributed food and other commodities. With the exception of Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, which were monarchies, and which continued to recognize the fallen Imamate 
as the legitimate government of Yemen, the other Arab states recognized the republic, 
soon after the coup...since West Germany, Italy had also recognized the republic, the 
US found other non-Communist powers also represented in Yemen and aware of the 
danger of the security of the peninsula which the crisis suggested. 110
Thus US policy after the Yemeni revolution was to prevent the Yemeni conflict from
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spreading outside the country and endangering vital US and Western bloc interests in the 
Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and to prevent the Soviet Union from 
taking a strong position in the region.111
Stookey, emphasising that the Saudi Monarchy was "under no threat, no matter how shaky
some people imagine it to be," commented that Washington chose to mediate because of "the
Communist element, the British factor and the general impulse to be helpful to less fortunate
peoples." He elaborated "we didn’t want to see the British kicked out of South Yemen at that
time, even though the British were having second thoughts about their position in east of
Suez generally, we still wanted to encourage them to stay on to defend Western interests in
that part of the world."112 He added:
By recognizing the new regime and conducting normal relations with it we had a 
better chance of furthering our own interests... as well as the British position. We 
could influence the new YAR government to maintain decent relations with the 
British across the border in South Yemen. Normal relations would make it possible 
for any official to plead their case in Yemen. Without recognition we would have no 
influence at all. The British...refused to follow our example and therefore the YAR 
forced them to close their diplomatic office.113
In London The Guardian expressed its belief that what made the US recognise the YAR at 
that particular time were the reports from Yemen that "in the last few weeks Russia has been 
sending by air equipment to Yemen that can be used in guerrilla warfare, and the amount 
which has already arrived is three times greater than the supplies sent by Egypt."114
Cortada also reasoned that "In view of the United States government objective of peace in
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the Middle East, and policies designed to deny the area to Soviet control, it became apparent
that if American influence was to be exerted on behalf of peace, it was important for the
United States to remain on talking terms with all parties to the dispute."115 He concluded:
An alternative to the recognition policy would have been continued support for the 
Royalist regime, the United States thus becoming a direct partisan in the conflict, with 
unforeseeable consequences in view of the danger of an armed conflict between the 
Saudis and the Egyptians. The United States could also have backed away from the 
situation entirely and allowed events to develop without an American attempt to 
influence their course. The latter decision would, in effect, have been a signal to the 
Soviets that no obstacle was to be placed before them. Since a basic American 
consideration in the Middle East is to help keep the area free of Soviet domination, 
it would have been unrealistic, in the light of this objective, to remain aloof from 
trying to help solve the conflict...When the United States recognized the Republic, it 
had become quite evident that the United Arab Republic had the capability of 
maintaining itself indefinitely in Yemen.116
Another reason for recognition, according to Cortada, was that "tensions were developing in 
Saudi Arabia, in whose welfare the United States had considerable interest." He pointed out 
that any KSA involvement in the conflict in support of the royalists, coupled with the general 
effects in Saudi Arabia of the Yemen revolution, was straining the fabric of stability in the 
kingdom. He stated:
In fact, there was evidence that even before the United Arab Republic bombed Saudi 
depots in November 1962, there was considerable opposition within Saudi Arabia to 
any kind of Saudi military venture. Saudi nationalists opposed the return of the 
Imamate, and many economy-minded Saudis saw financing of the Imam’s 
counterrevolution as a serious strain on the country’s financial resources at a time 
when economic and social development plans were about to be strongly supported by 
the government. Furthermore, Saudi army officers, aware of the country’s military 
limitations, were concerned over the possible military confrontation with a relatively 
powerful United Arab Republic army. It seemed to many Saudis that since Saudi 
Arabia could not hope to cope militarily with the United Arab Republic, and since 
royalist forces were quite small and numbers and poorly trained, it was only a 
question of time before Egyptian aerial attacks would increase and Egyptian 
subversive attempts to destroy the Saudi Arabia regime would be intensified.117
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Thus according to the first US Charge d’Affaires in Sana’a after US recognition, 
Washington’s policy was a means of countering the UAR and Communist influence from 
within the YAR itself rather than from outside it.
According to Cortada there were four specific reasons for US recognition: 1) The YAR’s
control over most of Yemen; 2) The YAR’s undertaking to adhere to previous international 
agreements, among which was the Treaty of Sana’a of 1934 between the British and the 
Imam; 3) The US AID mission which afforded a means for the US to exert its influence in 
Yemen and which would have had to be withdrawn if recognition had not been forthcoming; 
4) The acquisition of a position of influence inside Yemen with a government which had 
evidenced a desire to work with the Western world, thus enabling the US to work more
effectively for a negotiated agreement designed to reduce the tensions flowing from the
conflict.118
There were also four narrower US objectives: 1) Development of a situation which would 
lead to the safeguarding of American private and national interests in the Arabian peninsula;
2) Prevention of the conflict’s escalation; 3) Termination of outside intervention in Yemen;
4) Avoidance of further enhancement of Soviet influence in Yemen.119
International Recognition of the YAR
Many other countries followed the American example and the next day, the 1202nd Plenary 
Meeting of the Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly discussed the draft resolution
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of the Credentials Committee of the UN. The meeting witnessed an acrimonious encounter
between the representatives of the UAR and the KSA. The Egyptian Foreign Minister,
Mahmoud Riyadh, pointed out that the General Assembly had before it the report of the
Credentials Committee which unanimously recommended the YAR to be accepted as the only
valid Yemeni credentials in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. He expressed his
confidence that the General Assembly would uphold the recommendation of the Credentials
Committee and that the Secretariat would be instructed to see that the delegation of the YAR
occupied its rightful seat in the General Assembly. He asked the members of the General
Assembly to support the lawful representation of the YAR in the UN. He went to say that
"since the emergence of the new progressive revolution of the people of Yemen against the
reactionary feudalist regime, the Yemeni people have been subjected to a brutal combination
of the reactionary forces in the Arab world," and stated that "all means of slander and terror
have been mobilized against the peaceful people of Yemen and its new progressive
revolution." To explain the UAR role in the Yemeni arena he stated that the UAR was duty
bound to come to the assistance of the Republic to defend its sovereignty and its territorial
integrity, and that his government "could not conceivably be indifferent to the reactionary
aggressive conspiracies designed to reimpose the monarchy which isolated the Yemeni people
from the world and from civilization for generations." Riyadh ended his speech saying:
In the Arab world, as in other parts of the world, there exists a decisive battle 
between the forces of reaction and the forces of progress, between the will of the 
people and the reactionary regimes. It is the determined desire of the people to 
liberate themselves from poverty, injustice and exploitation. The victory of the forces 
of progress will be an accomplished fact in the foreseeable future. No effort to stifle 
the people and challenge the power of these new forces will be successful. This is 
what happened in Yemen, and any honest and objective observer could not but 
welcome the great achievements of the people of Yemen.120
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The Saudi representative (in fact, a Palestinian), Djamil Baroudy, opposed the YAR 
delegation occupying the Yemen seat in the General Assembly. Quoting part of a 
memorandum which the Saudi delegation had received from its government and which he 
considered presented the facts as they actually obtained in Yemen, Baroudy argued that "ever 
since the rebellion of a small group of Yemeni citizens occurred on 27 September 1962 
against their lawful government by resorting to armed force for the attainment of their 
objectives, the Saudi Arabian government has been watching closely and with deep concern 
the development of events in Yemen- and naturally so, because Yemen is on our frontiers." 
He stated that "the main interest of the government of Saudi Arabia has been motivated by 
its genuine desire to safeguard a neighbouring sister state from becoming the victim of evil 
strife and civil war." He also said that "the interventionist government seems to have 
forgotten or tried to ignore the fact that no sooner had His Majesty Mohammed al-Badr 
ascended the throne after the death of his father, the late Imam Ahmad, then he declared a 
new policy introducing various reforms." The Saudi report denied any Saudi intervention in 
the Yemen affairs and declared that "there is not a single Saudi soldier on Yemeni territory, 
nor has the government of Saudi Arabia at any time interfered by the dispatch of troops in 
the internal affairs of Yemen."121
The Saudi representative also said that "the persistent foreign interference in the internal 
affairs of Yemen is likely to worsen the situation and cause the present conflict to spread into 
other countries" and warned: "Recognition or no recognition, the fight will go on in Yemen 
because the Yemeni people are fighting in their homeland ...”122
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The UN General Assembly adopted the resolution of the Credentials Committee by 73 votes 
to 4, with 23 abstentions. It was clear from the debate that the US position led to the 
welcoming of the first YAR delegation to the United Nations. After the vote was taken, 
Muhsin Ahmad al-’Aini, who headed the Yemeni delegation, mounted the rostrum and 
expressed "the gratitude of the people of Yemen and their progressive government to all the 
countries which have recognised us and supported our people’s aspirations” and proclaimed 
that "those countries have thus demonstrated their friendship and their desire to promote the 
well-being, development and progress of our people and our country"123. Al-’Aini also 
reaffirmed the YAR’s adherence and dedication to the United Nations...124
On 26 December 1962 the YAR representative to the UN presented his credentials to the
Secretary General of the International Organization, U/Thant. On that important day in the
history of the YAR the old flag was replaced by the flag of the Republic in the United
Nations.125 Al-’Aini, the first YAR Ambassador to the UN and Ambassador to the US
considered US recognition and support in the UN to be a very symbolic moment in the
history of YAR-US relations:
As you know the annual meeting of the UN starts in the second week of September 
and the royalist delegation was occupying Yemen’s seat as of the 17th of the month. 
It was necessary, therefore to move quickly to represent the people’s Republic. I 
arrived there to face this problem especially since the Committee of Credentials 
discusses the papers on the last few days of the session to deliver its report 
recommendations to the General Assembly in the last session. That’s why everything 
continued to be the same until the end of the session. So we used the time to present 
our cause outside the hall where we succeeded in getting recognition from many 
countries. President Ahmad bin Billah of Algeria helped us. And at the end of the 
session the US who recognised us on the 19th of December helped us to regain the 
seat of Yemen. There were many Latin American countries who were not for or 
against recognition, but when the US recognised the Republic they followed its path.
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During the last session we took over the Yemen seats. Despite its strong connection 
with Saudi Arabia, the US stand ■— -?
was unforgettable in comparison to France or Britain who recognised us only in 
1970.126
In conclusion, the chief American concern was the protection of its basic interests by 
diplomacy and by political and military support to its allies. According to an American 
source, in reply to the inquiry from Senator Bourke Hickenlooper in a letter of 16 July 1963 
as to whether in view of "the growing discredit of the republican government" American 
recognition should be withdrawn, US Assistant Secretary of State Philip Talbot revealed that 
Washington had never insisted upon the withdrawal of Egyptian troops once Saudi Arabia 
had begun to observe the terms of the disengagement agreement, but merely expected the 
Egyptians to "withdraw in a phased and expeditious fashion." He said that American 
recognition of the Republican government was based on "its control of the apparatus of 
government and most of the country, apparent popular support and ability to honour 
international obligations."127 However, such a statement was clearly not a full account of 
US general thinking, because the US denied recognition to the People’s Republic of China 
for many years while the latter was in total control of its territory.128
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE FIRST PHASE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The US position towards the YAR, the KSA, and the UAR, immediately after the revolution
is evidence that Washington was mainly concerned to protect Western interests in the KSA
and Aden. The US realised that the KSA’s best interests would be served by leaving Yemen
for the Yemenis, by convincing the UAR to withdraw its troops from the Yemen, and by
convincing the Saudis to end their support for the counter-revolution. This was overtly
expressed in a telegram from the US Embassy in Ta’iz to the State Department on 14
September 1964: "US is willing to guarantee support of SAG territorial integrity if SAG
cooperates in the proposed positive program. Conversely, if SAG chooses to intervene
directly in Yemen, the YAR and its ally, the UAR, would be justified in retaliating and the
USG could not make a commitment to defend SAG in these circumstances." In another
telegram to Washington, the US Embassy in the YAR revealed the American position on the
southern areas of Yemen:
Considerable importance we attach to base dependent on wise UK handling of 
complex situation in Aden’s hinterland, which UK sees as buffer zone for Aden and 
base. Conceivably ill considered UK measures toward SAF on Yemen could make 
continued USG support for UK position so impracticable as to lead USG reconsider 
importance of base itself. Above all we must not allow Aden develop into another 
Cyprus or Algeria.1
Once American and international recognition had been achieved Sana’a was hopeful that this 
diplomatic victory would mean that both the UK and the KSA would withdraw their
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opposition to the Republic.
But US recognition of the YAR angered Washington’s allies in the area. The Royalists, 
supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, launched offensive attacks on many northern areas. 
This led to the UAR aerial bombardment of many Saudi targets, including Djizan and 
Nadjran. On 1 January 1963 the KSA
reported the resumption of UAR air attacks on "its territory"; two days later the KSA ordered 
a general mobilization. Washington "was concerned lest a situation develop in which the 
Saudis might ask [them] to come to their aid militarily."2 On 3 January the US Department 
of State publicly deplored the UAR air attacks and emphasised American interest in the 
preservation of Saudi Arabian integrity. On 7 January President Al-Sallal summoned the 
American Charge d’Affaires and warned him that Yemen would not hesitate to defend its 
territories.3 In a reaction to the American and Saudi stances Al-Sallal announced a general 
mobilisation on 11 January "to launch a last effective attack against the reactionary regimes 
in the area" which he called "the dregs of the Saud, Faisal, and Hussein Houses."4 On 17 
January the YAR President announced he was going to seek the support of Arab volunteers 
and claimed "the Arab people and our friends the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc are all 
backing the Yemeni people."5
These developments coincided with greater pressure from the US allies in the area who called 
for a US policy review towards the UAR and the YAR. In an effort to influence the US, the 
Prime Minister of the KSA restored diplomatic relations with Britain, which supported the
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Royalists with arms and military advisors.6 Even the Royalists tried to influence decision­
making in the White House. On 20 January 1963, Prince ’Abd Allah bin al-Hussein, 
Commander of what he called the "First Royalist Army based in al-Djawf" and "American 
University of Beirut Senior Student on Academic Leave" sent a seven-page hand-written letter 
to the US President in which he appealed for a US fact-finding mission to enter the country 
via the Harib-Beihan7 eastern borders of the Yemen:
We believe that if competent American observers will come to render a confidential 
report to the White House on the true situation in Yemen and will compare conditions 
here in the free Yemen with those in the Egyptian occupied part, that the following 
facts will be established, and may possibly lead to a re-appraisal of the Yemen 
situation vis a vis American and Free world interests in the Arabian peninsula, the 
withdrawal of recognition of the Sallal puppet regime, and at least to a "wait and see" 
policy vis a vis eventual recognition of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen when 
our people have recovered the presently Egyptian-occupied parts of this Kingdom.
The Prince promised President Kennedy that "the very names Egyptian, ’Abdul-Nasser and 
Soviet Union would be hated in Yemen for generations" and pointed out that "massive 
American aid to Egypt has freed Nasser’s hands and funds to pursue his merciless war of 
aggression against the Yemeni people, just as it frees other funds for his expensive ‘Voice 
of the Arabs’ [radio station]... and ceaseless attacks against imperialism."8
In fact, what resulted was the exact opposite of what the Prince warned: the UN, in the 
person of the Secretary for Political Affairs, Dr Ralph Bunche, arrived in the eastern area 
after the Prince and his forces had been defeated, and the words "Nasser," "Nasserite Egypt" 
and the "Soviet Union" remained venerated by many Yemeni.
’Abd Allah’s letter and other Royalist appeals did not change US policy towards Yemen 
because the US was aware when it recognised the YAR that "the royalists had scored 
considerable successes but did not seem to have the weapons or the organization for a really 
decisive push."9 Royalist attempts to put pressure on Washington may, however, have
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influenced the US decision to encourage the UN to send a fact-finding mission to the YAR.
The Kennedy Administration not only supported the Saudi government’s commitment to the
preservation of the KSA’s integrity, but also despatched a number of jet fighters, a destroyer,
and American paratroopers to express US determination to defend Saudi Arabia.10 In early
February 1990 the YAR Ambassador in Washington said that Kennedy had supplied the KSA
with arms only after the bombing raids of the Egyptian air force on Saudi depots and when
Riyadh was "under real threat."11 US anger was also expressed through a show of force -
an aerial demonstration over Djiddah in mid-January. In an interview on 25 February 1967,
Ambassador John Badeau revealed that R. W. Komer, US Advisor for National Security, had
urged "much stronger tactics: possibly, letting American planes patrol the border and shooting
any Egyptian plane that got out of line. By this time Yemen was called ‘Komer’s war.’ I set
myself very strongly in opposition to that course of policy."12 At the time the State
Department declared:
The United States, as an impartial friend of all governments involved, remains 
convinced that the best interests of the Yemeni people will be served by the 
disengagement of foreign military forces and termination of external intervention.13
In a memorandum to Kennedy, Komer justified US military action:
There [are indications] that Nasser is going to invade Saudi Arabia and that the 
Pentagon is raring to use the Sixth Fleet but the soft heads in the State Department 
are opposed. We’ve already done a lot to deter the UAR from escalating. We’ve had 
destroyers visit Saudi port, bombers flying in, now a Special Force team is there. 
We’ve warned Nasser again not to step on our toes... True, Nasser may still try 
greater pressure on Saudis... We’ve consistently estimated (dead right so far) that 
Nasser would escalate rather than quit in Yemen. He’s already resumed bombings, and 
we discovered UAR parachute drop of supplies to... partisans in Hi[d]jaz. Some...think 
UAR may try to promote a revolution in the Hi[d]jaz or a raid on Saudi supply dump. 
We’re warning Nasser again...Painful and uncertain as it is, I see no alternative to our 
present effort...14
Vice-President and Foreign Minister ’Abdul-Rahman al-Baidani threatened, "if the despatch
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of the American naval forces endangers the Yemeni revolution there is another military force 
which is no less mighty that will come to help us."15 Following this statement, which 
illustrates the deterioration in bilateral relations, the US tried to assure the Yemen government 
that it was doing its best to stop Saudi aid to the Royalists. American diplomatic efforts 
succeeded in calming Yemeni anger during the following week. On 28 January 1963 it was 
announced that Sana’a and Washington had signed a new agreement concerning the 
construction of the Ta’iz-Sana’a road and the Ta’iz water project in addition to the study of 
other projects that might be implemented with US assistance.16 On 2 February, the Yemeni 
Foreign Ministry welcomed the upgrading of the US legation to the level of embassy.17 Five 
days later, William Polk, a personal envoy of President Kennedy, arrived in Sana’a, where 
he stated that his mission was not political but merely "a regional tour of reconnaissance."18 
Within the same year the US Department of State assigned to Sana’a a First Secretary, a 
Third Secretary, an Administrative officer, a Public Affairs Officer, and an Army Attache 
with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.19 A suitable building for the first American Embassy 
in Sana’a was found in the spring of that year.20
Following the upgrading of its diplomatic representation, the US government tried to create 
a close relationship with the Yemeni government through the following means: 1) Providing 
the YAR with a modest assistance program which included training in Yemen, Beirut, and 
in the US, of Yemeni personnel selected for eventual managerial and technical responsibilities 
connected with the water project at Ta’iz and the road to Sana’a; 2)Grants to send to the US 
a small number of Yemeni government officials on ninety-day visits; 3) The presence of a
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US destroyer in the port of Hudaidah; 4) A tour of the US by two senior Yemeni army
officers; 5) Assistance to small villages in the Ta’iz area in the form of technical assistance 
and hand tools for self-help projects such as well drilling, improving mountain tracks, 
clearing the Mocha harbour of debris, etc.; 6) Encouragement of local merchants and officials 
in Ta’iz to develop plans to take advantage of the momentum created by the American AID 
projects; 7) Teaching of English to Yemenis under the supervision of the Public Affairs 
officer in Ta’iz; 8) Distribution on a grant basis of US surplus wheat and; 9) Maintaining 
close contact between American diplomats and AID officials with Yemeni government 
personnel and businessmen.21
Despite this improvement in YAR-US contacts during the end of January and early February 
1963, the bilateral talks did not achieve a great deal. The upgrading of American 
representation in the Yemen, was not in itself enough to cement YAR-USA relations 
completely.
As a result of this situation, which provided US diplomacy in the Middle East with "its
greatest challenge since Suez,"22 the US continued to play what was seen as "an ambiguous
role."23 The US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen, Parker Hart, who
indicated that Washington expected Egyptian withdrawal from Sana’a in return for
recognition, later explained his government’s stance:
Nasser didn’t repay our recognition of the YAR very well. He took it [to be] a 
hunting license to go after Saudi Arabia... He hit a border area near [D]jizan and he 
followed it up with strikes against Na[d]jran, and in February of ’63, in the middle 
of the night - believing, with false intelligence, that there was a big resistance group 
on his side that could be helped - he dropped by parachute force a hundred and eight 
bundles of ready-to-go weapons and ammunition on the Saudi coast north of [D]jidda 
where they were spotted in the early hours of the morning by an American special 
forces mission flying with Saudis on a training flight...this deepened, of course, the 
feeling of distrust in Washington of Nasser’s intentions.24
According to the US Charge d’Affaires, Robert Stookey, another factor that contributed to
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the uneasy YAR-US relations "was that when the British were expelled we were in charge 
of their interests and there were incursions from the territory of Sherif Beihan across the 
border into the Yemen and things of that sort."25
The YAR Ambassador in Washington during early 1990, Muhsin Al-’Aini, believed that 
Sana’a did not benefit from US recognition because of the very high tension in the area 
during that period: "there was a war between the royalists, the KSA and the US on one side, 
and Sana’a, Egypt and the Soviet Union on the other... The Egyptian forces’ operations in 
the country were at their maximum, and hence Cairo was the real ruler. Our government did 
not want to lose the support of Egypt naturally while the relations between Cairo and 
Washington were strained. There was a severe attack by President Nasser: veshrabu mavvat 
al-bahr (Let them drink water of the sea)."26
Asked whether Cairo worked hard in the beginning to secure American recognition for the 
new bom Yemeni Republic al-’Aini replied: "Recognition was one thing and Egypt-US 
relations were something else, despite the fact that Kennedy was trying to improve these 
relations."27
American concern over the effects of the Yemen conflict on the KSA increased further when 
a military coup on 8 February deposed the Kassim regime in Iraq. The leader of the coup, 
’Abdul-Salam ’Arif, announced his support for Nasserism. This seriously threatened the 
existence of the Sheikhdoms and the Saudi and Jordanian monarchical governments. Thirty
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days later another pro-UAR coup occurred in Syria. Although the Syrian revolution did not 
directly threatened the KSA, it was clear that pro-Nasser governments in countries close to 
Israel and the Gulf Sheikhdoms at a time when Nasser was trying to provoke revolution in 
Riyadh, did not fit in with US foreign policy in the region, as a US study of the Yemeni 
crisis stated:
Nasser was a popular, charismatic figure whose doctrine of Arab unity had great 
appeal to many Arabs who looked upon the Egyptian leader as a twentieth-century 
Muhammad or Saladin... In view of these perceived threats from the outside, the US 
urged Faisal not only to disengage from Yemen but to concentrate on internal reforms 
which would bolster his own political position within Saudi Arabia.28
On 8 February 1963 Washington again stressed the importance it attached to Saudi Arabia 
by releasing a letter that President Kennedy had sent on 25 October 1962 to the Saudi Crown 
Prince, Faisal, who as Viceroy was the de facto ruler of the monarchy while King Saud was 
in Europe. This letter pledged full American support for the maintenance of Saudi territorial 
integrity. Kennedy expressed his awareness "that in order to accomplish your goals you must 
have the requisite tranquillity - an atmosphere devoid of recriminations and instigations from 
within or without. I share your concern at the tensions which prevail in the area and which 
hamper your design to strengthen the fabric of government and society in Saudi Arabia. As 
I indicated to you in Washington, the United States desires to be helpful in finding a means 
of reducing these tensions."29 This was followed by repeated private assurances that the US 
was making the greatest efforts to get Nasser to end his air attacks on Saudi territory. 
Although it had to be recognised that "not only the UAR but also Saudi Arabia was 
intervening in Yemen."30
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On 9 February it was announced in Sana’a that USSR representation was upgraded to the 
level of Embassy.31 On 22 February President Al-Sallal warned that he would support any 
popular revolution in the Arabian Peninsula against Saud and his brother Faisal32.
On 27 February in a reaction to developments in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, Kennedy approved 
the sending of a special emissary to King Faisal to reassure him of US interest in Saudi 
Arabia and to convince him of the importance of disengaging from Yemen. The memorandum 
authorized the emissary to inform the King that the US would consider stationing a temporary 
air defense squadron in Saudi Arabia to deter UAR air operations.33
Meanwhile, correspondence between Kennedy and Nasser continued. This indicated that Saudi 
Arabia did not accept the American disengagement plan and that the US could not force it 
to. The American President urged Nasser to withdraw his forces from Yemen. Nasser refused 
on the grounds that the KSA was continuing to give aid to the Royalists. He stressed that the 
basic aim behind the despatch of Egyptian forces to Yemen was to stop any invasion of the 
YAR. Defending his policy toward Yemen, Nasser wrote a letter to Kennedy on 3 March 
1963 in which he said he trusted the sincere efforts of the US President regarding the conflict 
between the KSA and the YAR, but he could not tie his hands and just watch Saud invade 
Yemen or the fierce assaults of the British on the Yemeni people:
...Hence, the imperative response to the request of the government of the Arab 
Republic of Yemen to place some of our troops at its disposal to participate in the 
defence against the violent attacks which took [Nadjran] for a base and to which the 
Yemeni Northern frontiers were exposed at the time in the [Sa’dah] Region....34
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But he declared his interest in achieving peace and avoiding an armed clash with the KSA
through American mediation:
...The UAR certainly seeks no war with Saudi Arabia along the Yemeni borders. The 
historic difference between [the KSA and the UAR] is not the kind to be settled by 
armed clash. The difference is much deeper: its roots are well imbedded in the depths 
of the social conditions prevailing in the Arab world, with hopes in the future striving 
to break away from the remnants and residue of the past to forge an honourable future 
for the Arab human being, owner and master of his land....35
The Kennedy Administration believed it possible to persuade the governments of the UAR 
and the KSA to disengage from the Yemeni conflict because it was very much in their 
interests to do so. The only problem was "how to find a formula which would prove face- 
saving for both parties?"36 Washington felt that the best approach was "to persuade the UN 
to become concerned with the Yemen question as a threat to peace, and to use its influence 
in helping to calm down the situation".37 The US succeeded in getting the UN to send Dr 
Ralph Bunche, the United Nations Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to the area 
in early March on a fact-finding mission on behalf of the UN Secretary General. George 
McGhee, former US Under Secretary for Political Affairs, explained Washington’s reasons: 
"The Department and the President had become concerned about the Yemeni affair largely 
because of the introduction of large number of UAR troops. We feared that if this build-up 
continued there might ultimately be war between the UAR troops in the Yemen, and Saudi 
Arabia, who was supplying the Royalist forces."38
Washington was convinced that the Royalists could not win and that the UAR could not be 
driven out of the YAR except by direct full-scale military intervention by the UK or other
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Western powers. In addition, the US Administration was unable to assess either the reactions 
to the Yemen Republic in other parts of the Arab world, and was particularly ignorant of 
internal political developments in UAR. Washington believed that further instability and 
bloodshed in Yemen which was not in the interest of the KSA or UK might well spread 
across borders. The longer the massive UAR military presence was required because of the 
security threat to the YAR, "the more firmly entrenched Nasser becomes and the less 
authoritative become the voices of the Yemeni moderates, such as al-Iryani, Zubairi, Nu’man 
and ’Uthman."39 Nasser could not be bled to death but had to be allowed to withdraw with 
honour; if war was prolonged it was al-Badr and his supporters who were more likely to 
bleed to death. It was realised that there was a little chance of a compromise Yemeni 
government that would include the Hamid al-Din family and that the moderate YAR leaders, 
who were more Yemeni than Arab nationalist, had no designs on Saudi territory nor any basic 
antipathy toward the Saudi monarchy, but wanted cordial relations with the SAF government 
and friendly relations as well as help from the UK. Washington felt the moderate Yemeni 
leaders would agree to establish a "Dawlat al-Yaman" (State of Yemen) instead of the YAR 
that would exclude both Al-Sallal and al-Badr. It was also expected that if the "Yemenis were 
left alone a strong Zeidi leader might sooner or later restore [a] reconstituted monarchy or 
at least [a] spiritual Imamate, applicable to tribal society."40
To prepare the way for a US mediation mission to be led by the diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, 
the US Ambassador in Cairo, John Badeau, wrote to Nasser on 4 March requesting that the 
UAR suspend its air attacks on Saudi Arabia during the Bunker-Bunche efforts. Badeau told
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the UAR President that President Kennedy considered the Yemen dilemma a test case for 
Cairo-Washington cooperation in the Middle East and that Washington did not object to 
Nasser’s commitment to protect the YAR revolution as long as the affair was contained 
within Yemen.41 Nasser replied that Cairo’s involvement was "more costly than had been 
envisioned and that he was anxious to remove his troops from the YAR" provided the US 
persuaded the KSA to accept the disengagement plan. He agreed to suspend air attacks on 
Saudi supplies to the Royalists during "the course of the American-sponsored mediation 
exercise.42
The UN mission under Ralph Bunche, known as "an American-instigated mediation effort by 
the UN"43 began to alleviate the crisis. It was clear that US recognition had paved the way 
for the UN to take a role in resolving the conflict and for reducing the chances of the struggle 
endangering world peace. Bunche arrived in Ta’iz on 1 March. He visited many parts of the 
country and was both moved and disheartened by the conditions of the Yemeni people. In 
Sana’a he met President Al-Sallal and ’Abdul-Hakim ’Amir, the deputy Supreme Commander 
of the UAR armed forces.
Al-’Aini later gave his recollections of the Bunche mission:
I flew back home to arrange for Dr Bunche’s visit. On the way I stopped in Beirut. 
There, I heard that the Saudi Crown Prince Faisal had said that the UN envoy 
wouldn’t be able to visit anywhere other than Sana’a. I called my deputy to the UN 
and told him to inform the UN envoy that I was going to receive him in Ta’iz. There 
he was received by the Yemeni people in an unprecedented way. The same thing 
happened upon his arrival in Sana’a. Then we moved to the place where the Foreign 
Ministry stands today. Moved by the situation, Dr Bunche delivered a speech to the 
crowd, and I was the translator. On that day, Al-Sadat and Marshal ’Amir were in the
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capital after liberating Marib. I asked Dr Bunche "where do you want to go now?". 
When I received no reply I suggested he visit Marib, the ancient capital of the Queen 
of Sheba. Before making this suggestion, of course, I had been informed that our 
forces had already arrived in Marib. A helicopter carried us to the Queen of Sheba’s 
capital. Following our arrival numerous royalist tribesmen arrived in the ancient 
city. They were protesting against Egyptian interference in the Yemeni affairs, but I 
translated something else to him. I told him they were protesting against Saudi Arabia 
and asking "Who gave the Saudis the right to interfere in Yemen?" I also told him 
they were threatening to take revenge. Then I suggested he travel to the colony of 
Aden. We announced in the very early morning of that day that Dr Bunche would 
travel to Aden accompanied by our Ambassador to the UN. When the Yemeni people 
in Aden heard the news they gathered from every direction and he was given another 
mass welcome.44
After this visit Bunche announced the Republic was in effective control of the country and 
persuaded the UN Fact-Finding Mission of this. He even asserted that the YAR had a right 
to call in Egyptian troops to help deal with the Saudi-backed Royalists, and that the Egyptians 
had not tried to interfere in Yemeni affairs 45 Bunche’s findings were not accepted by the 
Royalists or the Saudis and the latter refused to accept that either the US or the UN could 
play a role of neutral mediator.
Bunker Mission
With the approval of the US President, the US Department of State decided to play a more 
direct role. First, it despatched Terry Duce, an ex-Vice President of the Arabian-American 
Oil Company (ARAMCO), "who was highly respected by the Saudis," to talk with Prince 
Faisal and "to see what he could do to try to find a bridge with Faisal and with the Saudis 
that could be useful in bringing about a disengagement on the Saudi side if there were a 
disengagement on the Egyptian side."46 But his efforts failed.
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American efforts continued when Ellsworth Bunker47, a former American Ambassador, was 
sent to the area in March 1963 to reduce the pace of hostilities and to prepare the way for 
a UN peace-observing mission. US planes and warships were sent to bolster the Saudi 
position in an operation called "Hard Surface", while Bunker flew to Riyadh to reassure the 
Saudi government of US support. This threatened to turn Yemen into a stage for a full-scale 
civil war with Republicans supported by Egypt and the Soviet Union, and the Royalists 
supported by the KSA, Britain, Jordan, Morocco and the US. On 6 March 1963, Bunker 
initiated talks with Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia to persuade him to support the UN 
mediation effort. Bunker returned to the region three weeks later to negotiate with Faisal the 
cessation of Saudi assistance to the Yemeni Royalists while at the same time seeking from 
Nasser a phased withdrawal of UAR troops. Bunker’s presence was part of Kennedy’s 
general policy of using high-ranking Americans to inject US influence and prestige 48 On 
1 April Bunker initiated talks with President Nasser. On 5 April he returned to Riyadh, and 
four days later he returned to Cairo where he successfully obtained a disengagement 
agreement which he delivered to the UN Secretary General on 13 April49 Bunker obtained 
the agreement of all parties concerned on a withdrawal of most UAR troops and a cessation 
of Saudi assistance to the Royalists. Both sides also agreed on the stationing of neutral troops 
on the Saudi side of the border, at Yemeni airports and at the port of Hudaidah.50 Though 
successful on reaching an agreement, the former US Ambassador did not use straight-forward 
mediation methods in either Djiddah or Cairo. From examining the personal papers of the US 
emissary Christopher McMullen observed an extraordinary feature of Bunker’s modus 
operandi regarding "his use of papers detailing the points to be agreed, which in each case
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left out - to be covered in oral pleadings - a point that was most sensitive to his interlocutors: 
In the case of Nasser, the proposal that he handed him did not include the element of 
simultaneity (which was resolved eventually by Nasser’s agreement to an initial token 
withdrawal), and in the case of Faisal the proposal handed to him on 5 April did not include 
the element of restrictions on the activities of the Yemeni royal family (which was resolved 
by a carefully worded clause in the agreement)."51
The terms of the agreement announced by the UN Secretary General in his report to the 
Security Council dated 29 April 1963, were as follows:
1) A demilitarized zone was to be established and extended twenty kilometres on 
either side of the demarcated Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border from which all military 
and para military forces and military equipment were to be excluded.
2) An agreement was to take place over the stationing of United Nations observers 
within this zone on both sides of the border to observe, report on and prevent any 
continued attempt by the Saudi Arabians to supply Royalist forces with arms and 
supplies.
3) Simultaneously, the United Arab Republic would begin a phased withdrawal of all 
its troops from Yemen to take place as soon as possible. The United Arab Republic 
would also abstain from taking punitive action against the royalists for any assistance 
prior to the disengagement and would likewise put an end to any actions on Saudi 
Arabian territory.52
Washington’s assessment of the YAR’s military strength without UAR backing was accurate. 
In their interventionist policy, they emphasised that the Yemenis should be isolated, because 
they knew that this would enable the Saudis, Great Britain and Jordan to defeat the Nasserite 
element in Yemen. The US Embassy in Cairo stated some time later in 1964 that though the 
Bunker agreement did not succeed "in bringing about withdrawal of the UAR troops," it had 
"given Faisal breathing room to strengthen his internal position and had averted a KSA-UAR
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confrontation."53
These US and UN mediation efforts resulted in the UN-Yemen Observation Mission whose 
task was to supervise the disengagement plan which had been proposed originally by the 
Kennedy Administration.
UN Observation Mission
On 30 April 1963 the UN appointed Major General Von Horn, Chief of Staff of the UN 
Truce Supervision Organization, to consult with the relevant governments on the details of 
setting up a UN Observation Mission.54 He arrived in the area in late May to observe 
whether the disengagement agreement was being complied with.55 An observation group of 
about 200 personnel was initially agreed upon; this was later reduced for security reasons. 
The units were furnished mainly by Canada, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. The UAR and the KSA 
agreed to finance the mission.
In reaction to the US and UN efforts to bring about peace in the peninsula, the Royalists, 
backed by the Saudis, tried to gain control of some northern areas of Yemen to demonstrate 
their existence and to demand that they should be part of the solution. Sana’a confirmed that 
the UAR and YAR air forces had bombed Saudi targets, where the rebels were gathering to 
cross the border.56 As a result American military units engaged in joint manoeuvres with 
Saudi military personnel in May 1963: however, in the words of one authority, "no decisive 
American reaction occurred, in part due to Saudi refusal to permit the stationing of Jewish
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personnel among the American military forces there due to its open opposition to Israel, and 
partially because the UAR operations did not threaten the survival of the Saudi monarchy."57
In June 1963 the UN observation units arrived, and on 4 July the Mission was officially 
established and commenced operations. On 15 July 1963 the US sent an air defence 
squadron of eight F- 100’s to the KSA, where it remained until 1 January 1964: "its orders 
were to conduct a training exercise with the Saudi air force as part of our overall effort to 
improve Saudi defense forces and as evidence of continuing US interest in the security of the 
country. The squadron was also to provide a limited air defense capability."58 The most 
important role to be played by the UN group was to prevent any direct clash between the 
UAR and the KSA forces. At the same time the US government urged the two countries to 
cooperate with the UN efforts. The UN Mission continued its work until 4 September 1964, 
but due to difficulties, such as when Saudi Arabia halted paying instalments of the mission 
expenses, it ultimately failed.
To implement the Bunker agreement Washington instructed its embassies in Djiddah, Cairo, 
Ta’iz and London, to persuade the UK to maintain the "moratorium on assistance to Yemeni 
royalists" and to "dissuade" the KSA "from any action to renew aid which it might be 
tempted to take in view [of] reports [on] royalists suffering serious military reverses" while 
in pressing on the UAR the need to withdraw it forces from Yemen.59
On 22 November President John F. Kennedy was assassinated; under Lyndon Johnson,
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Washington’s policy towards President Nasser, and towards the Arab world in general,
changed. The Johnson administration gave the Israelis and the Saudis a free hand in the area
as well as stronger American commitment to protect their security. Faisal adopted a tough
strategy towards both the YAR and the UAR and received all the necessary political,
economic and military support from Washington:
Faisal was favored by a rapid increase in revenues during the first two years of his 
reign, which rose at about double the 11 percent annual rate of the previous two 
years. It was clear that the increase, which [was] derived mainly from greater oil 
production, was the result of a deliberate move by ARAMCO and its parent 
companies to help Faisal. It was clear then that the American government [had] 
adopted a more cooperative attitude toward Faisal’s strategy. Disappointed by 
Kennedy’s attempt to woo Nasser, the United States under President Johnson was 
more willing to support Faisal’s plan to build up the Saudi armed forces.60
To counter Nasser’s Arab Nationalist Movement, Faisal backed by Iran and Jordan, called
for and sponsored what became known as "the Islamic Conference Organisation" in an
attempt "to widen the scope of regional politics to include non-Arab Muslim states like Iran
and Pakistan, and thus to dilute Egypt’s dominance of Arab politics." In the case of the
neighbouring Republic, Faisal encouraged some traditional Yemeni tribes to counter the YAR
and the UAR from within.61
The outbreak of guerrilla warfare against the British in the southern areas of Yemen on 14 
October 1963 encouraged Cairo to extend the presence of its forces in the YAR, and the 
subsequent YAR and UAR support to the guerrillas caused concern in Washington. On 28 
May 1964, Washington instructed its Charge d’Affaires in Ta’iz "to reiterate that the US was 
motivated by the desire that Yemen be fully independent and able to control its own destiny. 
The Charge was to urge the Yemenis to meet with British representatives under United
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Nations auspices for the puipose of considering [the] creation of a demilitarized zone. He was 
also instructed to urge the Yemeni government to make known directly to the Saudis its 
desires for peaceful relations."62 The American Embassy in Cairo revealed that Washington 
instructed the UN representative in Yemen, assisted by the US and probably others, to 
prepare for talks with the KSA, the UAR, the UK and the YAR concerning the normalisation 
of relations between the Republic and the UK.63
In January 1964 an Arab summit meeting was held in Cairo where President Nasser and King 
Saud met and discussed a reconciliation. This resulted in the resumption of diplomatic 
relations between Cairo and Riyadh on 3 March 1964. The YAR President met with King 
Saud, at the same summit but nothing concrete in Riyadh-Sana’a relations resulted. The 
restoration of diplomatic relations between Cairo and Riyadh was not welcomed by the 
Crown Prince and resulted in an inter-Saudi conflict between King Saud and Prince Faisal 
which showed Faisal’s greater influence. This undermined the UAR-KSA reconciliation and 
thus fighting in Yemen continued.
On 14 April 1964, President Al-Sallal returned from his tour to the Eastern bloc where he had 
sought military assistance.64 His tour had not been approved by Cairo and this led to 
President Nasser ^ visit to Sana’a. During Nasser’s visit it was announced that the YAR 
President had decided to delay second official trip to the Eastern bloc, scheduled for the 
following month, in order to attend the Aswan dam celebrations in Egypt on 14 May 1964.65 
In Cairo, President Sallal succeeded in persuading Egypt that a further tour of the Eastern
107
fl
bloc would be fruitful and he left for Warsaw on 20 May and for Budapest on 26 May. It 
was reported later that he had arrived in Beijing on 9 June.66 This is evidence that the UAR 
which had until now had preferred to keep the Eastern bloc as far as possible from peninsula 
affairs, now chose to engage it more directly in the Yemeni conflict in order to secure 
additional support for Republican Sana’a.
On 25 May 1964, Washington instructed its Embassy in Cairo67 to express concern over the 
failure of the UAR to make even a token withdrawal and to urge it to do so.68 But the 
situation on the ground continued unaltered. The American Embassy in Ta’iz noted that 
unless the 2nd Nasser-Faisal summit resolved the Yemen question, the prospects for 
escalation of the Yemen conflict in the south as well as in the north were "more alarming 
than at any time since before the disengagement agreement."69 The US government 
supported a Faisal-Nasser reconciliation because this would mean a containment of the 
Nasserite and of the Soviet threat of greater involvement in the Arabian Peninsula.70
During an Arab summit in Alexandria on 14 September 1964, President Nasser and Crown 
Prince Faisal jointly pledged cooperation to settle the Yemen dispute. The communique they 
issued called for a seven-month armistice during which the UAR would begin to withdraw 
its troops; the KSA would cease support for the Royalists who would meet with the 
Republicans to discuss a reconciliation. Yemen Republicans and Royalists met under Egyptian 
and Saudi auspices without any concrete results but with indications that a formula for 
national reconciliation would be found.71
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Following the 14 September 1964 Nasser-Faisal communique, the Yemen government 
clarified to the US government its aims for a peaceful solution. During a visit by Ambassador 
al-’Aini to the US Assistant Secretary of State, the former outlined the following points: 
Washington should use its influence on both parties to promote a settlement in Yemen; the 
settlement should involve the elimination of the Hamid al-Din family, and as a necessary quid 
pro quo, the YAR would expel Al-Sallal; a conference of up to 300 representatives of various 
Yemeni factions would be held outside Yemen to determine the new government; UAR 
troops would withdraw from the YAR and the KSA cease its interference in Yemeni affairs; 
a joint Arab force from countries not involved in dispute might be required in Yemen for a 
limited period of time; the UAR and KSA would divert a percentage of their military budgets 
to economic and developmental assistance for the YAR; the solution was not to be imposed 
by outsiders; and the fact that Republican moderates interpreted the Nasser-Faisal 
communique which had divided Yemen into spheres of influence as an indication of an intent 
to play off the YAR government against the wishes of its people. As far as the south was 
concerned, al-’Aini repeated his government’s willingness to accept a demilitarised zone, UN 
observers and even demarcation, provided these were part of an overall settlement in which 
Britain recognised the YAR and conceded rights to the people in the south to choose then- 
own government. In the name of the YAR Foreign Minister, Muhammad Sirri, al-’Aini 
conveyed Yemen’s assurances that it would not exacerbate the situation on the border, even 
though it was being pushed unwillingly in this direction by the UAR.72
On 3 November Yemeni Royalists and Republicans met at Erkwit in Sudan to discuss the
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means for convening a reconciliation conference and forming an all-Yemen government. 
Washington showed its good will towards the Yemeni people by sending on 7 November 
another shipment of American wheat which arrived in the port of Hudaidah (3,000 tons as 
part of a 20,000 ton gift). But it became clear that the events in Washington, Riyadh and 
Aden did not serve to improve the YAR-US relations.73 On 1 December the Erkwit 
conference broke down in disagreement over use of the term "republic" and the future status 
of the royal family.
Following the failure of the reconciliation attempt in Sudan, the Yemeni Republican 
opposition leaders continued to make unofficial side contact with the US government. In 
order to obtain US support to solve the Yemeni crisis by political means, they even promised 
to cease support to the southerners if the US succeeded in getting the UAR troops to 
withdraw. On 13 December, the US Embassy in Ta’iz reported that Ahmad Nu’man, the 
President of Madjlis al-Shura [parliament], had summoned him to his residence in Sana’a 
where Kadi al-Iryani, the leader of the moderate Republicans and a member of the Cabinet, 
joined them. Both confirmed their resignation from the government "because it was [the] 
powerless puppet of the UAR, and made [a] renewed impassioned plea for western and 
particularly [for] US help to save Yemen from Egyptian bondage; they asserted [that] all 
responsible Yemen leaders wanted to stop the fighting and effect [a] UAR withdrawal, which 
would bring [an] immediate end [to] interference in SAF over which they now have no 
control." Nu’man and al-Iryani also stressed that the key to the solution was that the US 
should persuade the UK and the KSA to deal with the national Yemen government.74
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There was no concrete co-operation between Sana’a and Washington for a long period 
following the assassination of President Kennedy, mainly due to the YAR-UAR alliance. 
Dana Adams Schmidt, an American historian, claims that during October 1964, Egypt asked 
the US for assistance to help solve its foreign exchange problems, but the State Department 
refused, and pointed out that the war in Yemen was draining Egyptian finances; there was 
clearly a paradox in Egypt opposing the policies and interests of a superpower and at the 
same time seeking its help.75 On 26 November Egyptian demonstrators attacked the US 
Embassy in Cairo protesting against Washington’s role in helping to rescue white hostages 
in the Congo.76 In December a private American aircraft was shot down over Egypt for 
intruding into its airspace; the US retaliated by postponing shipments of food assistance to 
the UAR.77 In January 1965 the Johnson Administration revealed that it had secretly 
approved the sale of West German tanks to Israel, which outraged the UAR.78
In early February 1965 the US Charge d’Affaires Clark met President Sallal and his Foreign 
Minister A. Hamim to discuss US efforts to "promote peace and progress in Yemen and 
emphasize recent US steps toward resumption of PL-480 shipments and construction of [the] 
Rahidah spur road."79 Clark expressed Washington’s concern "at rumours reported to US 
that in face of this dramatic support for Yemeni independence, peace and progress, some 
YAR officials still questioned US good faith and friendship."80 The Charge also expressed 
his concern at the arrest of a local employee, Yahya al-Dailami, who had assisted the 
Embassy in talks regarding US assistance and friendship.81
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Al-Sallal took the opportunity to express Yemen’s appreciation of US assistance and 
Yemen’s trust that the US was helping Yemen "out of sincere friendship."82 Al-Sallal also 
stated that he had given up hope of an improvement in relations with the UK because the 
new Labour government had failed to heed his Foreign Minister’s pleas for cooperation with 
the YAR. Al-Sallal believed that Britain was still "following 19th century imperialist 
policies", and in his country was committing a "crime of supporting discredited forces of 
reaction and oppression" whereas the "US had demonstrated its support of popular movements 
by recognizing the YARG." The YAR President thought the UK was a "great power but had 
misused its power and thereby had lost the world."83 Clark’s reply was that "it should be 
easy for Yemen to settle its problems with the UK if it was willing to take meaningful steps 
to relax tensions."84
Clark raised the issue of Vietnam and the Yemen media’s anti-US coverage. Al-Sallal 
expressed neutrality, and from that day the Yemeni media either ignored or treated 
temperately all reports about American action in the Vietnam War. This was an indication 
that Sallal was willing to come to an understanding with the US as long as it supported the 
political status quo in his country. Clark reported Al-Sallal’s comments as being "noteworthy 
and more in keeping with traditional cautious Yemeni attitude than might be expected", and 
hoped that the "YARG neutral stance continues since it probably best we can hope for in 
view considerable and growing Soviet and CHICOM presence and massive bloc aid 
programs" in Yemen.85
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Following the failure of the Republican-Royalist negotiations, fighting in the Yemen 
intensified and in early March 1965, UAR planes bombed Saudi depots inside Saudi 
territory.86 Washington instructed its Embassy in Cairo to express its disappointment over 
the breakdown of the cease-fire, and to stress US support for the integrity and independence 
of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh and Cairo were urged to continue discussions. On 2 April, having 
been informed by the Saudis of another air strike, the American Administration asked the 
Embassy in Cairo to "express our concern over these reports of violation of Saudi integrity 
and to note our commitment to Saudi security."87
On 25 April 1965 Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad Nu’man was appointed Prime Minister. 
Nu’man informed the US administration that he aimed to improve the YAR’s relations with 
the KSA and the UK.88 Some observers saw his abolishing of the Ministry for the Occupied 
South as a gesture towards London.89 He initiated his premiership by sending "a peace 
delegation" on a tour of Arab countries. On 10 May he sent a telegram directly to King Faisal 
publicly offering to hold informal talks with the Saudis and asking the King Saud’s assistance 
in establishing peace in Yemen.90 His proposed was rejected even though he asked Kuwait, 
Jordan and Syria to mediate.91
On 1 May 1965 the US Attache paid his first visit to the newly re-appointed YAR Foreign 
Minister, Muhsin al-’Aini. During this call, the YAR Foreign Minister expressed friendship 
for the US and urged the US government to stand by the YAR. He said the Nu’man 
government represented what the Yemeni people had hoped for when the 1962 revolution
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broke out but had been prevented from realising by the Egyptians. The new government, he 
claimed, had the backing of the entire Yemeni nation but lacked an army and was beset by 
many obstacles. It was believed in Sana’a that the UAR wanted to discredit the group of 
politicians under Nu’man and the proposed Republican-Royalist conference in Khamir, which 
al-’Aini believed would succeed and would lead to some changes in the government and in 
the powers of the Presidential Council where President Al-Sallal was trying to thwart 
Nu’man’s policies. According to al-’Aini the YAR really wanted peace with the KSA and the 
UK and that if only they would adopt more understanding attitudes, peace would come and 
UAR troops would be withdrawn. Furthermore, although the YAR wanted good relations with 
the UAR, it did not want to follow Nasserite policies. He pointed out that Nu’man had taken 
a brave step in dropping the post of Minister of the Occupied South Yemen. Nu’man was 
under pressure from the UAR to restore it and the new Prime Minister, despite Al-Sallal’s 
objections to ending criticism of other Arabs, was trying to control the media in an effort to 
stop criticism of KSA and the SAF. However, because he was accused of being an imperialist 
tool, he was obliged to move cautiously. Al-’Aini urged King Faisal to be understanding and 
patient until Nu’man won this battle, but he could not do so if Riyadh continued its support 
of the Hamid al-Din family who had no chance of returning to power. The US, therefore, 
could help best by convincing Britain and especially King Faisal of this fact because 
otherwise the Nu’man government would fall and UAR policies would triumph. Al-’Aini 
advised Clark not to call on the YAR Prime Minister because such a meeting would endorse 
Egyptian propaganda that Nu’man was a US stooge.92
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After this meeting Clark informed Washington: "we earnestly hope that SAG and UKG would 
realize that the present opportunity is a golden one and that if lost is not likely ever to recur." 
He concluded: "I recommend US do its best in Riyadh and London to enlist the 
‘understanding attitude’ al-’Aini seeks."93
The course of YAR-US relations continued to be affected by fears that Washington was 
trying to undermine the Republic through diplomatic means. On 2 May 1965 the US Embassy 
in Ta’iz reported to Washington that a "sizeable" "UAR intelligence type" pro-NLF (National 
Liberation Front of South Yemen) and anti-Nu’man demonstration was taking place in Ta’iz 
and had passed in front of the US AID and the American Embassy offices. The demonstrators 
opposed the Khamir conference on Yemeni reconciliation which was due to start on the next 
day as well as Nu’man’s policy of seeking reconciliation with the UK and the SAF. The 
report also mentioned that several Aden leaders: A. al-Asnadj, H. Kadi, and A. Badhib, were 
in Ta’iz to attend a counter-Khamir conference.94 According to a Ta’iz US Embassy note, 
Ahmad Dahmash who had been appointed Director General of YAR Broadcasting in early 
May 1965, was the first anti-Egyptian Yemeni official to criticize the Nasser-Faisal agreement 
at Djiddah on the grounds that Yemenis had not been part of it.95
At the request of Prime Minister Nu’man, in May 1965 the Yemeni Republican forces held 
a conference in the town of Khamir, the capital of the Hashid tribal confederation, in order 
to agree on a peaceful settlement with the Yemeni Royalists. But Nu’man’s efforts failed 
when he was forced to resign a month later on 1 July 1965. Three days earlier Nu’man and
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many of his supporters had flown to Cairo in an attempt to persuade Nasser of their point of 
view, but they had been put under house arrest; the Egyptian leadership knew it could not 
depend on Nu’man to achieve its policies in Yemen.96
The replacing of Nu’man did not solve the Yemeni dispute and the UAR found itself more 
involved in the military encounter in the Yemeni arena where the number of its troops 
reached nearly 70,000. After Nu’man’s arrest in Cairo, Sheikh ’Abd Allah bin Hussein al- 
Ahmar and around 250 of the main pro-Republican tribal leaders were forced to leave Yemen 
through Beihan, a border British protectorate on 20 July, where they announced they would 
travel to the KSA to meet King Faisal.97
In March 1965 Faisal had attempted to ease internal Saudi resentment about corruption within 
the KSA by reducing Saud’s status to that of a figurehead and by taking virtual control over 
the government; in November he acceded to the throne and pressed Washington to approve 
the sale of an air defence system to his country.98 The US supported the Saudi purchase of 
modem British aircraft worth over $100 million with Washington supplying related missiles 
and communications equipment. In June 1966 Faisal visited Washington and was rewarded 
with a contract to buy some $100 million worth of military vehicles.99
Following reports that Saudi Arabia had received the first large sale of aircraft and other 
modem military equipment from both the US and the UK100, President Nasser visited 
Djiddah in Saudi Arabia on 21 August and signed the Djiddah agreement with King Faisal
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on 23 August. This was welcomed by the Johnson administration:
In the Middle East, we are happy to see the statesmanlike agreement between King 
Faisal (of Saudi Arabia) and President Nasser (of the United Arab Republic) which 
seems to offer great promise of a peaceful settlement in Yemen. This crisis has long 
been a disruptive element in the relations between our two friends. We share their 
confidence that this long-festering issue is on the road to settlement by negotiations 
rather than force.101
This Djiddah agreement called for: an immediate ceasefire in Yemen under the auspices of 
a KSA-UAR peace committee; a plebiscite to be held in Yemen by November 1966; a 
Republican-Royalist conference to be held in the town of Harad in Yemen to agree on a 
provisional government; the departure of UAR troops in 10 months beginning on 23 
November 1965; the cessation of KSA military assistance to Royalists, and prohibition on the 
use of Saudi soil against Yemen.102
On 23 November, a third Republican-Royalist conference convened in Harad with UAR and 
KSA observers in attendance. This conference lasted until 24 December when it was 
announced it had failed. This put an end to further political efforts to solve Royalist- 
Republican differences. It had become clear during the last two weeks of the conference that 
neither side was prepared to reconcile its beliefs and objectives without a fight. Meanwhile 
there were indications that the Egyptian-Saudi agreement on the Yemeni dispute did not 
actually solve the Yemeni problem and that the UAR and the KSA were willing to support 
their allies by all means. On 21 December, Riyadh announced it had signed letters of intent 
(subsequently implemented) with US and UK companies for a $400 million air defence 
project which would include British interceptors, US Hawk missiles, ground radar and
» t « i  n*icommunications equipment.
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The war worsened as a direct result of the support given to the counter-revolution by the
KSA; Egyptian casualties were greater than at any time previous. This appeared to be part
of a tougher American policy toward Nasser’s Egypt:
The Johnson administration didn’t display as much patience toward Arab affairs as 
President Kennedy had, and President Johnson’s identification, in Arab eyes, with a 
pro-Israel position made it difficult to continue the same openness of dialogue in 
Cairo that had emerged during the negotiations on Yemen104.
Despite the failure of the Djiddah agreement which had only been reached under US pressure 
on both Cairo and Riyadh, the US Administration tried to revive it. US Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk told the UAR Parliamentary Speaker, Anwar al-Sadat, who was then in 
Washington, that he felt the agreement was not dead, and urged further Egyptian-Saudi efforts 
to implement it. The same views were expressed in an exchange of letters between the King 
of the KSA and the US President who considered the Djiddah agreement "an act of 
statesmanship which still affords the best approach for peaceful resolution of the Yemen 
conflict."105
In late February 1966, press sources linked the simultaneous visit of both Prince Sultan bin 
’Abdul-’Aziz of Saudi Arabia and Anwar al-Sadat to Washington, indicating that the US was 
mediating in the Yemeni conflict.106 The same sources added that Dean Rusk was on his 
way to Cairo and Riyadh. The earlier US mediation efforts in the Yemeni conflict seemed 
to have paved the way for a reconciliation during 1966. 107.
While the Yemeni conflict was moving toward a solution, London announced on 22 February
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that it would withdraw from the southern areas of Yemen in 1969. This encouraged Egypt 
to strengthen its forces in the YAR at the cost of Cairo’s "readiness against the Israelis."108 
On the same day, Nasser announced that he would keep his forces in the YAR for a few 
years more to protect the Yemeni revolution against "imperialist and reactionary 
conspiracies."109
On 15 March 1966 the US informed the UAR that the KSA sincerely wanted a settlement 
and Washington "wished to avoid becoming a party to negotiations and did not espouse any 
particular formula for implementing the agreement."110 In the spring of 1966, Kuwait began 
to mediate. The US Administration instructed its Embassies in Cairo, Riyadh and Kuwait to 
encourage the UAR and the KSA to make some concessions in order to reach a fruitful and 
peaceful settlement.111
At he same time the Johnson Administration continued to pursue a tough policy towards 
Egypt. Ambassador Hart justified this policy saying that the Egyptian President who 
"followed the policy of maintaining a kind of equilibrium between the Soviet bloc on the one 
side and the Western bloc on the other...gave encouragement to the formation of the Afro- 
Asian Solidarity Conference, which had a very pronounced left-wing anti-Western, anti-U.S. 
flavour, really was almost Communist-dominated from the beginning. This puzzled 
Washington. And he did things of that kind."112
The US wheat shipments113 to Cairo were reduced while more military and political support
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was given to Saudi Arabia and Israel. This situation, as was revealed later, was a result of 
mis-understanding or exaggeration by some members of the Egyptian government. ’Ali 
Sabri,114 for example distorted facts to Nasser, and he then attacked the United States in one 
of his speeches. The deterioration of relations between Cairo and Washington at that time led 
to a more rigid US stance against both the UAR and the YAR and greater support to both 
Israel and the KSA.115
On 22 June 1966, King Faisal arrived in Washington where President Johnson reaffirmed US 
interest in Saudi Arabia "and Faisal’s personal security."116 Both sides determined "to 
guard the free nations against the threat of international Communism."117 Johnson also told 
Faisal that "though we had difficulties with President Nasser, we believed it was prudent to 
leave room for dialogue and not force Nasser further toward the Communist countries." On 
the Yemeni issue Johnson urged Faisal to maintain self-restraint and expressed his conviction 
that "he doubted Nasser would dare attack Saudi Arabia without provocation."118
This appeared to coincide with some improvement in YAR-US relations. On 2 July 1966, the 
US Charge d’Affaires visited the acting YAR President, Muhammad ’Ali ’Uthman (Sallal was 
summoned by Cairo), during which the former presented an explanation and justification for 
the US bombardment of storage depots in North Vietnam. The Charge noted in a telegram 
to the US Department that though the Yemeni media had become once again influenced by 
Cairo and which "was sharply critical of US bombing and other actions in Vietnam, ’Uthman 
seemed understanding of US goals and action, and receptive to our position." The YAR
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acting President also passed on to the Charge what he believed to be secret information: that 
the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin during his recent visit to Egypt had advised Cairo to 
improve its relations with the US as well as to seek wheat aid from it.119
During the second half of 1966, the US Embassy in the YAR maintained contact with the 
anti-Egyptian Yemeni Republican leaders. Records of meetings show cautious US sympathy 
for politicians such as Muhammad ’Ali ’Uthman, currently acting President, who "desire to 
free themselves from UAR embrace." The US Embassy official dealings with the Republican 
leaders were cautious, expressing moral support and advising them to contact the Saudis, but 
withholding any political or financial support because "among other major considerations 
would be effect on overall US-UAR relations of our backing openly anti-UAR coup in 
Yemen."120 The instructions of the US Secretary of State to the US Embassy in Ta’iz in 
August stressed the following points to be communicated to the Republican leaders: (1) the 
US sympathised with those Yemenis who desired to be their own masters; (2) it was not US 
policy to become involved in Yemeni internal politics; (3) Kuwaiti mediation efforts offered 
the best hope for the withdrawal of UAR forces from Yemen and for the overall settlement 
of the conflict, and the US therefore hoped the YAR would cooperate with the KSA and the 
UAR; (4) as the US Secretary had promised the YAR Foreign Minister, Dr Hassan Makki, 
in 1965, the US would help the Yemenis to an extent possible once the settlement was 
achieved and a broad-based regime was set up.121
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk also informed the American Embassy in Ta’iz of the
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following:
American involvement in ’Uthman scheme122 would entail major US political and 
financial commitment to group we have little fundamental reason to trust and whose 
chances success on surface at least seem extremely slim. Expect $700 thousand 
monthly figure would be only beginning Yemeni financial needs. Political 
consequences our involvement would far exceed limits Near East... While we do not 
wish push ’Uthman back
into UAR arms, they should be given clearly to understand USG unprepared become 
involved in factional Yemeni politics.123
Apart from its cautious approach in its dealings with Yemeni factional politics, one of the 
implications of this policy toward the YAR Republican opposition was that Washington was 
not interested in Sana’a and would not, therefore, provide ’Uthman with the monthly 
$700,000 he asked for to help some Yemeni Republican leaders to counter UAR influence 
in the YAR.
A report from the US Embassy in Ta’iz, dated 14 August 1966, addressed to the US Assistant 
Secretary of State, Raymond Hare, informed the Department that the YAR moderate leaders 
"widely known to be working to reduce UAR control may be reluctant to be seen meeting 
him."124 Dinsmore left for Sana’a the same day in order to be able to meet ’Uthman and 
to convey to him the message from Secretary Rusk, "so they will know exactly where we 
stand."125
The cautious US sympathy with the Republican opposition shows that Washington was also 
continuing its efforts to establish better communication with the pro-UAR Republicans.
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President Sallal, who, on 12 August returned from a semi-exile in Cairo, also made a new 
move towards Washington. A few days before his return to Sana’a from Cairo, the Yemeni 
President stated publicly: "We do not plan to implement Socialism here. We have no 
capitalism. All are poor here". In the same statement he expressed his appreciation of the 
Eastern bloc as well of the United States for their unconditional assistance.126
Severance of Diplomatic Relations
Sallal’s return led to a dispute with Prime Minister Hassan al-’Amri, his cabinet, and other 
high ranking officers. The dispute reached its climax in mid-September when the Egyptian 
army captured the opponents of the Egyptian policy, among them 40 officers, the Prime 
Minister and his cabinet, and sent them all into exile and detention in the UAR capital. 
Sana’a Radio announced on 16 September that Premier al-’Amri had resigned. President 
Sallal formed a new cabinet whose members were mostly supporters of the UAR.127
These internal developments, which showed enormous UAR influence in the YAR, had a 
negative effect on the YAR’s foreign relations which had been initiated during the Nu’man 
and the ’Amri governments. As the relationship between Nasser’s UAR and the Johnson 
administration was deteriorating at this time, YAR-USA relations were also badly affected. 
Evidence of the deteriorating relations between Sana’a and Washington appeared on 28 
September 1966, when the YAR government declared a USAID employee who was an 
American citizen, persona non grata, and the US Embassy failed to have the decision
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reversed.128
Another encounter between the Yemeni opponents of UAR policies in Yemen and al-Sallal’s 
government took place in October 1966, when the Egyptian forces executed the Minister of 
Tribal Affairs, Muhammad al-Ru’aini, and four other high-ranking officers, on fabricated 
charges of having "plotted against the Republican and progressive orientation of the 
YAR."129 The executions were followed by anti-US demonstrations and strong anti-US 
campaigns in the YAR and UAR media.
On 11 October 1966, the YAR Foreign Minister, Muhammad ’Abdul-’Aziz Sallam, who was 
attending the UN General Assembly in New York, visited Washington, where he met US 
Assistant Secretary of State, Raymond Hare, and USAID Assistant Administrator William B. 
Macomber. During this meeting Hare denied his country’s involvement "in any attempts to 
manipulate the internal affairs"130 of the YAR. Following Sallam’s talks in Washington, the 
US Administration informed its Embassy in Sana’a of the "firm intent to continue to maintain 
the US presence in Yemen in order not to leave the field open to Russian and Chinese 
Communist penetration, and to continue to provide a major Western alternative to Arab 
reliance on Communist powers."131
Meanwhile, in November 1966, the first Hawk battery arrived in Saudi Arabia. Following 
UAR air attacks on Saudi depots in Nadjran, the US, deployed a supply unit to the town of 
Djizan in mid February 1967. It also instructed the US military training mission to assist the
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Saudi air defence units in the border with the YAR, and confirmed in principle the Saudi 
commitment to a US agreement to provide Riyadh with air-to-air missiles.132
Despite these setbacks to its relations with the YAR and the UAR, in early April the US 
proposed a US mission of mediation to meet all the parties involved in the Yemeni issue. 
Cairo and Riyadh "agreed to accept Ambassador Hare, but final agreement on terms of 
reference were never reached."133
25 April 1967 witnessed the climax of the crisis between Sana’a and Washington. The YAR 
announced on this day that two USAID employees, Liapis and Hartman, had been arrested 
allegedly entering a military warehouse in Ta’iz, which had resulted in the killing of a 
Yemeni and an Egyptian soldier.134 The US Embassy asked the Yemeni authorities to allow 
an Embassy officer to remain with the detained men. The YAR media claimed a US plot to 
destroy the city. Demonstrations followed the announcement of the so-called offensive and 
Yemeni students attacked the American Embassy in Ta’iz with stones "and AID offices were 
broken into and ransacked."135 The anti-US propaganda arising from the case of the USAID 
employees’ in Ta’iz worried the US. The Ta’iz Embassy suggested that a US Presidential 
letter, and Arab and Eastern European mediation on a humanitarian basis, might solve the 
problem. The Attache expressed sorrow that in the light of UAR influence at that time: "[As] 
far as we know not one Arab government has put in sympathetic word for us in right 
places."136
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David Ransom, the official in charge of Arabian Peninsula affairs in the Department of State
in early 1990 who in 1967 was a junior officer in the US Embassy in Ta’iz, remembered:
I was sitting in my house at night. Knocks. "Beit al-Halali." I went to the door and 
it was a messenger of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 10 o’clock at night. I took 
the note. I had only had a little Arabic, and he said I had to deliver it at night. It was 
a very dark night, dark in the streets. No lights outside. No traffic. I opened the note 
and I couldn’t understand it...It was a long list of names and there was one phrase 
which I couldn’t translate: "ashkhas gheir marghoobeen" [personae non grata]. I 
didn’t know what it meant. My wife and I had the dictionary out and we were looking 
it up. Suddenly we realized that this was a long list of names, 26 names of people 
who were being asked to leave...then I walked over to the Charge’s house, at 
midnight, knocked at the door and gave him the note... and the result was that the 
American government withdrew most of the American mission.137
The YAR Foreign Minister at the time (Ambassador to the UN in February 1990)
subsequently revealed to this author that the whole story had been fabricated:
It wasn’t true that two USAID employees tried to storm explosives warehouse in 
Ta’iz in April 1967.1 have never heard of such a warehouse. What happened was that 
Tal’at Hassan, Commander of the UAR Forces in Yemen, who used to consider 
himself the real ruler of Yemen, called at my place after visiting the Interior Minister, 
Muhammad al-Ahnoumi, and asked us to accompany him to Ta’iz. He even prevented 
us from asking permission from President Sallal to leave the capital for Ta’iz. There 
Egyptian intelligence said that the two Americans tried to storm a military warehouse 
in order to sack the city of Ta’iz and that they were caught just in time. They did not 
show us this imaginary warehouse.138
Sallam also revealed he had attended part of the interrogation of the two US AID employees,
who complained to him that they had been mistreated and beaten by the Egyptians. He
continued: the "Egyptian intelligence had arranged the burning of the American Embassy, a
decision which was not sanctioned by the Yemeni government." He maintained that what
happened was a reflection of the Egyptian-American relations at that time, and did not serve
Yemen interests. "The UAR wanted to wreak revenge on the Americans in Yemen." To
justify his position and that of his government, Sallam made it clear that "at that time there
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were 70,000 Egyptian troops in the country and if any objected to Tala’t Hassan’s decisions" 
they would "manufacture an accusation and execute us as traitors of God and Yemen."139 
He also said there was little he could do to express good-will towards US employees serving 
in Yemen:
I went myself to their homes to arrange with them their departure, in order to avoid 
further complications that would harm future mutual relations, because I was sure that 
such Egyptian policies were not serving Yemen’s interests.140
The US Secretary of State immediately ordered all AID personnel and dependents of other
US government personnel to leave the YAR, and announced that there was to be an
immediate reduction to a skeleton staff in the US Embassy. By 1 May all Americans except
the nine diplomats were ordered to remain had been flown to Ethiopia.141 According to
Muhammad Sallam, YAR Foreign Minister at the time, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk
wrote a warning letter to the UAR Foreign Minister saying that he would take retaliatory
action "against the forgery of the incident and the mistreatment and beating of the two
USAID employees", and he ended his letter by saying that "what happened would not pass
without retaliation."142
The release of the two USAID employees on 16 May and their departure the next day, 
calmed the crisis, preventing further deterioration in the relationship between the YAR and 
the US. According to a well-informed Yemeni security source the crisis had been created by 
both Yemeni and Egyptian intelligence, in reaction to US policies toward the UAR and 
YAR143; it was meant to halt any further contact between Sana’a and Washington. It 
succeeded in that relations between the two nations were virtually frozen for a period.
127
On 5 June 1967 the Israeli-Arab Six Day War broke out. Cairo saw it as "an American-Israeli 
war against the anti-Western movement in the area."144 The US, which had supplied Israel 
with tanks, bombers and fighters for the first time just a few months before, succeeded in 
striking at the Arab nationalist movement from Tel Aviv and in reducing the Nasserite 
influence in the region.
By involving itself in the YAR, the UAR acted upon its national obligation to support
liberation movements against colonialism and imperialism but it did not calculate that its
military involvement would last for long. Nasser stated later: " I sent a squadron to the
Yemen, then I needed to consolidate it with 70,000 men"145. The Six Day War came at a
time when Egyptian resources and forces were nearly drained by their long involvement in
the Yemeni arena. An ex-UAR War Minister, Muhammad Fawzi, wrote in his memoirs:
During the first few days of the North Yemeni revolution Egypt assessed that a few 
planes and a small force of 1,000 men were enough to assist the revolution for a 
period of three months, but the foreign military, and economic and political support 
to the Royalists, led to the expansion of the Yemeni civil war, and consequently the 
number of the Egyptian troops in Yemen had to be raised to 70 thousands in 1964. 
It was the American stance that led to this extension of the war and thus to the 
draining and weakening of the Egyptian forces in this war146.
On 6 June 1967 Sana’a, in common with several other Arab states, officially severed its 
diplomatic relations with Washington and with all other pro-US countries ostensibly because 
of "Washington’s blind support to Israel against the Arab cause in Palestine". According to 
the US Department of State "following the lead of the UAR, the Yemeni government called 
in our Charge d’Affaires and delivered a memorandum charging US participation with Israel 
in attacks against the UAR, and severing Yemen’s diplomatic relations with us. The Yemenis
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asked the remaining staff of our Embassy to depart. By June 9, the last person had left, and 
the Italian Embassy in Yemen accepted responsibility for US affairs."147
The total dependence of the YAR on the UAR had led to Egyptian interference in domestic 
Yemeni affairs to the extent that the Revolutionary Commanding Council and Yemeni 
Cabinet meetings were attended by an Egyptian secretary who reported every detail to 
Cairo.148 According to a former US Ambassador to Yemen "the trouble with the Republic 
was it was in the wrong hands at that time." He expressed his belief that "if it had been in 
the hands of Ahmad Nu’man or Muhammad Zubairi it would have been in good hands, and 
it would have been very much easier for the British to recognize it."149 This judgement 
ignores the fact that without UAR support during the first two years of the revolution it was 
unlikely that the Republic would have survived. On the other hand, without UAR influence, 
Sana’a-Washington relations might have not deteriorated to the point of complete severance 
of relations which was not in the YAR’s interests.
Up to June 1967 the US achieved its objectives in the region, "for the Yemeni revolution was
prevented from bringing about either the instability of Saudi Arabia or a direct UAR-KSA
military clash, and the oil resources of the Gulf were not jeopardized."150 On this issue
Ambassador Hart commented:
It didn’t gain us very much to stay either because we really never accomplished 
anything in the Yemen during that period. [’Abdallah al-Sallal] was a man you 
couldn’t accomplish any business with...They finally threw us out in ’67. We’d put 
our money in and we hated to give it up. We had a position there; the Russians were 
trying to move in; the Chinese, the Red Chinese were there; the Egyptians were there. 
What we would have missed by being thrown out was intelligence take and the
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informational take that we were able to get over that occupational period. And that 
was useful for us to have it.151
Yemen’s dissatisfaction with the US during 1967 was mainly a result of Washington’s
policies towards Republican Yemen. Although Yemen’s decision to break relations with the
US was consistent with Arab policies at that time, as a result of the American attitude
towards the Palestinian cause, it was mostly the outcome of the deterioration in bilateral
relations.152
In conclusion, it is clear that when the Yemen civil war began, as a consequence of the 
revolution and the counter-revolution, Yemeni-American policy was highly influenced by the 
Soviet, Egyptian, British and Saudi positions. The Americans saw the Yemeni revolution as 
a communist threat in the peninsula and consequently chose to support the KSA and other 
conservative claims in the Arab world. For them it was a matter of securing their interests 
through confronting the USSR in the area and safeguarding the Saudi monarchy. To achieve 
these objectives, US tactics aimed at getting the United Arab Republic out of the peninsula, 
preventing the USSR from having any real influence, curtailing Nasser’s nationalist 
expansionist aims, and taming the Yemeni revolution so that it would not affect American 
allies and interests in Saudi Arabia, Aden and the protectorates, and Jordan. The American 
Ambassador in Cairo, John Badeau justified this stance: "...the object of American diplomacy 
was to create a situation in which the integrity and stability of Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
would be protected from the shock waves of civil war in Yemen. By entering the fray on 
behalf of the royalist cause, the two countries were committing their resources to a prolonged 
and uncertain struggle, and inviting an even sharper Egyptian response. Given this
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involvement, the question the United States faced was how civil war in Yemen could be 
confined to Yemen and defused as a threat to neighbouring countries."153
However, the benefits of the YAR-US relations during their first phase were very limited for
Yemen, because Washington’s policy in the Yemen was subordinated to its general policy
in the Middle East as a whole. As David Ransom subsequently commented:
What we were trying to do in the Middle East as a whole was to prevent a split 
between the conservative Arab countries and the progressive Arab countries, a split 
between the Soviet Union on one side and us on the other. It was called at that time 
a pluralization, which means that any dispute could become a broader, very serious, 
dispute. And in Yemen, we tried with recognition, to stand with one foot in both 
camps. And in fact what happened was that neither the Saudis nor the Egyptians were 
happy. Each kept pulling us. The situation was difficult for the US. Yes, because the 
situation was difficult in the Arab world. You have to remember the attacks from 
Egypt on Saudi Arabia and on Jordan... Anyway the policy failed, because, we think, 
the government of Egypt went too far. Although to my mind, this is a all speculation. 
After we were thrown out of Yemen, the British had already announced that they 
were leaving South Yemen, and the Egyptians were very confident and decided to 
stay. They also felt that they were coming into a new era where they have the backing 
of the Soviet Union, where no Arab could oppose them, and where they would be 
able to expand their influence in the Arab world.154
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESTORATION OF RELATIONS
The severance of relations between Sana’a and Washington in June 1967 isolated the YAR 
more than ever before. Many Yemeni leaders were aware that cutting off direct 
communications with the US did not serve the best interests of their country, especially since 
the decision had been taken under UAR influence. They decided that one of their major tasks, 
after achieving an internal reconciliation, would be to repair relations with the rich and 
developed west as events within Yemen and the region after severance demonstrates.
Interlude
One month after the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, an Arab summit took place in al-Khartoum, the 
capital of Sudan. At the end of this summit, President Nasser and King Faisal agreed to the 
formation of a tri-partite committee on Yemen to prepare plans to guarantee UAR troop 
withdrawal and the suspension of Saudi support for the counter-revolution. Nasser and Faisal 
reached a modus vivendi by which Cairo decided to come to terms with Riyadh and withdraw 
its forces from the YAR, paving the way for Saudi Arabia and Washington to give more 
assistance and backing to the Royalists. This happened because Egypt had become financially 
dependent on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya in its struggle to overcome the consequences 
of the Six Days War.1 Kuwait, the KSA and Libya pledged an annual sum totalling of £135 
million to help the UAR and Jordan recover from their economic losses of the war. Riyadh’s
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share in this pledge was equivalent to $98 million2 every year in return for Nasser’s
assurances to withdraw completely. David Ransom, former senior diplomat in the YAR and
later Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs in the US Department of State, told this author:
I think Nasser made a terrible mistake when announcing that he was closing the Strait 
of Tiran and putting his forces into the Sinai. Everybody knows what happened after 
that. I am not saying anything about who fired the first shot, but those two moves by 
Nasser were a great mistake. After the defeat in June, Nasser withdraw from Yemen. 
This was part of the price for dealing with Saudi Arabia, but it was also necessary, 
because his dreams were finished. After the withdrawal, the friends of Egypt in South 
Yemen lost... Those decisions created the modem situation of Yemen, I think, [stuck] 
between the most radical state in the Arab world and the most conservative state.3
The YAR dependence on the UAR between 1962 and 1967 left Sana’a alone to deal with its 
own internal and external problems. The Republican leaders who had been detained in Cairo 
since 15 September 1966 returned to Sana’a where they on 5 November deposed the 
President and his government. By early December 1967 all Egyptian troops had withdrawn. 
This was followed by increased Royalist military activity around Sana’a in preparation for 
a planned final assault on the capital. The Royalists, backed by the Saudis and British directly 
and by the US indirectly, launched the strongest attack of the civil war and layed seige to 
Sana’a for seventy days between 28 November 1967 and 8 February 1968. The YAR Prime 
Minister and Commander General of the Armed Forces officially accused the US of 
continuing its supply of arms to the Royalists, stating "the Republican forces had captured 
some American arms which were different from those supplied by the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia."4 During the siege the YAR government also issued a communique stating that 
mercenaries from Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and the US were the real 
organizers of the strong offensive against Sana’a. The communique also accused Washington
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of supervising the siege.5 In fact there is no evidence that the US was providing the Royalists 
with arms to counteract the Republican government; it was the KSA which financed 
American arms from various sources as well as arms from its own stocks and made them 
available for the counter-revolution.
Some American military advisors participated in the civil war as individuals, not as
representative of official US government policy. Among them was Bushrod Howard who,
through contacting the Royalist Prime Minister, Hassan bin Yahya Hamid al-Din, offered his
services in propaganda and political work in the US, and who succeeded in campaigning
against Egyptian intervention inside the Senate and in cutting American aid to Nasser. These
American individuals may have had contact with American intelligence agencies. Thus the
US sought to contain the Yemeni conflict, but avoided any military Vietnam-like
involvement. The US Minister to Yemen in 1962 later stated:
Some boxes bearing the AID handclasp symbol and some weapons or pieces of 
military equipment were found or captured from the Royalists by the 
Republicans...[but] basically the weaponry did not come from our sources. It came 
from other places, old miscellaneous this and that they’d picked up all over the place 
(there was a great deal of help given by Iran, eventually), but it was small arms 
weaponry of miscellaneous kinds.6
Based on an agreement signed by President Sallal and the Soviets in September of that year, 
Moscow provided Sana’a with aircraft and other military supplies.7 On 1 December the 
Royalists claimed that they had shot down a Soviet-piloted MiG, and evidence was published 
in the British press to prove direct Soviet military participation.8 The US Department of State 
confirmed on 13 December 1967 that the USSR had supplied arms to the Republic in addition
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to the participation of Soviet pilots.9 The Yemeni revolutionary forces, supported by 
Republican Sayyids, some tribal leaders and army officers sympathetic to the Republican 
front, eventually defeated the siege.10 Soviet support of the YAR was severely criticised by 
Washington, and the US Department of State warned the Soviet Union that it would not 
permit the continuation of Soviet interference in the Yemeni conflict.11
Two contacts between the YAR and the US government occurred between June 1967 and 
March 1968. While no details were released about the first meeting, the US Department of 
State revealed that during the second March, meeting the YAR had "suggested to the 
Department’s Arabian Peninsula Country Director that the United States assign an officer to 
the Italian Embassy in Yemen, and asked us to communicate to the Saudi Arabian 
government the interest of the Yemeni government in ending the war."12 The Yemeni 
representative, ’Ali Lutf al-Thawr13, told the American officials that "Yemeni Republican 
leaders were worried over the threat from leftist-radicals." 14 The US representative 
"assured the Minister of our of basic friendly intentions and noted that our recognition of the 
YAR had not been withdrawn," but pointed out that "the continuing civil war created a 
serious problem for the United States in considering any resumption of diplomatic ties." "We 
did not", he affirmed, "wish to become involved on either side of the Yemen conflict."15
Kadi ’Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani stated clearly in late July 1968 that the two revolutions in the 
south and the north of Yemen were "being exposed to aggression perpetrated by the same 
enemy"16 and that both revolutions were "facing the same imperialist and reactionary
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forces."17 While in early 1968 the YAR continued to accuse the United States of being a 
"colonialist and imperialist" country, these accusations were toned down after the internal 
crisis of August 1968, which witnessed the military defeat of the Yemen left by the 
"moderate Republicans". However, no American response was forthcoming during 1968, 
possibly because the US wanted to ensure that the Yemeni left was completely defeated. In 
early 1969 some official statements expressed the YAR’s wish to restore relations with the 
US, and in an official statement the Yemeni Foreign Minister unveiled an initiative to restore 
relations with Washington. He justified this step by saying "Yemen was compelled by other 
forces when it severed its ties with the US in 1967"18 and that these "foreign partners were 
to blame for the decline of the relations in the past".19 In September 1969, under pressure 
from the growing strength of the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY), which was 
getting aid from the Soviet Union, and due to the need for the American aid, Prime Minister 
’Abd Allah al-Kurshmi announced that Yemen would welcome the restoration of relations 
with the US if the latter showed good intentions.20 Two months after the Prime Minister’s 
widely quoted statement, an official meeting between foreign ministers of the two countries 
was held in the United Nations after which the Yemeni Foreign Minister said they had 
"discussed the issue of restoring relations."21
The Seventy Day Seige of Sana’a in 1967-1968 was the basis for a reconciliation with the 
forces which opposed Egyptian involvement in Yemeni affairs. The civil war came to an end 
in April 1970 and a compromise was reached which retained the Republic and brought back 
some former Royalist leaders, apart from members of the Hamid al-Din family. In early 1970
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while a Sana’a-Riyadh reconciliation was being negotiated, it was reported that on a YAR 
initiative an American diplomatic office was to be permitted to open within the Italian 
Embassy in Sana’a. The US reciprocated the Yemeni initiative by permitting a Yemeni 
political office to open within the Somali Embassy in Washington.22 When Sana’a and 
Riyadh reached a compromise in 1970, it was expected that Sana’a-Washington relations 
would be quickly restored. But there seemed to be no pressure from the US to do so; this was 
perhaps because Washington had no reason to feel any threat from the YAR, since the 
general situation in the Middle East was already dominated by the American presence. The 
US Department Director of the Arabian Peninsula Country Desk stated other reasons for US 
caution towards the YAR after 1967: the possible influence of many other nations and the 
unstable political situation in Sana’a and the rest of the country 23
The same attitude towards Sana’a prevailed in Riyadh. YAR-KSA reconciliation was greatly 
affected by the poor relations between Aden and Riyadh, which had resulted in a limited 
military encounter during the last few days of 1969. This confrontation did not seem to affect 
US policies towards North Yemen during this period. The American administration left the 
Republican regime in Sana’a to the KSA to tackle. Faisal continued to use tribal leverage 
against the Republican forces, but after the proclamation of the PRSY and the Royalist failure 
of the seige of Sana’a, he recognised the YAR and became reconciled with its leaders. 
However, Faisal continued to use his influence on the tribal and traditional forces in North 
Yemen in order to address the more radical forces in Aden, which started to threaten the 
Sheikhdoms of the Peninsula.24
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Political developments within the two Yemens in 1970, it seemed, started to attract some US 
political interest in the YAR. On 29 April 1970 it was reported that Robert McClintock, the 
Second Secretary at the US Embassy in Sana’a before the break-off of relations in 1967, had 
returned to work in the American interests section of the Italian Embassy.25 The famine 
which affected some two million people in many North Yemeni provinces in the summer of 
1970 added more problems to the Yemeni economy. The famine was caused by three 
consecutive years of drought which dried up the country’s complex irrigation and well 
system. The low-lying Tihama region along the Red Sea was the worst affected. The US was 
the most active country in the international relief operation which lasted for more than a 
year.26
On 25 May 1971, the YAR’s economic plight was highlighted by Prime Minister Ahmad 
Muhammad Nu’man, who told the Yemeni Parliament, the Consultative Assembly, that a 
deficit of 90 million riyals (£8 million) was foreseen for that year’s budget which estimated 
an expenditure of 170 million riyals while exports would cover only 10 percent of the annual 
import bill. He also said that "appropriations needed for schools, hospitals, development and 
the maintenance of roads have been excluded from the budget." Premier Nu’man warned that 
the government had to repay a debt of £78 million which had been accumulated since 1956, 
of which £51 million had came from the Soviet Union and China27. Nu’man made it clear 
that he was in favour of restoring relations with the US in the hope of receiving economic 
aid.
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By 1972, several factors affecting the balance of power and oil interests in the region had 
aroused US interest in restoring relations with the YAR. In 1971 the British withdrew from 
the Gulf two years after the announcement by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, leaving 
a political vacuum threatened by the growing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean-Persian 
Gulf area, South Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Another factor was the Arab boycott of the 
US following the 1967 Six Days War. David Ransom, Yemen Desk Officer in the US 
Department of State, whose "recommendations brought Secretary Rogers to Sana’a in 
1972"28, told this author that a major reason for the US to restore relations was "to break 
the front of the Arab world against the US"; thus relations with Sana’a were "the first step 
by an Arab country after the 1967 rupture...at that time that was important." He also said that 
the US had contacted the governments of Sudan and Algeria recommending that they follow 
the path of the YAR in restoring relations with the US. Both agreed to do this but ultimately 
only Khartoum did so.29 The US was also concerned about the attempted 1969 coup in 
Saudi Arabia which, although it had been crushed, had aimed to replace the monarchical 
regime by a republican one.30 In Libya, a successful revolution in 1969 had overthrown the 
monarch; President Kadhafi’s anti-Western attitude led to the evacuation of the US air force 
base at Wheelus Field and the nationalisation of the marketing facilities of four North 
American oil companies as well as the cutback of the production operations of three other 
ones. Developments in the oil market were another factor. In December 1970, a decision had 
been taken in Caracas to raise oil prices and there was talk in Riyadh of nationalising 
ARAMCO. There was pressure on the Nixon administration from a number of US oil 
companies which assured the US government that there existed a real need for Arab oil to
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supplement the declining domestic resources. The drift of the YAR towards Saudi Arabia 
resulting from its rivalry with South Yemen had led to a deterioration in relations with the 
USSR making it a suitable buffer zone between the US oil interests in the most important 
country to Washington, the KSA, and the most anti-US Arab country, the PDRY.31
Also very important was the rise of a radical South Yemen which severed relations with 
Washington on 24 October 1969. Aden started to enjoy increasing Soviet military and 
economic assistance and to incite the YAR opposition based in Aden to launch guerilla 
attacks to overthrow the YAR government. Ransom told this writer that Washington saw that 
the Soviet Union had gained a military foothold in South Yemen and therefore decided not 
to see another YAR challenge to Saudi Arabia, or to other friends in the Peninsula.32
The rise of a radical pro-Soviet South Yemen in 1969, the beginnings of a leftist opposition 
guerilla war on YAR territory in an encounter with the strong Saudi influence in Sana’a, and 
the YAR’s support of the PRSY opposition can be seen as the most important factors behind 
renewed US interest in the YAR. In a reaction to some anti-PRSY activities by neighbouring 
states inside its borders and as a result of its ideological orientation, the 1969 South Yemen 
government decided to give full support to national liberation movements in neighbouring 
states and Sheikhdoms, mainly in Oman with its borders on the Persian Gulf and the Straits 
of Hormuz. The Western powers, especially the US, recognised this to be a destabilising 
factor in the area. The Western media reported that the Soviets were using Aden as a military 
base and the British-built airfield outside the city as a base for their reconnaissance. It was
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alleged that Moscow had constructed on the Island of Socotra a naval radio station and 
ammunition depot. Soviet and Cuban military advisors and East German police advisors were 
reported at work in the PDRY. In November 1969, limited border clashes between Saudi 
Arabia and the PRSY demonstrated KSA military superiority. From 1968, the Revolutionary 
Democratic Party (RDP) of Yemen based in Aden, launched a guerilla war in "al-manatik al- 
wusta" or the central areas of the YAR in order "to restore the revolution in Sana’a"33 which 
had been undermined by the KSA. This ended a phase of cordial relations between the two 
Yemeni states which had characterised the period following the independence of South 
Yemen on 30 November 1967. The RDP guerilla operations escalated throughout 1971 and 
1972 with the Southern Yemeni armed forces reportedly supplied with modem Soviet 
equipment. This situation in Aden, which gave Moscow a strong foothold in the PDRY, 
heightened once again the concern and alarm of the KSA and USA which both sought to tie 
Sana’a closely to them to use it as a "buffer zone" and as a weapon against the radical 
PDRY. Following the Saudi recognition of the moderate Yemen Arab Republic in 1970, 
Riyadh gradually became able to affect the political outcome in Sana’a. In an effective move 
against radicalism and revolution in the Yemen, a Saudi military delegation visited Sana’a 
in May 1972 to prepare for direct military cooperation to accompany the financial aid and 
tribal subsidies which tied the YAR tightly to Saudi Arabia. This Saudi initiative, which 
widened the political gap between Sana’a and Aden and Sana’a and Moscow, two months 
later brought the YAR closer to the US.
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Renewal of Diplomatic Relations
On 1 July 1972 diplomatic relations were restored between Sana’a and Washington ostensibly 
following a Yemeni initiative. This was a significant move by the YAR which had been the 
first Arab country to sever its ties with Washington. The YAR government sought to restore 
its relations with the US for political and economic reasons. Sana’a calculated that good 
relations with Washington would lessen the threat and pressure from the post-1969 radical 
PDRY government, as well as compensate for the rapidly deteriorating relations with its old 
ally, the Soviet Union, which curtailed its economic aid and arms supplies to the country in 
1970 and 1971. Kadi ’Abdul-Rahman ibn Yahya al-Iryani, Chairman of the YAR Republican 
Council 1967-74, emphasised that his country "which suffered a lot during the civil war, 
found itself in need of aid from any source...therefore it restored its relations with the US."34 
The YAR Prime Minister at the time later affirmed that the other reason was political: some 
of his government colleagues believed that such a step would help Sana’a counter the Marxist 
threat from the South.35
The prompt, positive American response to the Yemeni initiative indicates that renewed US
interest in the YAR reflected Washington’s wider concerns in the area. The US objective was
to break the anti-US front in the Arab world at that time. There is some evidence to suggest
the US indirectly pushed Sana’a to seek a restoration in relations as the YAR Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister in 1972, Muhsin Ahmad al-’Aini, revealed to this author:
At that time I was hesitant to undertake any action in this direction because the other 
Arab countries were all boycdtting the US. I was thinking how can we alone resume 
these relations. I was always asking myself what is the importance of Yemen to the 
US. Other Yemeni politicians were very enthusiastic to take this step, especially since
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relations with Aden were deteriorating. There were those who used to argue that 
America would support us and give us a lot because our economy was in a very bad 
state. I still remember that the late Muhammad Nu’man and his father Ahmad Nu’man 
used to whisper to Kadi al-Iryani that our government would get $30 million at once 
if it restored US relations. They even decided the amount. My reply was "If you get 
a million Bukshah (Cents) then I know nothing in politics. You are wrong." In the 
mean time the Italian Ambassador, who was in charge of American interests, called 
on the Chairman of the Presidential Council, ’Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani, and told him 
"If you restore relations, you will get lots of aid." A few days later I received letters 
from the National Assembly, from the Army and from President al-Iryani. All three 
letters urged me to restore relations. I called a Cabinet meeting...the Cabinet insisted 
on the re-establishment of relations with the US.36
The importance to the US of good relations with the Arab world was also indicated by
America’s decision to approach Egypt in July 1972. Cairo made a sudden move towards the
West later in the same month when President Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat ordered all Soviet
advisors out of Egypt. The US had clearly decided to take a firmer stand in the Middle East
against the Soviet Union and the anti-US element because it perceived its economic and
political interests to be seriously threatened.
Between 1967 and 1972 there were many indicators of the growth in influence of the USSR,
and the nationalist and radical elements in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf and the
Arabian Peninsula. It was this that caused the US to renew its interest in the YAR in early
1970s. US policy was also affected by Washington’s concern to protect American oil interests
in the KSA and the Sultanate of Oman and its determination to counter the USSR in the
PDRY. As David Ransom, told this author:
We were interested from the beginning as soon as it was clear that the Republic was 
going to survive as an independent government from attacks from both the south and 
the north - we were interested. The Yemeni government moved slowly, step by step, 
and in the end, Yemen took the step on its own initiative - the first step by an Arab 
country to renew relations with the US after the 1967 rupture. I think it was in the
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interest of Yemen to do that.37
Secretary of State William Rogers in Sana’a
On 1 July 1972, US Secretary of State William Rogers arrived Sana’a to restore relations 
between the two countries. Rogers who described the occasion as "historic...marking a new 
beginning of mutually beneficial ties", revealed his hope it would "contribute in a modest way 
to stability and tranquillity in the Arabian peninsula", and said his discussions with the YAR 
Prime Minister and other Yemeni officials would concentrate on "the prospects for 
cooperation among neighbouring countries of the peninsula."38 Rogers stressed that his 
country’s response to the YAR initiative "reflects a US policy...in the area" and that 
Washington "looks forward to the day when the few remaining states in the Arab world will 
take a similar step."39
At a dinner given in his honour on the night of his arrival Rogers said that his country 
intended "to continue its efforts to promote a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, 
based on full implementation of the UN Security Council resolution of November 1967, 
number 242."40 In his speech of reply the YAR Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, 
Muhsin Ahmad al-’Aini, announced the resumption of diplomatic relations, and stressed that 
his country had never forgotten that the US was one of the first few countries to have 
recognised the first Republic in the Arabian peninsula, and it had been due to this recognition 
that "we were able to occupy our seat in the United Nations, in spite of the fact that the 
General Assembly session was nearing its end."41 After mentioning what he described as
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"useful" US-initiated projects in parts of Yemen, he pleaded the Arab cause in Palestine
saying:
The Yemeni people, being part of the Arab nation, cannot on this occasion but draw 
attention to the important problem that affects all our Arab people and its threat to 
international peace and security; that is, the problem of Palestine. All we ask in this 
regard is the implementation of the United Nations resolutions and complete 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab land and the people of Palestine be 
given their legitimate rights. It is also our duty to ask the USA as a great nation and 
a permanent member of the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility by exerting 
greater efforts in this direction.42
The YAR government’s enthusiasm for the restoration of relations with the US reflected 
several factors: 1. It doubted the justice of the severance decision because it had been dictated 
by the UAR. This was stated clearly by Kadi ’Abdul-Rahman al-Iryani, the second President 
of the YAR, three months after Rogers’ visit when he told foreign correspondents that 
severance had not been a Yemeni decision.43 2. The YAR was convinced that any 
substantial development aid could be better obtained from the Western powers. 3. The YAR, 
situated between the closest friends of both Superpowers in the Arab world, needed to break 
the seige. 4. The UAR’s plea for the Arab cause in Palestine reflected Sana’a’s earlier belief 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be solved without the participation of the US 
government which had the greatest influence in the area. The YAR government did not 
expect or ask for prompt aid in return for the restoration of the relations. Al-’Aini told this 
author that the American government did not promise any aid: "Promises came from others, 
on my part I was aware that to get paid for restoring relations with a big country is degrading 
and an insult to the small country - as if they had paid for these relations." But he stressed 
that the important thing was that the mutual relations returned to normal as they should be.44
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A leading article in The Washington Post on 11 July 1972 welcomed the decision of the 
YAR to become the first Arab League member to resume formal diplomatic relations with 
the US since the Six Day War, but pointed out that "Yemen being the small, poor, strife- 
plagued country it is, of no particular strategic importance with the Suez Canal closed, the 
step is no coup for the US." It added that the restoration decision was of greater importance 
for Yemen which "presumably welcomes the extra political propping against neighbouring 
South Yemen." It stressed that a symbolic measure of balance was being restored to a part 
of the world which had seemed to be tipping against America and toward Soviet interests: 
"If only psychologically, it is good to see an American Ambassador headed back to Sana’a," 
and pointed out that the most interesting aspect of the development was "its evidence of the 
increased irrelevance of the Arab-Israeli dispute to those Arab countries not directly involved 
in it." It concluded by expressing the belief that the resumption of relations between Sana’a 
and Washington, and the expected restoration of relations with Khartoum, was a blow 
against Egyptian policy which wanted to isolate Washington and TelAviv, but which actually 
resulted in Egypt being isolated and penalised.45
On 14 July 1972 Secretary of State William Rogers announced that the decision had been 
taken following appropriate consultations with Congress and that his government intended "to 
resume economic assistance programs patterned on our previous programs in Yemen."46 In 
the autumn of that year, a US team arrived in the YAR "to review Yemen’s development 
priorities and discuss how the United States might best support the international effort to help 
[the country] with its pressing social and economic problems."47 The aid programme was
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resumed from 1973.48 After Rogers’ visit to Sana’a, Washington announced it would give 
the YAR a few million dollars for irrigation, and later provided grants for mineral exploration 
and for a new drinking water system for the city of Ta’iz. According to the Yemeni Prime 
Minister "The US did not aid Yemen even with one dollar" until early October 1972 49 But 
al-’Aini later stated that economically the YAR had benefited indirecdy from restored US 
goodwill: the Department of State recommended the YAR to the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Food Program and other international organisations largely financed 
by the US. Al-’Aini concluded "Rogers’ recommendations paved the way for the flow of 
international aid to the YAR."50
The restoration of relations between Sana’a and Washington also opened the YAR to US 
scholars, journalists and politicians who furthered American understanding of the country. For 
example, Robert Stookey, formerly the US Charge d’Affaires in the YAR told this author he 
visited the country at this time "as a Fulbright-Hays senior research scholar, microfilming 
unpublished manuscripts in private libraries and following political developments."51
Inter-Yemeni War Follows Restoration of Relations
After the restoration of YAR-US diplomatic relations, a point of high tension was reached 
in Sana’a’s relations with the PDRY. These had been deteriorating since July 1968 when 
South Yemen claimed Washington was providing the Southern opposition with arms and 
training inside Saudi Arabia and the YAR for the overthrow of the "Revolutionary regime in 
the Yemeni arena."52 The Northern opposition forces stationed in the PRSY53 reacted by
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launching attacks in the central areas of the YAR. In early December 1970, the Secretary 
General of the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF) announced the PDRY’s support for all 
"liberation movements" in the Arabian Peninsula.54 This drove an even greater wedge 
between the YAR and the Soviet-backed South and provided the US with the opportunity to 
challenge Soviet influence in the PDRY. The NLF perceived the renewal of YAR-US 
relations as an aggressive act and a threat to its "revolutionary" orientation from "reactionary 
and imperialist forces."55 The resumption of YAR-US diplomatic relations was responsible 
for this heightened tension and distrust between the two Yemeni states.
The first inter-Yemeni war broke out on 26 September 1972. It continued until 13 October 
as a direct result of the tension and the border clashes which had been escalating since the 
assassination on 21 February that year of Sheikh ’Ali Bin Nadji al-Ghadir, a leading Sheikh 
of the northern Bakil tribes,56 and more than 60 of his followers. According to an official 
YAR statement the South Yemenis had invited the Sheikh to a banquet where he and his 
party had been killed. Rumours in Sana’a at the time claimed that mines had been planted 
beneath the tents of the Khawlan57 guests before the feast and they had been killed while 
asleep that night. The immediate cause of the outbreak of war on 26 September was an attack 
on southern areas by the southern armed opposition forces stationed in the YAR. Prime 
Minister al-’Aini told this author that the KSA persuaded the Southern opposition in the 
YAR to attack Southern areas while he was out of the country.58 But according to a 
statement by Sheikh ’Abd Allah al-Ahmar the paramount Sheikh of the Hashid tribes 
confederation and advisor of the President and the Chairman of the Parliament "Madjlis Al-
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Shoura" (The Consultative Assembly), the YAR parliament had decided even before the 
eruption of war to reunite Yemen by use of force.59
In part this inter-Yemeni war can be seen as a consequence of super-power rivalry. Riyadh 
feared that stable and strong regimes in the more populous YAR and PDRY could exert a 
serious threat to its monarchy and security; the Libyan support to the Front of Liberation of 
Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) forces in the YAR was also a contributory factor. Yet 
another factor was the opposition armed groups to the two Yemeni republics were stationed 
under supervision in both capitals. The restoration of YAR-US A relations exacerbated the 
situation: the US was judged by its willingness to counter radicalism in the Arabian Peninsula 
to safeguard its own interests in such a highly volatile region.
The military government of the YAR which took power in 1974 found itself subjected to 
increasing Saudi influence and confronted by deteriorating relations with both the PDRY and 
the Soviet Union. In this year the hundred Soviet advisers employed to train the Yemeni army 
became isolated. The expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt by President Sadat pushed 
Moscow to send more arms to Aden to defend and help its "people’s revolution" and 
strengthen its foothold in this strategic part of the Western sphere of influence. All this 
occurred in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war which created an oil boom and 
gave Saudi Arabia a greater opportunity to exert influence in the Middle East. It was evident 
that the wealthier Saudis, encouraged by the US, became more influential in the YAR and 
more dependent on it for their labour force and consequently more able and more willing to
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attempt to contain the USSR in the PDRY and the Red Sea region.
YAR-USA relations, were affected by the Saudi policy of offering aid to Sana’a which 
promoted and utilised the political instability in the YAR for its own ends. Lieutenant Colonel 
Ibrahim al-Hamdi who assumed power in Sana’a on 13 June 1974 was considered pro- 
Riyadh. Yet he tried to lessen the heavy Saudi hand on his country by seeking American 
arms and economic assistance, as had his predecessor. In August 1975 al-Hamdi confirmed 
that his country was negotiating with the US for a package of arms including several F5 
fighters worth nearly $100 million. In 1977 the deal was increased to a total of $138 million 
of arms to be financed by and channelled through Saudi Arabia.60
Riyadh Vetoes Direct YAR-US Dealings
Despite a united Riyadh-Sana’a stand against a radical threat from the PDRY, there were 
many long-term political, territorial and religious differences dating back to the 1920s61 
between the YAR and the KSA which inhibited any amelioration in their relationship. 
Sana’a’s efforts to have direct dealings with Washington were intercepted by the KSA, which 
did not want to weaken its own influence in the internal affairs of the YAR. KSA leaders 
calculated that if the Yemenis were to gain political stability, economic independence and 
military strength, there would be an attempt to recapture the three bordering provinces which 
had been annexed by King ’Abdul-’Aziz in 1934.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia could not forget the insecurity it had experienced during the
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five years following the outbreak of the YAR Revolution in 1962. It became alarmed by the 
prospect of a stronger, more radical PDRY, which might gain control of the YAR. An anti- 
Saudi government in North Yemen had always been the main fear of the government in 
Riyadh and it therefore concerned itself with all developments in Sana’a. On this, the London 
Financial Times62 wrote "The Saudis fear Yemen’s political volatility, which is made 
important for them by the fact that the Yemeni population of some [10]63 million is...bigger 
than their population. One specific fear is that there might be a left wing coup d’etat in 
Sana’a. Even more alarming is the thought of a union of the two Yemens, with a combined 
population of some 13 million, under a left wing government." In the words of a Saudi senior 
intelligence official "Saudi Arabia views events in North Yemen as having a major influence 
on Saudi internal security, whether positively or negatively."64
Direct relations between the YAR and the US started in 1974 through some small-scale 
military dealings. But against the YAR’s wish, these military dealings soon became indirect 
as they were channeled through Saudi Arabia. This Saudi policy towards the YAR was 
approved by Washington when in this year the KSA forwarded to the United States a YAR’s 
list of new weapon requirements. This eventually led to the despatch of an American military 
team to study the Republic’s military needs, although negotiations for a long-scale US arms 
deal with Sana’a did not start until near the end of 1975.65 Early in 1975, the YAR’s 
President al-Hamdi asserted his government’s willingness to accept arms without conditions 
from any source.66 He also showed eagerness to ease military ties with the USSR and to 
expel the Soviet experts if the US would provide the necessary arms. His efforts were ignored
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because, according to Yemeni sources, the Saudis continued "to delay in making a firm 
commitment on which arms will be purchased for Yemen despite warnings that delay could 
be disastrous for Colonel Hamdi’s still weak central government"67. Due to this complex 
situation, the US Embassy in Djiddah prodded the Saudis "to be swift and generous in 
helping bolster Colonel al-Hamdi’s position with arms.68 In early 1975, to overcome this 
problem, President al-Hamdi, expressed his hope that "a new friendship with the US will 
exist," and sought to consolidate relations with Riyadh at the cost of further deteriorating 
relations with the PDRY. Relations with Washington improved as a result. In the same year 
the US prepared a plan to provide the YAR with arms to be financed by Saudi Arabia; a 
trilateral agreement to provide Sana’a with a package of modem American arms was signed 
in 1976.
This agreement with Saudi Arabia to modernise the YAR’s armed forces indicated that the 
US had "approved and encouraged Saudi Arabia’s desire to become a leading force in the 
region of the Persian Gulf to tackle radicalism."69 At this time it was reported that South 
Yemen had begun to receive modem tanks, planes and naval vessels from the Soviet Union 
to counter the Saudi-American supply of arms to the YAR. On 11 February 1976, the leftist 
Northern opposition in the YAR formed the National Democratic Front (NDF) with Sultan 
Ahmad ’Umar as its Secretary General, indicating that the opposition supported by the PDRY 
was willing to escalate its military operations in the YAR. The US consequently put strong 
pressure on Saudi Arabia to finance the arms deal since it perceived the YAR to be "a useful 
Western-orientated buffer state between the traditionally-ruled oil-producing states of the Gulf
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and South Yemen."70 But the idea of providing the YAR with free arms was not acceptable 
to Saudi Arabia which continued to depend on the belligerant northern tribes to implement 
its policies towards Sana’a. In the words of the American Military Attache in Sana’a: Saudi 
Arabia had caught itself in the impossible bind of wanting a North Yemen that was "strong 
enough but not too strong."71 In the words of US Ambassador George Lane: "the Saudis 
wanted the North Yemenis to have guns that will only point South."72
Because Riyadh was not convinced it should provide Sana’a with modem arms, it tried to 
contain the threat from South Yemen by other means. The Saudi government responded to 
a two-year old PDRY initiative to establish relations based on mutual respect and non­
interference in each other’s affairs. Saudi Arabia and the PDRY established diplomatic 
relations just one month after the formation of the NDF. A joint communique was broadcast 
in both Aden and Riyadh on 10 March 1976 in which the two Arab and Islamic states 
expressed their "desire to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding to serve their causes 
and those of the Arabian Peninsula...in affirmation of the importance of safeguarding and 
consolidating relations among all the states of the region in an atmosphere of mutual respect 
for the sovereignty of every state over its territory."73 It confirmed that both states had 
reviewed their relations "in present circumstances" and concluded that Riyadh and Aden 
"declare their intention to establish normal relations between them on the basis of Arab 
fraternity, good-neighbourliness, unity of destiny and non-interference in internal affairs, in 
a manner that realises the security and stability of the Arab peninsula and the interest of the 
Arab nation, away from foreign influence."74 PDRY internal political and economic
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problems, its need of getting some Saudi assistance, its plans to activate the strategic Aden 
harbour after the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the mutual KSA-PDRY concern over the 
growing Iranian military presence in Oman, pushed the two countries towards cooperation for 
the first time. The Saudi response had a calming effect on the NDF and the People’s 
Liberation Front of Oman (PFLO) guerilla war taking place in the YAR and in Dhofar, a 
southern province of Oman. This development gave Saudi Arabia an excuse to argue with 
both Washington and Sana’a that arms were not needed in Sana’a. Riyadh also convinced the 
US of the feasibility of initiating some contacts with the PDRY instead of providing the YAR 
with arms that could be used to control the YAR northern tribes or to point North. As Robert 
Burrowes, an American specialist on the YAR, concluded, the Saudis "have sometimes acted 
in each of the Yemens through the other Yemen."75
All these Saudi manoeuvres, talks, hopes, and promises, resulted in nothing of any 
significance in either the military or the economic fields of cooperation between the YAR and 
the US in the period 1972-1976. During the years following the resumption of diplomatic 
relations Washington provided Sana’a with only $16.8 million in economic aid and $200,000 
in military aid, while Riyadh provided the YAR with more than $400 million as development 
assistance.76 According to American military scholar Major John B. Lynch, Washington 
gave Sana’a only a limited amount of aid because it wanted "to keep taut the string of 
relationship with Saudi Arabia."77 The US Ambassador to the YAR 1983-1987, William 
Rugh, assured this author that despite "the Saudi-American connection, we don’t determine 
our policy towards Yemen based on what anybody else tells us to do. We determine our
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policy towards Yemen with Yemen, based on our concerns for Yemen", stressing that Saudi 
Arabia is obviously "terribly important to the United States, and the position of Yemen in the 
Arabian Peninsula has to take into account the role of Saudi Arabia."78 Concerning the level 
of aid to Yemen, Rugh stated that this was constantly debated in Washington with several 
factors in mind but the foremost was always: what is the national interest of the US?79 
Despite all the rational analyses, the fact is that it was the oil boom of 197380 which gave 
Saudi Arabia the upper hand in the Yemeni arena and this was reflected in the YAR-USA 
relationship of that period.
Bloody Events in the Yemen and US Concern
In 1977, in reaction to Saudi policies and in order to put some pressure on the US, President 
al-Hamdi visited Europe and sought French arms in "an attempt to break out of the 
diplomatic pattern largely dominated by Saudi Arabia and the United States".81 When he 
returned home he contacted the US Ambassador in Sana’a, Thomas J. Scotts, to complain that 
Saudi Arabia was delaying the delivery of arms under the agreement. The US then urged the 
Saudis to deliver some arms to Sana’a.82 Robert Burrowes, a US scholar who worked for 
several years in Sana’a during this period told this author that Ambassador Scotts83 was very 
much concerned about the American stance in Yemen. Scotts argued for US mediation 
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen to protect al-Hamdi from the Saudis. This caused tension 
between the Department of State and the Ambassador. Scotts opposed the arms delay, 
wanting a prompt delivery to protect al-Hamdi from the sceptical American policy. But he 
was told "We won’t upset relations with Riyadh for a small country like Yemen." In his
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belief, the US "wanted to have the Yemen on the cheap and wanted the Saudis to pay for its 
friendship even when American interests were threatened by Aden."84 President al-Hamdi, 
who saw the Saudi pronouncements as a waste of time, became convinced he could not rely 
on Riyadh to reorganise and equip his army in order to establish central government control 
over the northern tribes who were more loyal to the Saudi money or to help him uproot the 
Saudi political influence in his country. He decided to break the Saudi stronghold in the YAR 
by forming closer relations with the PDRY.
At the height of al-Hamdi’s efforts to break through this "pattern largely dominated by Saudi 
Arabia and the US"85, al-Hamdi, and his brother ’Abd Allah, were assassinated during the 
night of 12 October 1977, a few hours before his first scheduled visit to Aden to proclaim 
with his southern counterpart a new step towards Yemen unification. This incident put an end 
to the YAR’s efforts to be independent of the KSA for about two years. Robert Burrows later 
wrote: "Despite this event which brought Col. Ahmad al-Ghashmi, more responsive to Saudi 
Arabia, to power, Saudi policy toward the reorganization of the Yemeni army did not 
apparently change. One year later, it was observed that the YAR army was much weaker than 
it was in 1974. The Saudis had played political football with the program and used it...to 
manipulate Yemen’s politics and its leaders to their ends."86
On 24 June 1978 President Ahmad al-Ghashmi also met his predecessor’s fate. According to 
Sana’a sources, Salem Rubiyya’ ’Ali, the Chairman of the Presidential Council of the PDRY, 
had telephoned al-Ghashmi on 23 June to inform him that he was sending a special envoy
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to Sana’a. When the envoy arrived in Sana’a airport the next morning, he was directed to 
President Ghashmi’s office where he opened an explosive-filled briefcase killing both men.87
On 26 June a military struggle broke-out between political factions in South Yemen during 
which the 43-year-old President Salem Rubiyya’ ’Ali lost his life. According to the official 
announcement on Aden Radio, the Central Committee of the ruling Unified Political 
Organisation of the National Front (UPONF) had held an emergency meeting on the evening 
of 25 June to discuss developments in the North but Rubiyya’ refused to attend and instead 
sent his resignation. When the meeting reconvened the next morning to discuss this 
resignation, Rubiyya’ ordered forces loyal to him to bomb the Committee headquarters in an 
attempted coup d’etat; the Central Committee retaliated by ordering a military attack on 
Rubiyya’. Within a few hours the Committee ordered the execution of Rubiyya’ and two of 
his close associates.88
In Sana’a the leading officers and political elites chose ’ Abdul-Karim al-’Arashi, Speaker of 
the Assembly, as acting president for a two month period until presidential elections could 
take place. On 17 July the People’s Constituent Assembly elected Lieutenant Colonel ’Ali 
’Abd Allah Saleh as the new President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
upgrading him to the rank of Colonel. The fifth President of the YAR immediately began to 
reorganise the divided, ill-equipped, army and to contact the Sheikhs and persuade them the 
political elite to work towards permanent stability. Saleh survived an attempted assassination 
a few days after his election.89 Three months later, on 15 October 1978, Saleh survived
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another attempt on his life by a Libyan-backed Nasserist faction headed by Colonel Mudjahid 
al-Kuhali. The Minister of Social Affairs, ’Abdul-Salam Mukbil, and other senior army 
officers were subsequently sentenced to death; others fled the country. In Aden the execution 
of President Rubayye’ in June was followed by the creation of the Yemeni Socialist Party 
(YSP) in October in succession to the Unified Political Organization of National Front 
(UPONF). Elections to the Supreme People’s Assembly were held in December. ’Abdul- 
Fattah Isma’il, a hardline Marxist, became the Chairman of the Presidential Council and the 
Secretary General of the YSP.
Following the success of the hardliners in the south the NDF re-started its armed attacks 
inside the YAR and was calling for the overthrow of the "reactionary" regime in Sana’a. 
These guerilla operations were supported by Isma’il, whose Congress of October 1978, 
attended by the NDF Secretary General, publicly declared support for the NDF. These 
Yemeni developments which made the situation critical in southern Arabia caused much 
concern in Riyadh, ever fearful of Communist expansion in the region.
The US also became concerned, especially since three years of Saudi-US efforts to moderate 
the PDRY had clearly failed. The US moderating attempts began in 1974 when Republican 
Congressman Paul Findlay had been invited to Aden to discuss the release of American 
teacher Ed Franklin; the latter had been jailed for taking photographs of Aden harbour 
without permission during a transit tour stop of his ship. Findlay handed to the PDRY 
Foreign Minister, Muhammad Saleh Muti’ and President Rubiyya’ a letter from US Secretary
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of State Henry Kissinger, which presented Washington’s desire to achieve "a just and durable 
peace in the Middle East." An alleged case of espionage that same year, resulting in the 
imprisonment of several Americans working in South Yemen and President Ford’s decision 
in 1975 to supply the YAR with modem US arms, brought all indirect US-PDRY 
communication to halt. The establishment of relations between Aden and Riyadh in March 
1976 was followed by a Saudi attempt to promote talks between Washington and Aden, but 
the US replacement of the British in Masyarah air base in neighbouring Oman and the break 
of the Somali-Ethiopian war in the Horn of Africa90, which created diverse South Yemeni, 
Saudi and US responses, prevented any immediate dialogue. Congressman Paul Findlay met 
President Rubayye’ again at the United Nations Assembly in September 1977 when the latter 
addressed that year’s general Session. According to Findlay, Rubiyya’ "restated his desire for 
renewed relations with the United States and suggested that I report our discussion to 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.91 Encouraged by Saudi Arabia, Cyrus Vance also met with 
the PDRY Foreign Minister on UN premises and it was agreed that the US would send a 
mission to Aden to discuss the issue of restoring relations between the two states. Between 
January 13-15 Findlay visited Aden for the second time and held talks with both Muti’ and 
Rubayye’ on the prospects of mutual relations.92 Findlay carried back to the Carter 
administration a verbal response from Rubayye’.93 Clearly the US was almost convinced of 
the feasibility of restoring relations, especially since this would offer Washington an 
opportunity to confront the Soviets from their only stronghold in the peninsula. In a letter 
dated 26 January 1978 to the US National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezezinski, Findlay 
wrote: "Thanks very much for receiving Mrs Meyner, Leo Ryan and myself in regard to
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Palestinian and South Yemen policies. I am reassured by your statement that the Executive 
Branch will check further with Saudi Arabia with regard to diplomatic relations with South 
Yemen. This is, it seems to me, very prudent for us to have a listening post there reinforcing 
the one already established by the Saudis...."94
On 26 June 1978 a State Department official announced that the director of the Arabian 
Peninsula Desk, Joseph Twinam, "was on his way to Aden when President Rubayye’ was 
deposed" and was therefore only able to visit Saudi Arabia.95 With Rubayye’ out of the way, 
YSP Secretary General ’Abul-Fattah-Isma’il consolidated his power, announcing his 
willingness to adopt a clear pro-Soviet line and to put PDRY resources into a confrontation 
with "imperialism, reaction and conservatism in the area".96 Tension escalated with Oman 
as a result of PDRY support to a leftist revolution in Oman at a time when the NDF re­
started its guerrilla operations in the YAR. In Aden it was announced on 5 January 1979 that 
the "13th June front"97 had decided to join the NDF.98 Moscow’s position on the Horn of 
Africa may have been behind the Soviet willingness to enhance its presence in the PDRY. 
Stephen Page, a Canadian historian, saw that Moscow’s loss of access to facilities in Somalia 
in November 1977 increased Aden’s importance to Soviet strategy, leading to the creation of 
a more radical pro-Soviet leadership in the PDRY.99 One month later Aden became involved 
in the Soviet support of Ethiopia. A small number of PDRY forces were despatched to the 
battle field near Oghadin in support of Ethiopia against the new Saudi ally, Somalia. Failure 
of Riyadh-Washington efforts to contain the PDRY by the diplomatic instrument resulted in 
the emergence of a harder US stance against the PDRY; Washington believed Moscow to te
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behind the crisis of June 1978 in Aden in order to block relations with the US and KSA. In 
this scenario, entirely consistent with Cold War politics of the time, Moscow would have 
wished to preserve its foothold in the area, especially in the Yemen, by any means. The 
American Administration was therefore prepared to defend its own foothold in the YAR both 
militarily and politically.
The change in the government of South Yemen was viewed in Washington as a new 
challenge to the US strategy of reducing the Soviet role in the oil-rich area. The American 
Embassy in Sana’a "viewed the political turmoil in late June 1978 from the perspective of 
North Yemen’s vulnerability to military action from the South."100 The Embassy strongly 
recommended that "with a minimum of effort by the United States, quantities of weapons 
already purchased for Yemen by Saudi Arabia could be shipped by air to Yemen on an 
expedited basis, thus significantly improving North Yemen’s defensive posture." The 
American Military Attache stated: " Since Saudi Arabia was paying the bill, our only hurdle 
was to convince them of the feasibility of our initiative. Accordingly, a conference was 
arranged (with the approval of State) to be held in Riyadh in late July."101
The choice of Riyadh as the venue for this conference on Yemen defence needs reflected US 
concern for the security of Saudi Arabia. John Ruszkiewicz, the US Military Attache in 
Sana’a, travelled to Riyadh in late July to work out the arms deliveries with the US Military 
Assistance Mission in Saudi Arabia "prior to presenting our concept to the Saudi military." 
The conference, attended by representatives of a number of Department agencies from
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Washington, discussed the American proposal to improve the YAR’s defense capabilities and 
developed a programme for the use of the American equipment by Sana’a which meant an 
increase in the US presence paid for by the Saudis. This conclusion by the conference aimed 
at "supplanting" the Russians completely from the YAR as well as challenging the Soviets 
in South Yemen.
The American media openly stated that the US was "accelerating its military aid to North 
Yemen as a response to the recent tightening of Soviet influence in South Yemen," and that 
"the Carter administration is also considering sending a military advisory mission to North 
Yemen to try to reorganize and train its army. So far, that army has not been able to make 
proper use of U.S. ... military equipment that Saudi Arabia is paying for it"102. Both the US 
and Saudi Arabia governments expressed interest in an increase in US commitment. Instead 
of only supplying arms and training a few officers, the Saudis and Americans suggested that 
a US military advisory mission could be established in the YAR to take direct responsibility 
for building up the armed forces and improving the air force. With the approval of Congress, 
Saudi Arabia transferred from its stocks four trainer versions of the American-made F-5 
fighters to the YAR. Also discussed was the possibility of "following up the trainers with a 
dozen F-5 jets."103
The American proposal was not welcomed in Sana’a. Both the Americans and the Saudis 
asked the YAR to cut its links with the USSR, but Sana’a wanted to maintain at least 
minimal links with Moscow. The cost was considered to be too high since the programme
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did not include necessary items like aircraft, tanks, artillery and modem rockets similar to 
those being delivered to the PDRY by the Soviet Union. In early 1979 President Saleh told 
a Kuwaiti journal "Our current acquisition of US arms is limited and we have not received 
what we really need from the US."104 It took the Saudi government, which was not 
convinced of the feasibility of the new package to the YAR, three months to decide what to 
do. Eventually, as a result of American pressure, they submitted the Letters of Offer and 
Acceptance for the new equipment in January 1979 when the situation in Iran was alarming 
both Washington and Riyadh more than that in Sana’a.
On 10 February 1979, US Defence Secretary Harold Brown visited Saudi Arabia. On his 
arrival the Saudis suggested a larger US presence and commitment in their region, a matter 
for which Washington was not prepared. Saudi intelligence assured Brown that the Soviet 
threat to the Kingdom was real and "produced information that large numbers of South 
Yemeni tanks and artillery were moving into a remote area of North Yemen, supported by 
air strikes"105 which the Americans were "unable to confirm." On 12 February Brown 
delivered to Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Bin ’Abdul-’Aziz a letter from President Carter to 
King Khaled "suggesting periodic consultation between Washington and Riyadh on matters 
affecting the security of the Gulf region".106 Washington officials stated: "Saudi Arabia has 
been urging the United States for months to take a firmer stand in the region to 
counterbalance Soviet influence in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia." In both Riyadh 
and Dhahran Brown held talks with his Saudi counterpart Prince Sultan. He also made an 
aerial inspection of the nearby oil fields. The discussions concentrated on weapons’ sales for
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North Yemen and Sudan, which were considered "the first tangible result of a new US pledge 
to consult more closely with Saudi Arabia on defence matters." A report from Washington 
revealed that the United States was prepared to sell twelve F-5 fighters to Yemen and was 
willing to consider additional F-5s, tanks and armoured personnel carriers in a package 
totalling about $300 million, all to be fmanced by the Saudis. According to the same report 
the deal "would be subject to Congressional approval".107
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DEVELOPMENT OF A US INTEREST IN THE YAR
Tension between the YAR and the PDRY increased in January 1979, reaching a climax in 
February when war broke-out on the 23rd of the month. This tension was reflected by the 
National Democratic Front (NDF) guerrilla attacks, military preparations in both capitals, 
President ’Abdul-Fattah Isma’il’s tour to Syria, Kuwait, Iraq and Libya where he secured 
financial support from Libya for the NDF, and several official statements from both Yemens. 
On 8 February Colonel Ali Ahmad Nasser ’ Antar, reserve member of the Political Bureau and 
Defence Minister of South Yemen, issued a decree calling up the sixth group of those obliged 
to perform national service as well as those who had just completed their term of service. He 
also instructed the General Mobilization Department to implement his orders "in coordination 
with the state sectors, establishments, public and quasi-state corporations and other organs."1 
A few hours later, the YAR President ’Ali ’Abd Allah Saleh released "all political prisoners 
arrested before and after the ‘13 June Corrective Movement’2, those involved in the ‘abortive 
15 October conspiracy.’3 Minister of Interior of the YAR, ’Abdul-’Aziz al-Barati, commented 
that "the decision refutes all the allegations brought by the information departments of the 
ruling clique in Aden, whose jails are full of thousands of innocent citizens."4 Five days 
later, the YAR Foreign Minister confirmed that his government had asked for arms and 
ammunition from the US "for purely defensive purposes."5 Saleh told The New York Times 
on 18 February that his country was in urgent need of American arms to ward off Communist 
threats from the PDRY which received substantial Soviet-bloc support, but noted "such 
deliveries would be effective only if they were accompanied by American economic
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assistance." Recalling that post-war economic development in Western Europe, Japan and
South Korea had "constituted a positive factor" in blocking expansion, he concluded:
We believe that armies alone, no matter how powerful, cannot defeat the tide that is 
going through the area.... American business investment could be as important as 
ilitary aid in insuring stability in the YAR and in the rest of the Arabian peninsula.6
The justification for such a statement in the context of deteriorating relations between the two
Yemeni states was that, unlike the PDRY, the YAR was becoming more oriented towards the
Western countries and opening the doors to Western investors.
The first two weeks of February witnessed frequent clashes along the YAR-PDRY borders. 
American sources confirmed that the Yemeni government had summoned US diplomats in 
Sana’a and told them that Aden, assisted by the Soviets, was attacking YAR territory. Within 
a few days the CIA office in Sana’a confirmed the seriousness of the situation. But the 
military office reported it was being exaggerated. Two weeks later the American Ambassador, 
George Lane, "decided to go along with accounts of a very serious situation and make policy 
recommendations to Washington accordingly"7 In mid-February, Washington sought informal 
consent from Congress to most of the items of the $390 million arms package financed by 
Saudi Arabia to the YAR.
During the second half of February 1979, the US government announced "a more active 
policy to shore up the security of the Arabian Peninsula in the light of events in Iran."8 It 
also expressed concern "about the recent flare-up in fighting between North and South 
Yemen." But on 27 February President Carter stressed that he did not intend to deploy US
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troops anywhere in the Middle East, and denied press reports that his Administration had 
proposed setting up a military base in Saudi Arabia, making it clear that America intended 
to provide only encouragement to its friends in the area to defend themselves and to protect 
US interests against Iran and South Yemen.
In the third week of February 1979 Washington confirmed that $100 million worth of 
American arms to the YAR had been despatched by air, "mainly infantry support weapons 
such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns."9 On 23 February YAR and PDRY troops became 
engaged in open warfare. On 28 February the Department of State announced it was 
increasing arms supplies to the YAR for "defensive" use against "invading PDRY forces"10, 
and notified Congress of its intention to waive the waiting period for these. The Carter 
Administration also informed the Saudi government of its decision to deploy a squadron of 
F-15s and two AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia "to bolster the security of Saudi airspace." 
It ordered a carrier task force headed by the Constellation from the Seventh Fleet into the 
Western Indian Ocean to demonstrate US concern for the security of the Arabian Peninsula, 
and "to deter any possible South Yemeni advance into the North, should the opportunity for 
this on the ground appears."11 In late February and early March US military teams started 
to arrive in Sana’a to assist the Yemen armed forces in learning to operate and maintain the 
new equipment which arrived when the war was over.12 State Department spokesman 
Hodding Carter revealed that "word has been received from diplomats in Saudi Arabia that 
military personnel in the desert Kingdom which borders North Yemen had been ordered to 
report for duty"13, indicating that the US administration was determined to accelerate arms
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deliveries to North Yemen without Congressional approval "to show United States’ resolve 
to our Yemeni friends...our willingness to protect vital national interests in that part of the 
world to our Saudi ally, and finally, to send a signal to the Soviets we were serious about 
meeting Soviet encroachment into the Arabian Peninsula."14
On 3 March 1979, while the war was still going on, PDRY Foreign Minister Muhammad 
Saleh Muti’, stressed that what was going on in the North was a conflict between the 
Yemeni people led by the NDF in the North, and the regime in Sana’a.15 An NDF 
spokesperson told Aden Radio a few days later that "the client reactionary regime in Sana’a 
has assembled a strong force of regular troops and mercenaries, led by a notorious warmonger 
[and] has attempted to recover a number of areas under the control of the revolutionary 
people’s forces."16 This source expressed the will of the NDF to continue the war "against 
imperialist reactionary influence and to bring about the establishment of a democratic national 
regime in the YAR."
The border "mini-war" between the two Yemeni states of 1979 in which Washington believed 
the North "didn’t show well"17 unquestionably heightened the sense of insecurity in the 
region, alarming the US which feared the YAR would impose once again, as it had during 
the 1960s, a threat to its interests in Saudi Arabia. President Carter increased his country’s 
involvement in South Arabia politics and offered the YAR protection and arms which had 
been already "in the pipeline"18 against the PDRY.
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David Ransom, Deputy Director Office of the Secretary of Defence during the 1979 inter- 
Yemeni war of 1979, confirmed to this writer that the US stance towards the YAR in 1979 
was both military and political. Recalling what happened when he was advising the Secretary 
of Defence, he said:
The most important initiatives of the US towards the YAR were during 1979 and 
1980. When the South invaded the North after the deaths of al-Hamdi and al- 
Ghashmi, the northern army fell apart, and it looked to us that the South which was 
in a strong position was trying with Soviet help to push over the new government, to 
take it over. The YAR and the other Gulf states requested us to do something, the 
Saudis requested even more, and we did something military and political: we sent the 
Constellation, we sent planes over Aden so they would not mistake our seriousness. 
We sent a message to the head of the Soviet Union privately, warning them that we 
saw no cause or justification, for the problems from the South to spill over into the 
Arabian peninsula. It was not a threat but it was unusual to send a message. We also 
went into the UN, and coordinated with the Arab league. We shipped weapons and 
advisors very quickly. We also airlifted tanks in 1979, one tank in one plane.19 This 
was so amazing, we have never ever lifted tanks to anywhere before.20 We supplied 
intelligence about who was where. It was a very large range of diplomatic and 
military efforts, and it succeeded. It was a symbol, but an important symbol of what 
we were preparing to do if the situation got worse.21
William R. Crawford, the first US Ambassador to the YAR, also justified the US belief in 
the seriousness of the situation in the YAR during February and early March 1979. He said 
that the fighting, which began on 23 February, was "more serious than past incidents"22 and 
that it was "clearly a carefully planned, coordinated and amply supported campaign with the 
apparent intention of seizing and occupying North Yemeni territory and destabilizing the 
North Yemen government. The timing of the attack may have been related to South Yemen’s 
desire to exploit its current superiority in equipment before our announced military assistance 
reaches and is integrated into the North Yemeni armed forces.23
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The situation in the Yemens in February and early March 1979 was viewed in the United 
States in terms of global Washington-Moscow relations. Ruszkiewicz stated: "President Carter 
has to take a stand somewhere in the region, and he can do it cheap in Yemen because Saudi 
Arabia is paying all the bills."24 Quoting his Desk Officer in Charge Affairs, Lieutenant 
Colonel David Holmes, he added: "If Yemen had not happened at that particular time, it 
would have been invented."25 He also said: "our modest proposal to improve Yemen’s 
defence capability hit Washington at a time when the Administration was apparently casting 
about for some way to present a stronger image in the region. North Yemen presented itself 
as likely place for the United States to take a stand against Communist encroachment from 
the Horn of Africa, and had become the subject of a national security memorandum."26 
Ambassador George Lane quoted Zbigniew Brzezinski as saying at that time that if the YAR- 
PDRY "mini-war" hadn’t occurred, "the US would have wanted to invent something like it 
as a way of being able to demonstrate that we are serious against the Soviets who were 
backing their man, ’Abdul-Fattah Isma’il as pushing at the edges of a key country for us, 
Saudi Arabia", which was "producing 10 million barrels of crude oil everyday and hosts our 
military bases."27
Lane also indicated that the US Arms package was designed to serve the security of Saudi 
Arabia and nothing else: "The US was trying desperately to persuade Saudi Arabia to support 
the Camp David agreements [peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979], and the Saudis 
were saying ’no’. The Saudis asked us to support ’Ali ’Abd Allah. If we didn’t then the 
Saudis would say don’t ask for our support any more, [on oil prices] from oil to Camp
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David."28
The inter-Yemeni war of 1979 was viewed seriously in Washington because it coincided with 
many other events that negatively affected implementation of US foreign policy in the Area. 
These main events were: the Arab opposition to the Camp David agreements; warfare in the 
Horn of Africa in 1977-78 as a result of the Ethiopian revolution which announced its 
socialist orientation on 11 February 197729; the revolution in Iran30 which ended the role 
of the Shah of Iran as a US "policeman" in the region, the Soviet influence in Afghanistan31; 
the growing importance of the Bab al-Mandab straits following the reopening of the Suez 
Canal throughout the 1973 Arab-Israeli war during which Sana’a declared war against Israel; 
the alleged transfer of some of the Soviet Union’s military capability from Somalia to the 
PDRY; and the Carter Administration’s determination to bring about peace between Egypt 
and Israel to end the Soviet influence in the former.
Aden Condemns the US Naval Movements
On 9 March a PDRY Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed the despatch of the US 
aircraft carrier to the Arabian Sea and the passage of several US naval units through the Suez 
Canal to the Red Sea: "[Aden] sees a clear indication of America’s aggressive policy towards 
the peoples and countries of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and the resolve of the 
imperialists to create and expand hotbeds of war and fan regional conflicts in an attempt to 
harm the national sovereignty of the Arab states and peoples and to push them into 
preoccupation with regional issues and conflicts."32 He added: "They do it in an attempt to
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pave a course for Sadat to complete the negotiations with Israel." He viewed the US 
despatch of its warships from the Indian Ocean and the airlifted arms from the West to 
Sana’a aimed "to bolster up the YAR government at the cost of the peoples revolution", as 
a "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the northern part of the homeland" which 
"exposes hostile designs against Democratic Yemen."33
Debate in the US Congress Over 
the US Arms Package to the YAR
On 12 March 1979 the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 
East chaired by Lee H. Hamilton34 held a hearing on the proposed transfer of the 12 F-5E 
aircraft, 50 armoured carriers, 64 M-tanks and two C-130 transport aircraft to the YAR. 
(These transfers were considered by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other 
executive branch agencies to represent a necessary and prudent response to the military 
situation in Yemen.) The following witnesses were questioned during the Sub-committee 
session: William R. Crawford, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs of the Department of State, who had served as the first Ambassador to the 
YAR (1972-1974); David Ransom, Deputy Director, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; James Michel, Deputy Legal Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State; and Alan A. Platt, Chief, Arms Transfers 
Division, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The meeting was also attended by 
Joseph W. Twinam, Director of the State Department Bureau of Arabian Peninsula Affairs. 
This meeting in itself indicated that the US was seriously concerned by events in the Yemens.
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The situation in the YAR was a serious threat to US interests in Saudi Arabia. The effect of
the situation on US security interests was one of the major topics of the debate:
Mr. Fountain. I happen to agree with you, right or wrong, that the national security 
interests of the US are affected by what may happen there. You say Saudi Arabia’s 
security is directly affected by the situation, and neighbouring North Yemen.
Mr. Crawford. Yes.
Mr. Fountain. How is it directly affected?
Mr. Crawford. Remember the million North Yemeni workers who are in every aspect 
of Saudi Arabia and its life. It is the strong feeling of the government of Saudi 
Arabia, I think shared by ours, if because of subversion - more than subversion, actual 
invasion - from the PDRY, North Yemen were to be destabilized to the extent that 
you have a hostile pro-Soviet regime in North Yemen, all of those million workers 
in the oil fields and every other aspect of Saudi life would be hostage to the political 
dictates of the government back home. In other words, they could become a very 
harmful force in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. So, there lies the interest of Saudi 
Arabia in maintaining a government with a politically moderate orientation.35
Another aspect discussed was the Soviet presence in South Yemen and its influence in the
area, and the failure of Washington-Aden contacts to moderate South Yemen during the life
time of President Rubayye’. The witnesses expressed concern about intelligence estimates of
from 800 to 1000 Soviet advisers, about half of which were regular military personnel,
between 500 and 700 Cuban advisers, and more than 100 East Germans primarily
concentrated on internal security intelligence.36 They emphasised the strategic importance
of South Yemen: "You only have to look at the map to know how important the whole area
is to the United States."37
This fact was emphasised by all the witnesses, but the complexity of the situation was clearly 
revealed. Like the Saudis, American officials were not sure if the arms delivered would be 
used to defend Saudi and US interests. Congressman Platt said: "We cannot afford to turn our 
backs on the legitimate defence needs of the YAR. At the same time, it is not in our interest
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to supply arms to the YAR without limit."38
During a debate on the use to which military equipment sent to the YAR would be put, the
same problem was raised by committee members such as Congressman Fountain, who said:
I am not sure whether we are shipping to friend or foe. You have Russian advisers 
in North Yemen, and apparently the Saudis are concerned about the impact of the 
South Yemeni efforts against North Yemen. Just who will get hold of these tanks and 
planes, and so forth; do we know?39
To some Americans, the YAR was an unreliable ally because although its government was
not pro-Soviet, nor was it pro-Western.
This debate indicated that the main objective of the US equipment to North Yemen was
political rather than military:
Mr. Bowen40: ...That was a rather impressive list of aircraft and equipment that you 
recited to us earlier, in the possession of South Yemen, equipment which is manned, 
experienced, and operational. Do our defense experts calculate that the equipment 
which we are now discussing to be provided North Yemen is sufficient to defeat 
South Yemen, to deter aggression, to reconquer lost territory? Just what can it 
accomplish? I might add, when will it be prepared to take such action? Presumably 
it is not now, since we do not have pilots ready, or other personnel needed. To what 
extent, in other words, is this simply a showing of the flag on the part of this country, 
as opposed to an actual capable, operational force which can achieve a specific 
calculated objective?41
This was a relevant question for the US arms package in itself was useless, but intended 
simply to interrupt the YAR-Soviet military connection and to achieve a listening post in the 
YAR army. On 13 March, the US State Department confirmed that about 65 American 
military advisors would be sent to North Yemen, and stressed that they were ordered not to 
become involved in clashes with PDRY forces. This move was condemned in Congress by
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a Wisconsin Democrat, Leslie Aspin, who considered it a "dangerous" switch in US foreign 
policy. Aspin added that Department officials were saying that the atmosphere was 
"reminiscent of Vietnam in 1963." He said that the US Administration was "about to change 
its foreign policy from relatively passive to intensively active yet in [a] highly arbitrary 
fashion".42 But the Administration ignored such criticism and announced that it was sending 
a General to Saudi Arabia to coordinate the emergency shipments of Saudi and US weapons 
to Yemen 43
On March 15, Tom Reston, the State Department spokesman, stated that the "military 
instructors would play only a limited role."44 He added: "Twenty American advisers are 
already in Sana’a, and 70 more are on their way", and emphasised that America’s "primary 
objective is to see that this problem is resolved by peaceful means."45 But following the 
arrival of the American military advisors, rumours spread in Sana’a that US advisors who 
were training the YAR army to use the American arms, were at the same time training 
commandos to blow up bridges in the south, and to use ground-to-air the Vulcan weapons, 
against personnel and against villages. There were also rumours outside the YAR which 
suggested this was a part of a wider plan by the governments of the YAR, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia to overthrow the PDRY government.
Political observers in Washington believed the swift American response to the situation in the 
YAR to be due to the seriousness of the threat to American interests in Saudi Arabia.
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...the Saudis evidently need to be elaborately reassured that they and their gold would 
be safe there. This reassurance campaign has now led the Carter administration to rush 
some expensive military equipment and several score of US instructors to Yemen, a 
Saudi dependency at the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula... Yemen is a frail stage 
for [a] demonstration of US power. But it is important to the Saudis, either as a buffer 
or as a weapon against their other neighbour. Southern Yemen has been raising hell 
throughout the region in the decade since the British left. Its radical leaders seem 
responsive to anyone who wants to cause the Saudis trouble. They are also well 
supplied with Soviet arms and have recently augmented their corps of Soviet and 
Cuban advisers....46
The eventual ceasefire mediated by the Arab League was a result of American, Soviet, Saudi, 
Syrian and Iraqi pressure on the PDRY. The NDF and PDRY forces returned to their bases 
in the South by 23 March, leaving the few border town and villages they had occupied to 
YAR forces. The withdrawal of forces started on 17 March following a meeting in Sana’a 
between the two Chiefs of Staff the previous day.47 Despite this development, on 11 April 
1979 the US State Department said that "the withdrawal would not affect plans to increase 
the number of military advisers in North Yemen", that "if the ceasefire between North and 
South Yemen is held, shipment of the weapons might be made by sea instead of by air", and 
that "the aircraft carrier, Constellation, and a task force of ships would remain in the Arabian 
Sea indefinitely, as a reaction to the fighting."48
Yemeni Talks on Reunification and US Response
After the ceasefire the Arab League arranged for the two Yemeni Presidents to meet in 
Kuwait on 11 March 1979.49 Instead of merely discussing normalisation of relations between 
the two states, both Sana’a and Aden stressed that unity, "the solution for all Yemen’s 
tragedies"50 was on the agenda. On 26 March President ’Abdul-Fattah Ismai’l, the Secretary 
General of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s
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Council in the PDRY, stated that the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the US, "the 
enemy of the Arab people, is reflected in the protection of their joint interests" which was 
"the continued flow of oil and insuring the protection of Israel." The PDRY President also 
mentioned that "the gravity of the Arab political situation arising from the signing of the 
treaty of surrender between the Zionist enemy and the Sadat regime will require Saudi Arabia 
and the Arab oil-producing countries to take practical measures to strengthen Arab solidarity. 
Foremost among these measures is the oil weapon as confirmation of the clear Arab stance 
on the Camp David agreement." President Isma’il accused the US of creating the 1979 inter- 
Yemeni war "by sending arms to the region before and after the events between the two parts 
of Yemen, Washington "did not merely aim to avert what had happened in Iran and to 
preserve its interests, but also to frustrate the efforts of the Arab peoples and transform the 
Arab-Israeli war into an inter-Arab and inter-Yemeni war, like that which happened in 
Lebanon. "51
It would seem that Ismai’l was suggesting that the US encouraged the inter-Yemeni war to 
threaten Saudi Arabia, to ensure it would not use the oil weapon against Washington in 
reaction to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as it had under the leadership of King Faisal in 
1973. But if this is what he thought, a pertinent question is why was the PDRY unable to 
stop the NDF operations inside the YAR in order to counter the "imperialist conspiracies" of 
which the PDRY Cabinet spoke one day later?52
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Instead, the YAR and the PDRY tried to counter these "conspiracies" in their own way. 
Between 28-30 March President Saleh and his Southern counterpart met in Kuwait and 
decided to begin a new phase in inter-Yemeni relations. On 29 March President Isma’il 
revealed that the PDRY had proposed a unity plan at the very beginning of the summit.53 
The President of the YAR told the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai al-’Aam that the US arms 
package to his country during the war had been the subject of four years negotiations and had 
nothing to do with the recent war. He stressed that his country "deals with the US in the 
same way it does with the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference 
in internal affairs."54 On 30 March President Saleh and President Isma’il announced a new 
unity accord. Their joint statement asserted a determination "to consolidate the just pan-Arab 
struggle against the common enemy represented by the imperialist-Zionist-US alliance and 
treason."55 In the wake of the summit, as a gesture of good will, President Saleh dismissed 
his Foreign Minister ’Abd Allah al-Asnadj, and his Minister of Culture and Information, 
Muhammad Salem Basindwah, who were among the leaders of FLOSY. Rumours in Sana’a 
said that al-Asnadj opposed President Saleh’s attempts to normalise relations with the South 
and had started cooperating directly with Saudi Arabia in order to influence President Saleh. 
Alarmed by this development and by the movements towards unity, Saudi Arabia promptly 
stopped the flow of US arms to Sana’a. The US did not welcome the unity plans because of 
its strong connections with Saudi Arabia and because they contradicted Washington own 
plans to counter Soviet influence in the PDRY.
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Minimal YAR-US Relations
When the war ended in March 1979, YAR-US relations were interrupted: American interests 
in Saudi Arabia were no longer under threat, and the Saudis, who had better connections with 
Washington and who had financed the US arms package to Sana’a, saw that continued 
cooperation between Sana’a and Washington would not protect KSA interests. In early 1979 
the US took the situation in Yemen seriously mostly because it was considered important in 
Riyadh56. This was stressed by the first US Ambassador to the YAR, William Crawford, 
who stated: "We felt that this situation was of sufficient gravity... [to] enter the arena of 
United States-Soviet global relations. We sought to serve clear evidence to the Soviet Union 
that we regarded the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia as vital to the interests of the United 
States: that the security and integrity of North Yemen is important because it is in return 
regarded as vital by the Saudis."57
Another factor was that in the weeks immediately following the ceasefire and before the
South Yemeni threat to Saudi Arabia eased, the US was reportedly training North and South
Yemeni commandoes to carry out sabotage raids in South Yemen.58 When YAR and PDRY
leaders started to discuss unity, however, American policy was forced to change. Political
sources in Washington revealed:
US intelligence organisations have concluded that the North Yemeni government of 
President ’Ali ’Abd Allah Saleh, which is receiving emergency shipments from a US 
arms package worth $500 millions, is likely to collapse within the next six months 
...intelligence reports circulated within the Administration conceded that US analysts 
are uncertain who will succeed the erratic and unpopular President Saleh and take 
control of the F-5e jet fighters, M-60 tanks and other weapons now being supplied to 
the North Yemeni army...the uncertainty about a successor...[has] initiated 
discussions in the State Department, National Security Council, and [the]
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Pentagon about slowing the emergency shipments authorised by President 
Carter on March 9, during border fighting between North and South Yemens... 
US analysts have concluded that the South Yemeni military thrust into North 
Yemen was not an attempt to occupy the country but was aimed at destroying 
Saleh’s credibility and embarrassing his army so severely that it would turn 
against him.59
The change in US policy was clearly a reaction to the Yemeni unity talks. Theso talks slowed 
down the transfer of American arms to the YAR still in Saudi Arabia, creating 
misunderstanding between Sana’a and Washington. In March 1979 rumours circulated in 
Sana’a said that except for two air force personnel all American military advisors had left the 
country, and that their departure was connected with Sana’a’s efforts to get arms from the 
Soviet Union.
Consequently, during the same month, Saudi Arabia agreed to resume the supply of American 
arms demonstrating that the KSA did not dictate US policy when the strategic interests of 
Washington were concerned. This was subsequently confirmed by Major Ruszkiewicz, the 
US Military Attache in Sana’a, in his personal account of the events in this period.60 Despite 
opposition from Riyadh the US administration removed some constraints on the provision of 
military aid to Sana’a in order to restrict military relations between Sana’a and Moscow. This, 
however, was not enough to satisfy the needs of the YAR.61 On 12 April The Washington 
Post reported that a squadron of 12 F-5E had been delivered to Saudi Arabia for reassembly 
and shipment to North Yemen.62 It was then confirmed that the last items of the $390 
million arms package, hurriedly authorised by President Carter when war broke out in 
February, had been delivered by the US Navy. US Defence Department spokesman Tom Ross
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was quoted saying "the ship began unloading 32 M-60 tanks and 50 armoured personnel 
carriers at Hudeidah", that "the 80,000-ton aircraft carrier Constellation, despatched to the 
Indian Ocean to show the American flag, had been relieved by the carrier Midway from the 
South China Sea", and that "the US mobile teams in North Yemen numbering 21 men, will 
continue to instruct North Yemenis in the use and care of US arms."63
But part of the US arm package was delayed in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh, fearing the influence 
of Sana’a on its Yemeni client tribes in the North, which were its lever in YAR affairs, 
decided to constrain the power of President Saleh and his government by restricting the 
supply of American arms. The Saudis justified their position by raising the issue of the YAR- 
KSA border dispute and the presence of military advisors in Sana’a. This "Saudi 
unwillingness to transfer the weapons either quickly or fully indicated the continuation of 
certain basic differences between Riyadh and Sana’a on security matters."64 According to 
Ambassador Lane, "after the war there was a major problem between the United States and 
the Yemen because the Saudis were no longer interested in sending the weapons to the 
Yemen, because the danger from South Yemen ceased. President Saleh was terribly interested 
in building up his military forces so as to make sure that what happened in February 1979 
could not happen again."65
Originally, the US and the KSA saw that it was in their interest to provide Sana’a with only 
a limited amount of defensive weapons to provide military protection in the event of pro- 
sov iet invasion. A Department of State memorandum66 issued in August 1978, which
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referred to the 6 August meeting of Ambassador West with Prince Sultan the Saudi Defence
Minister and Prince Saud al-Faisal, stated that the scope of the military program to the YAR,
"which essentially involves accelerated and more effective introduction of already approved
and funded equipment, will fall short of meeting Yemeni expectations." It stressed that the
US-KSA air-lift to accelerate delivery of artillery and anti-aircraft weapons would
"demonstrate in a politically effective manner" the two countries’ support for the YAR. The
memorandum continued:
At the moment we are facing numerous technical problems characteristic of trying to 
implement a program such as this in a country like North Yemen in cooperation with 
a government like Saudi Arabia, but no basic policy problems are involved. Down the 
road we face the question of whether we will be able to accede to the general Saudi 
desire that we put up at least a token amount of the financing of our participation in 
training the YAR forces on specific items of equipment as well as the issue of how 
to handle inevitable Yemeni requests for additional weapons and equipment... For the 
moment, however, we are launched on asserting a limited but direct US role in North 
Yemen, related to introducing specific, Saudi-funded equipment in a way which can 
build the Saudi confidence in our desire to cooperate fully with them while 
demonstrating to North Yemen that our support is tangible.67
The North Yemeni government continued its efforts to establish direct dealings with
Washington. In mid June 1979, President Saleh, in a letter that his top political adviser, ’Abd
Allah al-Asnadj, personally handed to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington, asked
for the despatch of senior US military advisers to help train his armed forces in the use of
the American equipment. He also appealed "for a more direct US military role in the Arabian
Peninsula and Gulf region". In an interview in Washington al-Asnadj called on Americans
to "liberate themselves from the Vietnam complex" by actively defending "certain political
values" in the Peninsula. Al-Asnadj also said that "the 30,000-man Yemeni army, which
largely has been trained and equipped by the Soviet Union over the past decade, was having
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trouble converting to US material and methods and would benefit from a reorganization 
program that would be directed by US officers stationed in Yemen". Mentioning that between 
30-50 military instructors had been roistered on short-term postings, and that members of a 
military planning and command-structure team headed by Major General Richard Lawrence 
stationed temporarily in Saudi Arabia had also visited Sana’a to survey defense needs, al- 
Asnadj said that "Yemen would welcome a similar planning mission and predicted that 
permanently stationing senior U.S. officers in the area would not draw criticism from other 
Arab countries."68 According to political analysts in Washington, al-Asnadj’s statements 
"indicated irritation with slow deliveries of the US arms through Saudi Arabia"69 for he 
emphasised "that any increased U.S. presence in Yemen should be made in the context of the 
trilateral military arrangement."70 A few days later The Christian Science Monitor quoted 
the Yemeni envoy as saying "North Yemen would do nothing to undermine US peace efforts 
in the current Egyptian-Israeli talks to implement the Camp David agreements."71 By making 
such a statement, al-Asnadj was trying to convince the American Administration of his 
government’s commitment to the West. But his argument was not as strong as that posed by 
US business interests in the KSA.
Although the YAR slowed down unity talks as a result of Saudi pressure Al-Asnadj’s mission 
was not successful72, nor did he succeed in representing the Yemeni point of view 
concerning direct YAR-US contacts and he was forced to talk constantly about trilateral 
relations.73 The following month the YAR Prime Minister, ’Abdul-’Aziz ’Abdul-’Ghani, 
travelled to the US where he met US Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
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Zbigniew Brzezinski on 28 August to discuss "the arms package, the bilateral relationship and 
relations as a whole"74, according to Ambassador George Lane who was also present. Due 
to the stronger Washington-Riyadh relationship, demonstrated by Saudi Arabia’s helpful oil 
policy at a time when Washington was trying to persuade Riyadh to accept the Egyptian- 
Israeli Camp David agreements, US policy did not alter. Ambassador Lane stressed that 
during this period Saudi daily oil production reached nearly 10 million barrels at $32 per 
barrel, $4 less than the OPEC price.75 No real understanding between Sana’a and 
Washington developed because the two countries did not share the same strategic outlook 
regarding threats to security. As was the case of many countries in the area Sana’a believed 
the main threat to its security came from Saudi Arabia and a radical South Yemen as well 
as from Israel, whereas the US believed the chief security threat to its interests in Saudi 
Arabia and Israel came from the Soviet Union and the radical Arabs.
US military and political arrangements successfully contained the PDRY and Soviet threats 
to its interests in Saudi Arabia throughout the inter-Yemeni war period of 1979. This was 
achieved in part through alternative strategic assets, its bases in Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean and Masirah in the Sultanate of ’Oman, making the need to arm the YAR redundant. 
While opposed to the latter policy the KSA had no objections to the former. This provides 
one possible explanation for Washington’s negative response to the YAR’s demands. The 
events of 1978, 1979, (and later of 1986) in the two Yemens also weakened the hardliners 
in the PDRY and the country as a whole, indicating that US bases around the PDRY were 
sufficient to protect US interests. The outcome was that the YAR felt forced to respond
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positively to Soviet initiatives during and after the second inter-Yemeni war of 1979.
Sana’a Seeks Soviet Arms 
Creating US Concern
On 5 October 1979, YAR Foreign Minister Dr Hassan Makki confirmed that Sana’a had 
invited US military advisors to join Soviet experts in training his country’s army. He added 
that negotiations were in process for a new agreement to supply the North Yemeni army with 
US weapons. At the same time Makki confirmed the USSR was still supplying arms and 
military advisors concluding: "We cannot forget the role played by the Soviet Union in 
helping us and providing us with weapons when the revolution was under attack. We are 
proud of our friendship with the Soviet Union, which is based on mutual respect and the 
preservation of the interests of the two people."76 This can be interpreted as indirect 
criticism of the US. In Sana’a proposals to obtain more Soviet arms were justified because 
the US refused to supply equipment directly; Washington only approved an annual aid budget 
to be spent on training YAR personnel in American military academies and on the 
maintenance of the US military equipment previously sold to the YAR. Yemen apparently 
accepted this kind of aid in order to avoid American conditions. Washington may have 
favoured a presence in the YAR on an equal footing to Moscow, but Makki’s statement 
indicates that Washington had become less interested in arming and reorganising the Yemeni 
army.
Two months later the US press made it clear that Sana’a had moved towards Moscow in
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return for more arms and military advice. The Washington Post commented: "Yemen’s 
President, having pocketed the [nearly half a billion] US arms, is now taking even larger 
doses of Soviet arms, and advisers... This development is no small embarrassment for 
Washington. The administration perhaps thought it was buying a Yemen. It turns out it may 
have been only renting a Yemen, for uncertain time."77 It seemed strange to many Western 
observers that what they considered to be their Yemeni ally should seek arms from their 
enemy. Yemeni needs were never discussed.
Despite this, the YAR continued to be of significance to the US because of its position on 
the Red Sea and its location between the rich oil resources of the KS A and the radical PDRY. 
This is why, according to Ambassador Lane, Sana’a was "the only country in the world 
where in the morning the United States had a training program for Yemen pilots on the F5 
planes at Sana’a airport, and in the afternoon the Soviets had a training program for Yemeni 
pilots on the Sukhoi 22."78
Correspondence between the White House and Congress shows that YAR-US military 
cooperation could not be developed simply because it did not serve US national security 
purposes. Arming the YAR was opposed by many influential Americans who criticised 
President Carter for his decision to waive congressional authority in order to expedite the 
delivery of military supplies to Sana’a. Letters dated 3 and 4 April and 30 May 1979, signed 
by a number of Congressmen79 demonstrate strong objections and raised the following 
points: any reasonable review of the facts in the Yemeni situation supports the view that
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Presidential powers had been misused; the State Department was unable to state exactly what 
national security interests were involved in the Yemen; although US intelligence on the 
fighting between North and South Yemen was meagre, it had been confirmed in early April 
that the YAR could not utilize, maintain or absorb any of the US equipment quickly, for few, 
if any, of its military personnel were acquainted with the equipment the US was proposed to 
sell; the use of the waiver to avoid the 30-day review procedure and the expedited deliveries 
could not affect the military conflict which had been defused by the Arab League mediation 
efforts; if the Administration felt a need to support the Saudis and to show America’s firm 
resolve, there were more appropriate steps which would not distort the law; had 
Congressional debate taken place, serious questions would have been raised about the wisdom 
of sending sophisticated arms. The YAR was described as "a feudal society with an army 
divided along tribal lines" and "the most unstable country in the Middle East", therefore there 
was "grave danger that the weapons will fall into hostile hands, as they did in Iran." Only 
Jonathan Bingham’s letter expressed the view that "the administration could have felt our 
national security interest in Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves and hence in the continued pro- 
Western orientation of the Saudi Arabian government required that the United States respond 
in a vigorous and decisive way to [a] South Yemeni attack on the Yemen Arab Republic."80
In reply to these letters and others from Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional Relations, to Clarence Long, Chairman of the US House of Representatives, 
Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House, the US Department of State argued that the Administration had
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concluded by September 1978 it was necessary to provide arms to Sana’a, but that the 
Congressional calendar delayed notification until the new Congress convened in 1979. It also 
pointed out that although the ceasefire of mid March was successful and the PDRY withdrew 
its troops, after the Arab League ceasefire of March 8 was unsuccessful, the PDRY rapidly 
took possession of some strategic YAR territory, hence prospects for sustained peace 
remained uncertain. Thus the American government believed that the equipment provided 
important reassurance to the YAR government during the war and served as a signal to 
regional friends that the US was a dependable partner in their quest for stability and enhanced 
security, and that the US action had an ongoing impact in helping deter renewed PDRY 
aggression. It concluded that "the level of sophistication involved does not match that 
provided to Iran or other regional states over the years"; while the Department did not believe 
the risk of its equipment falling into hostile hands was high, "the limited numbers involved 
and our control over spare parts, munitions and supply equipment would preclude the 
equipment becoming a threat to our friends in the area."81
The shift towards the USSR indicates that the YAR government believed that it was in their 
interests to maintain good relations with Moscow because the US was not willing to organise 
and equip the YAR’s army without the approval of Riyadh which footed the bill. US 
objectives were seen to be merely to "minimize any further threat against Saudi Arabia, 
reduce Soviet influence, and counteract the PDRY’s radical government."82 It was clearly 
only Washington’s concern for Saudi repercussions which made it decide not to send more 
arms to the YAR. Al-asnadj’s and ’Abdul-Ghani’s subsequent visit to Washington shows that
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Sana’a tried to deal directly with Washington during June 1979, but when this failed the 
Yemeni government turned the very next month to Moscow, where a major arms agreement 
was signed. Between 26 and 28 October 1979, President Saleh visited Moscow personally 
to seek more arms. The Soviets agreed to provide the YAR with many of its military needs 
in order in support of their policy that aimed at "neutralization of the ...Gulf, Red Sea and 
Indian ocean area."83
On this subject, Professor Robert Stookey has stressed that "the special relationship between
the United States and Saudi Arabia formed after the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict had
repercussions on Yemen-American relations." It therefore "became customary for the United
States to take significant action toward Yemen only after close consultation with the
Saudis."84 Stookey also wrote:
Since some Saudi policies in the YAR are actually determined to [restrict] the 
authority and freedom of action of the Sana’a government, this is resented by the 
Yemenis, who would prefer a more direct, and broader, relationship with the United 
States. The United States appears to oppose the Soviet presence in Yemen, without 
acknowledging its value to the Yemenis as a counterweight to the tight Saudi embrace 
and its contribution to Yemeni national security.... The YAR was reluctant to sever 
its military ties with the USSR, prompting the Saudis to delay the delivery of 
American arms and ammunition and also to suspend financial aid to the YAR 
government. To the consternation of the United States and Saudi Arabia, substantial 
shipments of Soviet arms and equipment began to arrive at the port of Hudeidah in 
October 1979.85
David Ransom, the Director of Arabian Peninsula affairs in the US State Department in 
January 1990, commented that the Soviets felt they were going to loose their position in the 
North, "so they offered a very big arms package to Yemen."86 When asked if he thought this 
was a result of the negative US attitude towards the YAR, Ransom replied: "Yes. And the
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Yemenis accepted [the Soviet offer], but the Soviets gave more aid and more weapons to the 
South than to the North and provided more advisors until 1986. In 1986, 1987 and 1988 the 
curves cross. Now the Soviets provide more to the North than to the South, because the South 
is a failure.”87
Even though the YAR had received strong US military support, its leaders felt they had no 
choice but to remain on good terms with the USSR. If they had been expelled from the YAR, 
the Soviets would no longer have had any incentive to restrain Aden’s military ambitions 
against Sana’a. Events in the Horn of Africa set a precedent: when the USSR attempted to 
mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia both allied to the Soviet Union but opposed to each 
other the Soviets had been expelled from Somalia in 1977. Moscow then gave all its support 
to Ethiopia leaving Somalia unable to receive comparable support from Washington. Somalia 
had been trying to seize territory from Ethiopia, the YAR, however, merely wished to protect 
territory it already had. The YAR leadership, therefore, felt it was essential to their country’s 
security to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union.88
Sana’a’s relationship with Moscow worried the US Administration but its interests in Saudi 
Arabia were secure. Washington wanted the YAR as an ally but "at a cheap price."89 On 5 
February 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said before the House of Representatives 
Foreign Affairs Committee that the US "faced an important and troubling situation"90 
because of the signs of growing Soviet influence in Yemen, and as a consequence a special 
envoy had been sent to the YAR for talks with President Saleh. Calling the political situation
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in Sana’a "very delicate and fragile", Vance said that Soviet arms deliveries to the country, 
along with the presence of Soviet advisors there and talks with Aden over political unity, had 
led to new fears of Soviet gains in the oil-producing Arabian Peninsula. He asked members 
of the Committee to help the Administration remove restrictions on providing military and 
economic aid to certain countries such as the YAR. He told journalists the Soviets were 
"prepared to fish in troubled waters"91.
The YAR-USSR arms deal to break Saudi interference in the Yemeni affairs was the direct 
result of the Saudis’ insensitive handling of the transfer of US arms, the diplomatic situation 
after the border fight and the unity agreement with South Yemen.92 On the Subject of a 
campaign within the US to keep the YAR pro-Western, former US Secretary of Defence 
Arthur Schlesinger, then Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at City University 
New York, wrote:
It is now a year after the great Yemen crisis of 1979... This anniversary provides an 
appropriate opportunity to consider what subsequently happened to Mr. Carter’s 
"emergency." In the year since, negotiations between the two Yemens, already under­
way when the emergency was declared, have turned into unification talks. Colonel Ali 
’Abd Alla Saleh, the President of "our" Yemen, has signed an arms agreement with 
Moscow. Soviet tanks, planes and rocket launchers have arrived in North Yemen. 
Saudi Arabia, disturbed by the turn of events, has cut back its financial aid to North 
Yemen. The American F-5E aircraft, M-60 tanks, Vulcan air defence systems, so 
imprudently rushed to North Yemen, may well, at the next spin of the dial, end up 
pointed at the Saudis, if not at us...93
President Saleh, in an interview with the Kuwaiti al-Siyassah, dismissed these allegations 
against the YAR, which never mentioned the fact that Saudi Arabia was playing with the 
YAR for its own objectives; the Saudis succeeded in disturbing military relations between
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Sana’a and Moscow and then slowed down the delivery of the US arms package in order to 
promote further instability in the YAR. On this issue Saleh said "what is surprising is that 
it is we, and not others, who are the target of campaigns of suspicion and attack, as if by 
diversifying the sources of arms for our armed forces we have moved from one position to 
another. Our decision to diversify the sources of arms is dictated to us by Yemen’s interests 
as well as pan-Arab interests."94
Soviet "Strategic Advance"
Constrains YAR-USA Connection
What a specialist on Yemen observed during his visit to Sana’a in April 1984 about a Soviet
preparation for what he believed to be "another strategic advance" in the area, was applicable
to the situation a few years earlier:
The Soviet Union has intervened to help the conservative government of North Yemen 
crush a left wing guerrilla movement in a move largely unnoticed by the rest of the 
world and played down here.95 The aid in the form of an estimated $600 million 
worth of arms delivered from 1979 onwards and hundred of military advisors, has 
enabled the Sana’a authorities to build an effective central army for the first time in 
the country’s history and inflict defeat on the forces of the National Democratic Front 
which had been active throughout much of the southern part of this country for some 
years... The Russians did not want to loose their foothold in North Yemen to the West 
without a fight...96
This was an accurate observation. The Soviets abandoned the NDF and even their greatest 
ally, ’Abdul-Fattah Ismai’l97, for their wider concerns in the area; more than just preserve 
its interests in the YAR, Moscow sought to "reassure the Gulf Arabs of its non-hostile 
intentions in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion."98 On the other hand, in late 1979 after 
direct USSR involvement in both the PDRY and the YAR, Moscow did not support President
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IsmaiTs policies in South Yemen99: instead the YAR realised the necessity of maintaining 
communication with the Soviet Union and accepting a Soviet presence. It was reported that 
Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev was opposed to the policies of South Yemen during that 
period, a matter which contributed to the ousting of Isma’il in 1980. The leadership in 
Moscow was convinced that "revolution was unlikely in the oil rich states of the Arabian 
Peninsula."100 Moscow sought to befriend these conservative governments and supported 
the fourth PDRY President, Ali Nasser Muhammad, who paved the way for the Soviet Union 
to establish relations for the first time ever with most of these rich states.
According to Stookey "the Soviets have come to the conclusion, on the basis of their 
historical experience in various apparently radical countries, that no Arab country, including 
the PDRY, is a realistic candidate for membership in their community of socialist nations, 
given the persistent strength of Islamic and Arab Nationalist traditions. They, therefore, now 
seek to continue mutually beneficial relations with Arab countries regardless of their political 
complexion."101
In addition to what can be considered a shift in the Soviet position vis-a-vis the US in the 
Arabian Peninsula, it is also possible to discern the invalidity of the old Soviet strategy of 
opposition to US influence in the region. Moscow was forced to adopt new policies towards 
the YAR to prevent the loss of a foothold in the most populated country of the area.
As a consequence of the Soviet initiative, relations between the US and the YAR soured in
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mid-1979 and thereafter were at best only minimal. Throughout the early 1980’s the US was 
criticised in the YAR for its subordination of Yemeni interests to those of the Saudis, its 
strong support of Israel, and for the poor quality as well as the small quantity of its military 
and economic aid programs. These criticisms were not as strong as they might have been 
because Yemenis expectations of the US were gradually lowered.102
Beginning of "Tangible US Participation"
By the end of 1979 nine private non-profit-making US organisations provided the north 
Yemeni people with development assistance and material aid. As far as the arms package was 
concerned most of the equipment arrived before the end of the year. US official figures show 
that in 1980 the total value of American arms received in Sana’a was US $316.4 million.103 
The YAR Ambassador to Washington in 1990 told this author that the total received to date 
was $360 million worth of arms.104 The American F5s were present at the military show 
in Sana’a the 17th anniversary of the revolution, on 26 September 1979. Ambassador Lane 
told this author that on that day nine of the twelve planes in the show were flown by pilots 
of four different nationalities without a common language. There were three Saudis, two 
Yemenis, two Americans and two Nationalist Chinese (Taiwanese). The Yemenis and the 
Saudis spoke in Arabic which the Saudis translated into English to the Americans and the 
Taiwanese.105
Before the end of 1980 relations between the two countries were shaken yet further when the 
Yemeni government arrested two American citizens and put them on trial for spying.106
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They were released in early February 1981 after official negotiations between the two
107countries
YAR-US relations in the 1980s were characterised by some modest USAID projects in the 
country reflecting continued US interest in the country. US governmental and Congressional 
documents of the first five years of the 1980s reveal that US political interest in the 
strategically-located Yemen increased during these years as the political stability in the 
Middle East became increasingly fragile and as Western dependence on Middle East oil 
continued. The Reagan Administration stressed that in demographic and supply terms the 
YAR played an important role in the Arabian Peninsula. The YAR’s political importance was 
assured by its geographic relationship to the troubled Horn of Africa and Marxist South 
Yemen. A pact signed between Aden, Tripoli, and Addis-Ababa in mid-1981 was interpreted 
in Washington as being explicitly directed at countering US influence; one of the main 
purposes of the USAID-financed development projects in the YAR was to strengthen forces 
resistant to a PDRY takeover in the sense that "a strong government in the YAR, friendly to 
its neighbours enhances US interests in regional stability and security."108
The nature of US interest in the YAR changed after 1984 as demonstrated by USAID 
presentations to Congress in 1985 and 1986. These presentations, which referred for the first 
time to "the potential oil resources in the ill-defined border [area]", also revealed that "a long­
term US program of human resources and industrial development seeks to lay a foundation 
for sustained national development and a stronger friendship between Yemen and the United
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States"109, and stressed the need for "tangible US participation in the economic 
development"110 of the YAR.
Under pressure from Saudi Arabia to limit its role in Yemen, Washington no longer wanted 
to supply the YAR with arms and restricted the amount of official aid. But, bothered by 
USSR influence in the YAR, it permitted private sector oil exploration. In 1980 reports of 
large oil fields provided the US with a new opportunity to compete with the USSR in the 
YAR. The Texas based oil company, Hunt Consolidated Incorporation, invested $4 million 
to run an initial seismic survey of 1,845 kilometres to determine if there was an oil basin 
under the sands of Marib in Yemen. On 3 September 1981, the newly formed Yemen Hunt 
Oil Company signed a production-sharing agreement with the YAR to conduct hydrocarbon 
explorations of more than 3 million acres of the Marib-al-Djawf basin. Drilling started as 
soon as the first positive result was achieved111 and the first well "was exactly where it 
should be."112 In the same month the Yemen Oil and Mineral Corporation (YOMINCO) and 
the Hunt Oil Company of Dallas signed a twenty-five year sharing agreement. The US 
Embassy confirmed that it informally encouraged and advised the US oil companies to pursue 
their explorations, "because it’s good for the United States."113 The American press 
predicted that the oil find in the YAR "might bring a political shift" and that the discovery 
of oil enhanced "U.S. interests in that country and that the development of oil was likely to 
reduce Sana’a’s financial dependence on Saudi Arabia"114.
Apart from the profits which the US oil companies would get from their investments in the
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country the US sought to compensate for the declining YAR remittances from Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf by this oil find in YAR territory. Between 1982 and 1985 the oil revenues of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates fell from $180 billion to nearly $60 billion 
as a result of the Iraq-Iran war which consumed part of the modest revenues. This affected 
Arabian Peninsula aid to the YAR and the remittances of the North Yemeni workers in these 
countries which fell from $1.4 billion to just under $500 million. In terms of its global rivalry 
with the USSR the US feared that this economic situation might promote a leftist orientation 
in the YAR, which no longer accepted Saudi strings. Thus it was in Washington’s interest 
to promote oil exploration in the YAR, especially since the Iraq-Iran war was threatening to 
slow or stop oil production elsewhere in the area.
The Yemen Hunt Oil Company’s exploration resulted in a flow of Yemeni oil in July 1984 
in "commercial and exportable quantities." This was announced by President Saleh in 
December, at the beginning of the Islamic Conference Organisation meetings in Sana’a. This 
find had the biggest single influence in the US interest in the YAR since it promoted the 
country into a different category in the eyes of the US Administration.115 US imports of oil 
continued to grow every year giving the YAR new importance especially since, as Hunt 
sources confirmed to this writer, it was known that there was much more oil to be 
exploited.116
The outcome was an increase in official US contacts because, as Marjorie Ransom, a former 
US Cultural Attache and founder of the Yemeni-American Language Institute (YALI) in
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Sana’a, confirmed "when our private relationship expands that also affects the formal 
one."117 Washington doubled its aid to the YAR in 1984 once it became clear that there was 
oil, in order to exert more influence and to promote trade between the two nations. According 
to Marjorie Ransom aid programmes promote more knowledge about the country and 
companies that sell food assistance programs might also become interested in selling products 
through regular channels.118 According to John Kelly, the US Assistant Secretary of State 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in 1990, US aid to the YAR is generally considered 
to be "in the geopolitical interest of the US" which gives "good access for American oil 
companies and firms which have an interest there" and "has tended to dilute the Soviet 
influence."119 The transcript of the press conference given by Kelly in 1990 also reveals 
political reasons behind the decision to double the amount of aid to the YAR since 1984: 
Q. What about development assistance?
A.We provide assistance to North Yemen. The last fiscal year was about $20 million. 
Q. How much [do] we get back from the $20 million every year? What gain?
A. Oh yes. Well I think over the years, the US, there has tended to dilute the Soviet 
influence.
Q. $20 million every year for how many years?
A. This has been up and down. That was the most recent years figure.
Q. We don’t get anything back!
A. I think we are. I think we are getting access among other things, good access for 
American oil companies and firms which have an interest there.
Q. Oil companies should pay then. Should they?
A. Well... We’re helping a country that needs some help and development. It is in the 
geopolitical interest of the US.
The American use of the oil card to make closer contacts with the YAR was interrupted by
the Saudi government which claimed the Marib oil was within its own borders and a part
of its existing fields.120 The Saudi objections apparently went unheard in Washington for
the US companies continued to explore vigorously for more YAR oil. The USA had clearly
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decided not to leave the YAR to the Soviets who could not compete in developing the 
economy of the country. Yemeni and American officials confirmed that Saudi Arabia, which 
used not to have southern borders on its official maps, had laid claim to territory near Marib. 
A number of border clashes occurred as a result of Saudi support of some Northern Yemeni 
tribes resisting the authority of the central government in Sana’a. Riyadh resurrected old 
border claims spanning the new oil fields, and a map was published which put most of the 
area being explored by the Yemen Hunt Oil Company area inside Saudi borders. It was later 
revealed that in late 1984 Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, wrote to the 
YAR Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the YAR, Dr ’Abdul-Karim al-Iryani, 
reiterating these claims.121 Yemeni sources commented that the Saudi attitude toward North 
Yemen was "triggered by Riyadh’s fear that this poor but populous country could pose a 
security threat if it finds itself awash with oil", explaining why it had "revived claims to 
Yemeni territory where the oil was discovered."122 A Fellow at the US Institute of Peace 
warned his government that "if American diplomacy is unsuccessful in moderating Saudi 
policy toward its neighbours however, then, Washington should consider publicly expressing 
concern about Saudi actions and providing increased security assistance to Oman and North 
Yemen. Washington should not remain idle when Saudi policies hurt our, as well as their 
own, interests."123
Washington, it can be concluded, did not approve of the Saudi reaction because the oil 
partnership created the first economic incentive for the US private sector to invest in the 
YAR. The growing US dependency on Middle Eastern oil meant that the YAR had a more
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significant position in US foreign policy by the beginning of 1984 than ever before. Yemeni 
oil revenues encouraged trade between the two states. On 18 December 1985, it was revealed 
in Sydney that the US had sold to the YAR 50,000 tonnes of American wheat "subsidised by 
about $20 per tonne under the Export Enhancement Programme."124 The Australian Wheat 
Board reacted angrily to the sale claiming that "the subsidy was specifically targeted to cut 
the Australian price by a couple of dollars" and that "the US...have paid the international 
Louis Grain Trading Company [an American company] a subsidy of more than $20 per tonne 
to beat the Australian bid". Another sale of the same quantity took place in May 1986 and 
the Australian Wheat Board claimed that Washington’s wheat export subsidy policies had cost 
Sydney $1.32 million.125 These cut-price wheat sales to the YAR indicate that the US 
decided to use an economic instrument to achieve more influence in Sana’a. The importance 
of the US subsidised wheat sales to Sana’a in the 1980s to Washington’s foreign policy 
towards the YAR can be better understood in the light of similar sales to Egypt in the 1950s 
and early 1960s and the subsequent withholding of wheat shipments by the Johnson 
Administration.
YAR-USA relations became more stable as the YAR became an object of interest to many 
of the major American and multi-national companies involved in petroleum exploration and 
production. During 1984 one of the famous "seven sisters", Exxon, bought a 49 percent 
interest in the Hunt Oil Company’s concession and agreed to provide several million dollars 
of capital investment in 1986 and 1987. The YAR government approved this agreement by 
which Hunt and Exxon set up a joint venture to produce and transport oil from the Alif oil
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field, which had an estimated 400 million barrels of recoverable oil reserves. It also called 
for both companies to explore for additional oil reserves in the jointly held areas. The Hunt 
land was adjacent to areas held by Exxon which under a separate production-sharing 
agreement with the YAR government, was not affected by the joint venture.126 In the jointly 
controlled border area of the two Yemeni states, to which exploration rights were awarded 
to a consortium of multi-national companies, the American Hunt and Exxon companies had 
the biggest stake at 37.5 percent.127
US Vice-President George Bush in Sana’a
On 10 April 1986 US Vice-President George Bush arrived in Sana’a.128 The following 
factors were highly relevant to his visit: First, the Hunt Oil Company which had its 
headquarters in Bush’s home town in Texas, had stimulated US interest in the country;129 
Secondly. The defeat of the NDF a few years earlier had led to greater political stability after 
1982; Thirdly. The inter-PDRY conflict which took place three months earlier had weakened 
the radical government in Aden and hence Washington’s hopes for a less radical government 
in South Yemen were renewed; Fourthly. The ongoing Iraq-Iran war since September 1980 
was creating instability in the region.
On his arrival at Sana’a airport Bush stated: "this is a critical year in world events, especially 
here in the Arabian Peninsula, where a brutal war has been waged in the Gulf area for five 
years, and a smaller... but also brutal... one was fought south of here only a few weeks ago. 
Yet throughout these troubled times the Yemen Arab Republic has vigorously safeguarded
215
it stability and sovereignty." He added that the Americans had recently "found oil in the
Yemen Arab Republic", and that "we look forward to a close and enduring relationship" with 
Sana’a.130 At a dinner hosted by the YAR Vice President and Speaker of the People’s 
Constituent Assembly, Kadi ’Abdul-Karim ’Abd Allah al-’Arashi, Vice^emphasised the same 
points:
In recent weeks South Yemen has witnessed a tragic conflict. Many lives were lost; 
society as a whole suffered a serious setback from which it will take many years to 
recover. Here in the Yemen Arab Republic, on the other hand, under a practical and 
far-sighted national leadership, an American oil company took a big chance after years 
of studying the geology of this country, drilled for oil, and where others had failed, 
it succeeded. Now the Yemen Arab Republic at last has at its command the resources 
that have so changed other countries of the Arabian peninsula... Americans are eager 
to be a part of the Yemen Arab Republic’s growth. Americans are eager to be in 
partnership with your people and your government - a partnership that can help bring 
a better life not only to this country, but, I am confident, to this entire region. The 
confidence that the United States government has in this relationship with the Yemen 
Arab republic is reflected by our decision to build a new Embassy here.131
In his reply Kadi al-’Arashi stressed that the YAR January dispute was considered by the
YAR government to be an internal matter of the PDRY and pleaded the Palestinian cause.
Quoting from the US Declaration of Independence he said:
Through you, we address the values of the American people who believe in freedom, 
truth, justice and equality. We look forward to the role the US can play in supporting 
the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people to establish their own 
independent state, on their land, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, and to stop Israeli violations of the rights of 
the Palestinian people ho are exposed to mass liquidation both inside and outside their 
occupied territories and whose lands encounter growing Israeli settlements.132
The next day, at a press conference that followed his meeting with the YAR President and
other Yemeni officials, Bush said that he had discussed "the stability of this region", and "the
same broad range issues that have concerned me throughout this trip." He emphasised that
"this visit is an important milestone in relations between the United States and the Yemen
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Arab Republic" and that his country "is committed to assisting the Yemeni people as they 
work to build a peaceful and prosperous Republic." He announced that his government would 
double its PL-480 (Food for Peace) commitment to Yemen by $5 million in 1986.133 The 
topic raised at this press conference which most interested the Yemeni people was the 
American definition of "terrorism."134 At another event, the US Vice-President called the 
YAR to work with the US and the Sheikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula to eliminate the 
"scourge" of "terrorism."135 During his talks with the US Vice-President the Yemeni 
President expressed his hope for better bilateral relations, permanent peace in the area and 
argued that the US, as a superpower, should play an effective role in bringing the disputes 
in the area to a happy end. These points were also stressed by the YAR Vice-President at a 
banquet in honour of George Bush.136
The YAR media, especially Al-Thawrah, the main YAR government daily newspaper, hailed 
the Bush visit as the "fruit of the YAR’s constant and principled foreign policy", which was 
based on a "sincere and practical commitment to positive neutrality, non-alignment, and 
openness to cooperative relations with the countries of the world and peaceful co-existence 
with their people, as well as friendly relations based on mutual respect and non-intervention 
in the internal affairs of others and the development of mutual interests." It emphasised that 
"Our country will remain, in its policy positions and dealings on all Arab, Islamic and 
international levels, a distinctive country in its sincere and practical implementation of the 
principle of positive neutrality and non-alignment without relinquishing independence." Al- 
Thawrah went to say that the YAR’s positive neutrality was embodied in the YAR’s policies
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on international issues and events and its dealings with other countries, and concluded "our 
country has not fallen under the influence of guardianship, subservience or external control... 
Our young and developing country, the homeland of the September Revolution, has not fallen 
into the orbit of any external power, is not hostage to anyone, nor does it have external 
loyalties as some others do..."137 It was later reported that at a meeting with South Yemeni 
opposition leaders in Sana’a on 11 April, Bush had promised to provide them with military 
aid and other assistance to help them seize power.138 Some observers believed that Bush 
tried to persuade the YAR leadership to allow the opposition to launch a hit and run war 
against the South, but the proposal had been rejected completely.139
Only three countries in the area criticised Bush’s visit to the area. South Yemeni criticism 
of Bush’s visit started a few days before his arrival in Sana’a. It was claimed in Aden that 
Bush’s tour of the region "carried poisonous dishes of sedition and separation." The PDRY 
main daily newspaper, 14 October, called upon the YAR leadership to deny "the US 
Administration the chance to achieve its hostile goals and to uncover Bush’s intentions, which 
are aimed at jeopardising the ambition of our Yemen people to restore their unity through 
peaceful and democratic means."140 On the last day of Bush’s visit to Sana’a al-Thawri, 
the mouthpiece of the YSP, stressed that the US Vice-President had arrived in the Arabian 
Peninsula "after the largest US aircraft carriers roamed the seas and oceans and stayed in the 
Mediterranean amid an atmosphere of tension that prevails in the region following the recent 
increase in US provocations against the Libyan Djamahiriyah (Republic) and the launching 
of a flagrant and direct aggression against Libyan territory by US aircraft." The YSP
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newspaper saw the Bush visit an indication of "the recent change of attitude of the US 
government towards the Iran-Iraq war."141
The PDRY condemned Bush’s visit to the region but avoided mentioning he was actually in 
Sana’a because it was so close to home. In Tripoli, however the visit was openly criticised 
because of what Jana, the official Libyan news agency, saw as an attack against al- 
Djamahiriah "from the territory of the YAR". Jana stated that at his press conference in 
Sana’a Bush "disclosed aggressive United States intentions against the Djamahiriyah", and 
disclosed that "there has been a plan drawn up since the beginning of what he called the 
Libyan terrorism, aimed at destroying the anti-aircraft missile batteries situated on the Libyan 
coasts". Jana claimed that the US Vice-President had declared war against Libya "from an 
Arab country which is supposed to prevent him even setting foot on its territory - let alone 
make his statement from it." The Arab affairs editor of Jana considered that by allowing 
Bush’s statements against Tripoli the YAR "thus insulted itself and suggested "perhaps 
President ’Ali ’Abd Allah Saleh has not yet seen the statements which depict Sana’a as an 
American colony." The Libyan agency ended its editorial criticism by saying "the masses of 
the Arab nation now demand vengeance for the insult to their dignity and their honour that 
has been stained by the U.S. imperialists, Zionists, and Atlantists [ie, NATO members] on 
the basis that the Arab homeland as a whole is a target for the tenth crusade led by the child- 
killer Reagan and his Western allies. In their hateful crusade they make no distinction 
between one Arab country and another."142 In Teheran it was concluded that Bush came to 
the area to discuss the outcome of the "imposed war on Iran", the deterioration of oil prices
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and to assure the Arab gulf states that the US would protect their security.143
Bush’s visit to the YAR was followed by an increased American presence in the country. An
American Embassy attache estimated that the number of US citizens living in the YAR in
that year rose to nearly 2,000, but "every week or two you hear about American scholars,
American journalists or American officials arriving in Sana’a."144 On 9 September 1986,
Sana’a witnessed an exchange of notes of agreement concerning the provision of training
related to defence articles under the US International Military Education (IMET) programme.
This agreement (which remains classified) entered into force on 19 May 1987. As far as US
participation in YAR development plans was concerned, nothing of huge importance was
achieved. The US government remained unconvinced of the need to assist Sana’a with any
large development project; according to the YAR Foreign Minister, Dr ’Abdul-Karim al-
Iryani, it was ready to provide only small-scale "technical assistance."145 David Ransom,
Arabian Peninsula Desk Officer in January 1990, stated: "The Yemeni government has always
wanted us to do another road project like the Mocha-Sana’a road, a big expensive capital
project. And we didn’t think that was as important as the other things we do. We focused on
training and technical assistance; water projects, agricultural projects, public administration
projects and projects like that, but every year it was about $20 million. It’s not bad."146 In
1990 the YAR Ambassador in Washington commented on this American point of view:
This is their decision. We need the technical assistance. When Vice-President Bush 
visited Sana’a in 1986 I accompanied him on his visit to the Yemen American 
Language Institute. When we left the school, I whispered to him "Your Excellency, 
we don’t have anything else to invite the US Vice-President to, except this school. 
The Soviet Union, East and West Germany, China and others, all have big projects 
in the country like roads, hospitals, airports, harbours, schools, etc." When Mr. Bush’s
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visit was over, I suggested that Washington assist our country with a big project, but 
their reply was "This is not our policy. Our concern is to help your country in 
building an infrastructure through training, scholarships, and other basic projects like 
water, health and agricultural." This is the policy of the US.147
Evolution of Relations, 1986-1990
Three developments between 10 April 1986 and 22 May 1990 affected YAR-US relationship: 
more oil was discovered and more American companies became involved in the country; the 
YAR President’s first visit to the US in early 1990; Yemen unity, which marked the 
disappearance of the Yemen Arab Republic.
With American help the YAR started to export its oil to the outside world in November 1987. 
Export flow started at 100,000 bpd, rising to 125,000 on January 1988, and then to 175,000 
by the end of the year. On 22 May 1990, the Senior Vice-President and Director of Hunt 
Consolidated Incorporation, Thomas Meurer, estimated the reservoir of Yemeni oil as follows: 
300 million to 480 million in Alef, 135 in Asad al-Kamel, 20 to 40 million in Azal, and 5 
to 6 million in the smaller fields like bin Dhi Yazan and Thee Raydan.148 Meurer told this 
author the Yemen "has a lot of gas" and that "there are some ways which we can make 
gasoline out of it." On oil prospects, he said: "as the prices go higher we can produce more 
oil from the existing fields. Because we produce now a round 35 percent of the oil under 
ground. The new technology will help us to do that. Also, many parts of Yemen have not 
been explored yet, especially the area between Shabwah and Marib." When asked whether 
he believed there was more oil in the Yemen, he replied: "Yes and that’s why we’re spending 
more money on more exploration."
221
In the last week of January 1990 the first ever visit by a YAR President to the USA took 
place. President George Bush received President ’Ali ’Abd Allah Saleh in the White House, 
where the discussions covered a wide range of bilateral, regional and international topics. 
Bush expressed satisfaction that the US had been able to help the YAR realise some of its 
economic and development goals and noted that the US had increased the Food for Peace 
programme with Yemen in 1990. In response to the YAR President’s plea for a just 
settlement to the Palestinian cause, Bush reaffirmed Washington’s desire for peace and 
stability in the Middle East and outlined continuing efforts to find a solution to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. The American President stressed his Administration’s belief that US 
diplomatic pressure on Egypt and Israel to develop a dialogue between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians offered the best hope for moving the peace process forward towards direct 
negotiations between the parties. The two Presidents discussed the PDRY’s and the YAR’s 
ongoing efforts to unite the Yemen. They also reviewed the current situation in Afghanistan 
and their shared support for self-determination for the Afghan people. They agreed to work 
together in the continued search for peace throughout the Middle East region.149
It was announced in Washington that the YAR would get $47.5 million of US aid in 
1990 150 This represented an increase of nearly $10 million on than the previous year 
despite the expectations of US officials that Washington would maintain the same level of 
assistance, if not actually decrease it.151
The third event of significance to Yemen-US relations was Yemen unification which took
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place on 22 May 1990. In Washington this was seen as a victory for both the US and for the 
politically moderate YAR which had a larger population as well as larger oil revenues than 
the pro-Soviet PDRY. Despite these expectations, which were coloured by Cold War 
attitudes, Yemen Unity ultimately had an indirect negative effect on Yemen-US relations. 
This was due to Saudi objections to the emergence of a Republican, highly populated, multi­
party Republic of Yemen (ROY), which had claims on the ROY-KS A border regions Djizan, 
Nadjran and ’Asir. According to Yemeni allegations, the Saudis tried to promote instability 
in the Yemen by donating large amounts of money to their client northern tribesmen and to 
some religious groups which saw unity as an anti-Islamic development and by delaying 
deliveries of aid to Sana’a. Iraq reacted by providing the ROY with material and political 
support. This stirred the old enmity between the two neighbouring peninsula states and 
opened the door for a closer relationship between the ROY and Iraq within the context of the 
newly formed Arab Cooperation Council. When Yemen unity was announced in Aden on 22 
May 1990, it was not welcomed in Riyadh. This created a problem for Washington which 
was forced to find a way of reconciling its policy towards the ROY with that of its more 
established and stronger relationship with the KSA in which it had greater interests.
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CHAPTER SIX:
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
YAR-US economic relations involved aid, trade and oil during the period 1962-1990, and will 
be discussed under these, as well as other, relevant headings. This chapter examines the 
outcome of the US assistance programme to the YAR, analyses the nature of their impact on 
the country’s social and economic development, and examines whether trade between the US 
and the YAR played any role in bringing the two nations closer. It also investigates whether 
the discovery of oil in the YAR by a US company, and other relevant interactions, brought 
about any wider American economic interest in the YAR and with it the promise of better 
understanding and cooperation between the two states.
AID
US Assistance: First Phase
Politically, US economic assistance to the YAR, which was resumed in 1963 as a 
continuation of the programme which had started in 1959, was conceived within the context 
of Washington’s effort to counter the Soviet and Communist presence in the Middle East, to 
protect its interests in Saudi Arabia and to confront the rising nationalist and what the US 
saw as "radical” forces in the region.1
From 1959 to 1967, US economic assistance to Yemen dealt principally with infrastructure,
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training and humanitarian assistance via Public Law 480, Title II (Food for Peace). During 
this period the American AID programme accomplished or assisted in the following projects: 
(1) 400 km of the major "stabilized earth, gravel topped highway"2 from Mocha on the Red 
Sea through Ta’iz and to Sana’a was completed in 1965. (2) Wheat was provided under the 
Food for Peace Program. (3) Yemen’s first modem water system, the Kennedy Memorial 
Water System was completed in Ta’iz in 1965. (4) The establishment of the National 
Department of Public Water Supply and Sanitation; nearly 250 personnel were trained to 
manage, operate and maintain the System in all phases of water systems management, from 
basic chemistry and sanitation to warehousing and administration. (5) Scholarship funds were 
provided for approximately 100 Yemenis to be trained and educated at the American 
University in Beirut in engineering, agriculture, business administration, education and 
communications. (6) 85 self-help projects relating to potable water and feeder road 
development were completed.3
Thus, pre-1967 US aid to Yemen, costing nearly $42.7 million, focused primarily on the 
development of basic infrastructure, training and education. A Ta’iz US Embassy 
memorandum dated 1965 (when al-Sallal was President) stressed political concern about the 
Yemeni students pointing out that some of the nine who had been sent to the USA for college 
education in the mid 1950s became members of the radical Republican "famous forty."4 The 
memorandum also expressed concern about the possible future effect of many Yemen 
students then in the Soviet Union. It gave detailed information about 13 of 47 graduates in 
the YAR at the time who were from the "famous forty."5 US and Western Europe graduates
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at that time were about 40 percent of the total. Of the 47 graduates, 12 were diplomats posted 
abroad but expected to return. It maintained that the current group was "not as cohesive as 
the famous forty" but was generally nationalistic, interested more in Yemen than in other 
Arab causes ("they are not as emotional as other Arabs on, say, the Arab-Israeli question"), 
and that a number of them were anti-Egyptian, a feeling generated mainly by the UAR 
"occupation" of Yemen. It further commented that like the famous forty, "they provide a 
desperately-needed reservoir of skills but their number is small...the small size of this group 
is also disturbing when considering the number of students" who were "in training in the 
Communist bloc. It would appear that they will eventually be submerged as most of these 
students come back to Yemen."6
Perhaps because it was politically motivated, and intended to win influence, US assistance 
to the YAR and the provision of educational opportunities during this first phase, was what 
the Yemenis wanted. According to US documents the US Administration represented by its 
Embassy in Ta’iz, was keen during this period to play a constructive role in Yemen by 
providing the country with projects that would help to stabilise the country in favour of the 
Republic, especially in the northern areas. The US Embassy in Ta’iz suggested to the 
Department in Washington that the improvement of agricultural techniques and development 
water resources, particularly in northern areas, would redirect the Zeidis from fighting 
towards the pursuit of traditional soil tilling occupations.7 It was also mentioned that the US 
government could play a useful role by stepping up famine relief shipments of surplus 
agricultural products. The US Embassy in Ta’iz went on to say: "Most feasible and promising
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in our view is possibility of marshalling world opinion, including Arab states, for settlement 
which safeguards legitimate interests and security of parties.”8
The Yemenis during this phase were impressed by the USAID projects, such as the Mocha-
Ta’iz-Sana’a road9 and the Kennedy Water System since they were a source of new jobs and
an effective training for their people. Dr ’Abdul-Karim al-Iryani, Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister of the YAR 1984-1990, described the projects of 1963-1967 as
"development projects”10 and stated that the Yemeni people were introduced to development
assistance only through the Americans when they undertook the Kennedy Water Project and
the Mocha-Ta’iz-Sana’a road. He added that these projects were simple "but in the eyes of
the Yemeni people they were great. Many Yemenis were trained and worked and got salaries
from the projects and that was reflected on the standard of living of many families.”11 It can
be concluded that the substance of USAID to the YAR in this period reflected US concern
over the Communist and Nasserite presence in the country. It was, therefore, intended to
compete with the other rival powers in the Yemen. Other US officials took a different view
and considered assistance to the YAR at that time to be:
...incompatible both with US interests and free world security for the US government 
to continue to provide political and economic support to a state which is used as: (a) 
a base for subversion in SAF, in which the Western alliance has important interests; 
and (b) a base for subversion of, or military attack against, SAG. 12
US Assistance: Second Phase
The severing of diplomatic relations in 1967 temporarily ended the aid relationship, but when 
they were resumed in 1972 US aid was re-started the following year. The purely technical
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aid of this period was of a different nature, reflecting a new US assistance "philosophy"13 
for the Yemen. The YAR Prime Minister in 1972 later revealed to this author that Sana’a was 
keen to resume diplomatic relations with the US because of its great need for foreign 
assistance, and that the Italian Ambassador who looked after US affairs during the 
interregnum had personally told the YAR Chairman of the Presidential Council, Kadi ’Abdul- 
Rahman al-Iryani, that Sana’a would receive a great deal of US aid if it resumed political 
ties.14 US Secretary of State, William Rogers visited Sana’a on 1 July 1972 and relations 
were restored on that date. When he returned to Washington, Rogers announced that the US 
and the YAR had agreed to a renewal of cooperation for economic development. He said that 
the decision was "taken following appropriate consultation with Congress" and that his 
government "intends to resume economic assistance programs patterned on our previous 
programs in Yemen."15 Yet this never happened. In the autumn of 1972 the US sent a team 
to Yemen to review Yemen’s development priorities. This team concluded that there was a 
need for project analysis and feasibility studies to make the most effective use of offers of 
assistance from other donors. The report identified an immediate need to exploit water 
resources and increase water production and the importance of long-term training in 
management and resource development.16 Before the end of 1972, the YAR Prime Minister, 
Muhsin al-’Aini, confirmed to reporters that his country had so far not received one dollar.17 
He recently told this author that he did not expect a superpower to pay for restoring relations 
with it, because that would be insulting for a small country like Yemen, but he expressed the 
belief that Secretary Rogers’ recommendation of the YAR to the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Food Program and another international economic institutions for
237
which the US provided most of the finance, paved the way for the flow of international aid 
to the country.18
On 29 January 1973 the Yemeni government approved an agreement proposed by the US 
Embassy in Sana’a in September 1972 concerning an invitation to US Peace Corps volunteers 
to work in the country.19 The first article of this agreement, effected by an exchange of 
notes, stated that the US government would furnish such Peace Corps volunteers as might be 
requested by the YAR and approved by the US government to perform mutually agreed 
tasks.20 The first US volunteers arrived in 1973 to serve in health, education, and rural and 
urban development programmes. According to the YAR Ministry of Health and many high 
officials of the YAR Central Planning Organisation, these volunteers have ever since done 
good work in the areas of nutrition education and disease prevention; Peace Corps architects 
and town planners still held important positions in planning town development in the Yemen 
in 1990.21 According to this writer’s observation, US Peace Corps volunteers were very 
active and were seen in nearly every group of villages in the rural areas of the country until 
1990.
The full US economic assistance programme to the YAR was resumed on 20 April 1974 upon 
the signing of the Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance Agreement by the YAR’s 
first Minister of Development, Dr ’Abdul-Karim al-Iryani and the first US Ambassador to the 
YAR, William R. Crawford. Washington agreed to furnish such economic, technical and 
related assistance as might be requested by Sana’a and approved by the US government. The
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YAR agreed to the following terms: to make the full contribution permitted by its manpower, 
resources, facilities, and general economic condition in furtherance of the purposes for which 
assistance was made available, and to take appropriate steps to assure the effective use of 
such assistance; to cooperate with the US to assure that procurement would be at reasonable 
prices and on reasonable terms, to permit, without restriction, continuous observation and 
review by the US of programmes and operations, and records pertaining thereto; to provide 
the US with full and complete information concerning such programmes and operations and 
other relevant information which the US might need to determine the nature and scope of 
operations and to evaluate the effectiveness of the assistance furnished. The two governments 
agreed that a special mission would be received in Sana’a to carry out and discharge the 
responsibilities of the US, that this mission would enjoy the same inviolability of premises 
as was extended to the diplomatic mission of the US, and that the YAR should accord all US 
employees and their families in Yemen the same immunity as accorded by the government 
of the YAR to the personnel of comparable rank and category of the US Embassy in Sana’a. 
It was also agreed that "funds introduced into the YAR by the government of the USA for 
purposes of furnishing assistance should be convertible into currency of the YAR at the rate 
providing the largest number of units of such currency per US dollar.22
In March 1975, the AID office was upgraded to full mission status and located in Sana’a. 
During the 1970’s assistance continued for the repair and expansion of the water and 
sewerage systems in Ta’iz, an emergency water supply for Sana’a, and a rural water supply. 
Assistance was also provided for land, mineral and soil surveys, improvement in cereal and
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fruit varieties, poultry development, and health and nutrition studies. Provision of food aid 
continued.23 Yet by the end of 1976 the total of US assistance to the YAR reached only 
$16.8 million, while Saudi Arabia had provided the country with more than $400 million as 
development assistance during the same period. An American military scholar observed that 
Washington gave Sana’a only a very little aid because it wanted "to keep taut the string of 
relationship with Saudi Arabia."24 It should be noted that US aid worldwide was affected 
by an economic recession. This and the continued US lack of economic interest in Sana’a 
meant that the US Department of State was content to leave the YAR to the Saudi 
programme. No big development project was undertaken by the US government in the 
seventies and eighties because such projects were no longer United States policy.25 The 
continued US aid cuts were an outcome of the 1981 recession, especially after the arrival of 
President Ronald Reagan at the White House, who was no supporter of aid programmes.
The 1973-1990 period was also characterised by an expansion of technical assistance in order, 
according to the USAID reports, to strengthen the capacity of key government institutions to 
plan, manage and provide needed services in areas such as agriculture, education and training, 
health and water supply. Marjorie Ransom, US Cultural Attache and Director of the Yemeni 
American Language Institute in Sana’a 1975-1978, told this writer; "We worked with a 
number of different Yemeni institutions, especially to try to be responsive to Sana’a plans for 
university expansion, especially for higher education and training of future Yemeni faculty. 
We also worked in conjunction with our AID program. They had a large training program 
in Yemen where they sent people from all government ministries."26 Projects completed
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during this period include the Ta’iz water and sewerage planning and construction; the Sana’a 
emergency water supply, rural water supply and project support; water resources planning and 
management; a water/mineral survey; sorghum and millet crop and production improvement; 
poultry breeding; tropical and subtropical fruit improvement; land classification and soil 
survey; government personnel training; pre-development studies; hospital training 
programmes; applied health and nutrition, local resources for development, earthquake 
disaster relief, and water supply systems’ management.27
In both 1983 and 1984 the USAID budget in Yemen reached $28 million, of which half was 
allocated to agriculture. Marjorie Ransom stated that the gradual improvement of US 
assistance to the YAR since 1982 was also aimed at promoting bilateral trade, "because those 
companies that sell food assistance programs to Yemen might also become interested in 
selling products through regular channels."28 The food programmes included "activities such 
as funding technical advisors to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, training Yemenis 
in the United States and other countries from the secondary level to PhD, and implementing 
poultry and horticulture demonstration projects, among others."29
Amongst the projects of this period was the Secondary Agricultural Institute in Ibb, the 
construction and equipping of which was financed by the World Bank; it was the first 
institute of its kind in Yemen for training middle-level agricultural technicians. The US also 
supplied technicians’ equipment and modest budget support to the al-’Irrah Horticulture 
Station near Tihamah, the Garoubah Horticulture Station in Tihama, to help farmers produce
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fruit trees, and to the Sa’dah Poultry Station. The aim of the USAID educational programme 
was to improve primary education. Under another programme many Yemeni students were 
sent to the US and other countries to study for their Bachelor, Master or PhD degrees. The 
American-Yemeni Language Institute was inaugurated in Sana’a to help Yemeni students pass 
the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) requirements before proceeding to US 
schools and universities.30 A private American primary, intermediate and secondary school, 
the International School, was operating in Sana’a in 1990. USAID, with help from the 
Ministry of Public Works, the Peace Corps and local development associations, constructed 
small rural water systems in villages throughout the country. Under another program the US 
helped in developing primary health care in Tihama. It also played a role in helping the 
earthquake-hit province of Dhamar for several years following 1982.31 Many US aid projects 
were undertaken in cooperation with other donors, such as the water and sewage project for 
Ta’iz, which was financed by the KSA and United Arab Emirates, while USAID funded 
consultant engineering services, etc.32
Overall, from 1973 to the end of the 1989 about $392 million was provided through US 
grant, loan and food assistance programmes.33 The following table shows US economic 
assistance between 1959 and 1986:
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Table 1-1: USAID ANNUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO YAR ($000)
Year Grant Loan Funds PL 480 Total
1959-
1962 032,200 10,500 042,700
1973 001,708 001,708
1974 002,157 002,157
1975 002,449 1,350 003,799
1976 005,991 0,400 02,600 008,991
1977 015,319 0,500 01,000 016,919
1978 006,245 0,700 00,200 007,145
1979 016,553 1,100 00,300 017,953
1980 011,568 1,000 00,700 013,268
1981 014,200 5,000 00,300 019,500
1982 023,216 01,200 024,416
1983 026,755 026,755
1984 027,324 0,125 03,000 030,499
1985 027,448 0,200 12,000 039,648
1986 023,549 0,737 10,000 036,286
1987 022,000 0,305 15,000 037,305
1988 022,095 10,000 032,095
1989 023,300 10,000 033,300
Total 304,077 6,350 5,067 76,900 392,394
Source: USAID Congressional Presentations 1957-199034 and writer’s research.
The table above shows the doubling of USAID grants to the YAR after 1982. This shift 
reflects economic US interest from that date as a result of the positive oil indications found 
in the YAR. In 1985 the US government argued to Congress that the need to pay more 
attention to the YAR was due to the following factors. (1) Oil-surplus countries on the Gulf 
which had provided assistance to Yemen and employed its labour were in an economic 
recession and Yemeni workers’ remittances had dropped from $1.5 billion in 1979 to an 
estimated $1.1 billion in 1984. (2) Official Arab and international aid had declined from an 
estimated $472 million in 1980 to less than $300 million in 1984.35 Arab Gulf States’ aid
to the YAR had been reduced because of a drop in oil revenue and the diversion of funds to 
Lebanon and the Iraq-Iran war. As a result YAR foreign exchange reserves equivalent to 20 
months of imports in 1975, fell to seven months in 1981, and by late 1983 represented only 
about 2.5 months’ imports. (3) A $705 million YAR government deficit in 1983 had led to 
a reduced level of development expenditures. The YAR’s Second Five-Year Plan which 
began in 1983 projected that 46 percent of a $6 billion investment budget would be provided 
from foreign grants and loans, and it had become likely that the plan would have to be scaled 
back significantly. (4) The December 1982 earthquake added a new dimension to YAR’s 
troubled economic situation; the disaster had caused an estimated $2 billion damages and a 
World Bank report estimated that $620 million in public expenditure would be required in 
a four-year reconstruction program for houses, roads, schools, water systems and other 
infrastructure. (5) The strategic location of the YAR, its porous border with Saudi Arabia, and 
the large numbers of Yemenis working in the oil states of the Gulf underscored the 
importance of the YAR in terms of regional stability and hence to US economic interests. (6) 
US objectives were to help develop, through economic and other assistance, a strong 
government in the YAR, friendly to its neighbours, which would enhance US interests in 
regional stability and security. (7) The YAR had a strong, free enterprise tradition which was 
a countervailing model to the state-controlled economy of the PDRY. (8) Tangible US 
participation in the economic development of the YAR advanced American economic 
interests and objectives in the region as a whole. (9) The long-term US programme of human 
resources and institutional development laid a foundation for sustained national development 
and a stronger friendship between Yemen and the United States.36 In addition to the listed
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reasons two others can be seen in the oil find in the YAR by US companies and the prospects 
of trade between the two states.
Despite the doubling of US assistance to the YAR in 1982 and its continuous improvement 
afterwards, Arab and other international donors were still more effective in development of 
the YAR.
Table 1-2: ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL AID TO THE YAR 1962-1980 BY 
MAIN SUPPLIER
Country or Organization Amount in YR
Kuwait 1,672,115,001
KSA 0,284,451,523
UN 0,244,480,000
Netherlands 0,196,023,595
West Germany 0,090,540,164
USA 0,068,062,243 since 1959
UK 0,038,204,790
USSR 0,032,931,619
Source: ’Abd Allah Barakat, Masadt Tamwil aJ-Tanmiyya} al-Iktisadiyya. wa al- 
Idjtima’iyy^  fi al-Djumh uriyya al-’Arabiyya. al-Yamaniyya' Damascus, 1985, pp. 
798-799; YARCPO Annual Reports, Yemen Central Bank Annual Reports 1973-1990.
Table 1-2 shows that aid flowing from Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, China, Arab 
countries and the multilateral banks was greater than that of the US. Barakat, a Yemeni 
economist, observed that all Arab and international continuous aid has always been of a 
developmental and technical nature.37 West Germany and the Netherlands, for example both 
provided about as much development aid to the YAR as the US. But, unlike the Americans,
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the Dutch and the West Germans directed their assistance to some development projects 
required by the YAR government.38 Japanese assistance to the YAR was limited because 
its products were present everywhere in Yemen through ordinary trade. The Japanese 
government, therefore, had no interest in providing the country with aid and provided only 
commercial credits.
According to Barakat Arab and international loans to finance the various YAR social and 
economic development projects were much greater than those provided by the US.
Table 1-3: LOANS TO THE YAR 1962-1983 BY MAIN SUPPLIER
Source Amount in Million YR
Arab Countries 2867.9
UN 1162.9
Regional Funds 0715.4
Soviet Bloc Countries 0656.5
West Germany 0374.2
Japan 0217.0
Netherlands 0094.8
France 0059.3
UK 0029.7
US 0028.6
Source: CPO Annual Reports and Barakat, ibid, pp. 681-774.
According to USAID Congressional document even the US training program for the YAR in 
the eighties was "overshadowed by those of the Eastern bloc and other Arab states" because, 
for instance, the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia each offered "more than 200 undergraduate 
scholarships to Yemeni students every year, while US funded scholarships, both graduate and
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undergraduate, were between 60 and 80 every year."39
In late January 1990 President ’Ali ’Abd Allah Saleh visited Washington where he held talks 
with President George Bush and other American officials. During this visit Mark L. Edelman, 
Acting Administrator of the USAID, and Dr Muhammad Sa’id al-’Attar, the YAR Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Development, signed a bilateral grant agreement for $21 
million. Philip Christianson, USAID Assistant Administrator for Food for Peace and 
Voluntary Assistance, signed food aid agreements for $20 million. Edelman stated that under 
the Food for Peace programme the YAR would purchase from the US at a concessional 
prices, $10 million in rice and $10 million in feed grains for poultry; local currency generated 
from the sale would finance infrastructure projects, build and equip an eye hospital in 
cooperation with an American foundation, restore historical sites, and construct a vocational 
school for girls. He also stated that the bilateral grant assistance of $21 million would fund 
ongoing USAID projects developing the YAR’s agriculture and educational systems as well 
as a new project that would support private sector initiatives and promote trade and 
investment.40 Despite the expectations of many of the US officials concerned with Yemen 
that the US would not increase its assistance to the YAR, if not cut it, the YAR received an 
increase of nearly $10 million in 1990 over the previous year. This brought US assistance for 
the fiscal year of 1990 to $47.5 million - the highest since the restoration of diplomatic 
relations, showing increased US interest in the Yemen during the first seven months of 
1990.41
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Non-Structural or Industrial Assistance
US assistance to the YAR between 1963 and 1967 in the form of the Ta’iz Water Project and
the Mocha-Sana’a road made a great impression on the Yemeni people because it was of a
developmental nature, despite the fact that the West Germans had improved the road before:
"travellers became covered with dust and the road was never fully appreciated."42 The large
sums of money spent on assistance to the YAR between 1973 and 1986 made much less of
an impact because it concentrated on training Yemeni personnel in the US and was of a
technical nature, reflecting a new US assistance policy in the YAR. A USIA source told this
author that her country was no longer interested in "putting so much money in big projects
abroad; we are interested more in training people, a road is good, but to train people to build
a road is much better."43 The YAR Foreign Minister commented on this in 1988:
We can consider the US assistance in the context of technical assistance until now. 
It is not development assistance in the sense that it is not structural or industrial. The 
USAID agencies see that Yemen only needs technical assistance and not development 
assistance. That doesn’t mean in any way that the US assistance is not of value to us, 
but the Yemeni people see the material value of the West German and the 
Netherlands assistance more than they see that of the US, because the Dutch and the 
German assistance includes development as well as technical assistance.... We called 
their (the Americans) attention many times to the fact that "we considered the training 
assistance and training very important, but you must keep in mind...that the Yemeni 
public will never appreciate this kind of help unless you connect it to some 
development assistance"... We told them to choose two or three projects. I told them 
personally: "You are in a very disadvantageous situation coming with technical 
assistance alone."44
When Vice-President George Bush visited the YAR in April 1986 he stressed that the main 
objective of US assistance was to develop the agriculture sector and water projects as well 
as to assist planning urban growth and to improve Yemeni education on all levels45 The 
YAR Ambassador to the US, Muhsin al-’Aini, even tried to persuade Bush that Washington
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should assist with a big development project. Al-’Aini told this author that when returned to 
the YAR Embassy in Washington following the Bush visit, he repeated the suggestion but 
was again ignored.46 
The Limited Impact of US Assistance
Since US assistance to the YAR during 1962-1990 was often subordinated to Washington’s 
global political and economic concerns and interests in the Middle Eastern area as a whole 
in which Yemen occupied a minor position. Thus US aid remained at a limited level and had 
a relatively small impact on the YAR’s economic and social development during this period. 
The USAID programme to the YAR of the first phase reflected greater US political concern 
than in the 1970s and 1980s when the YAR became a friend of the US.
The trade indicators all suggest that because US aid to the YAR was implemented within the 
context of the Cold War and American objectives in the Arabian peninsula, it was used to 
improve the US political presence in the YAR by increasing Sana’a’s dependence on 
Washington.
TRADE
YAR-US trade (including arms transfers) which began in 1972, was as follows:
Table 2-1: YAR WITH THE US 1972-1986 ($million)
Year I m p o r t s  E x p o r t s
1972 002.2 00.2
1973 009.6 00.2
1974 010.5 00.6
1975 008.3 00.2
1976 025.4 00.3
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1977 046.4 00.6
1978 030.6 00.4
1979 214.1 01.5
1980 077.4 00.8
1981 043.9 00.4
1982 038.2 00.5
1983 107.5 00.4
1984 068.8 08.5
1985 042.2 01.4
1986 083.8 01.5
Total 808.9 17.5
Source: US Department of Commerce Highlights of Exports and Imports 1973-1986 and
author’s research.
US exports to the YAR increased in the eighties as a result of the increasing revenues from 
its workforce abroad. The large trade deficit was due in part to the KSA oil boom which 
attracted many Yemeni farmers to work there and to neglect their own farms. Consequently, 
the Yemeni government was obliged to import wheat and agricultural products from abroad. 
The American commercial credits encouraged Yemen to import these products from the US 
and the YAR worker’s remittances repaid these credits in hard currency. A report prepared 
by the US Embassy in 1979 stated that Sana’a was an excellent market for American 
products and investment due to the "continued but uneven expansion [which] marked the 
economy of the YAR in 1977-78." 47 International statistics show that the US was the fourth 
largest supplier of YAR imports.
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Table 2-4: YAR IMPORTS 1983-1986 BY MAIN SUPPLIER %
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986
Saudi Arabia 16.2 14.2 \0  Ci 12.9
Netherlands 05.0 05.6 OT | 06.1
West Germany 04.6 04.9 05.4 05.0
US 04.2 04.3 02.7 05.9
UK 07.5 04.8 07.6 06.3
Japan 11.0 08.0 \%'C 09.2
Italy 05.4 04.4 08.9 05.6
India 02.5 02.4 02.6 03.2
France 04.9 06.9 04.8 04.7
South Korea 03.6 02.9 o l < 03.5
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1987.
Following the announcement of the oil discovery in 1984 the US facilitated trade with YAR 
by opening credits in US banks for Yemeni businessmen - to attract Yemeni oil revenues. As 
a result of a US trade promotion several agricultural commodities agreements and 
amendments were signed in Sana’a between 19 June 1984 and 26 July 1986. YARCPO 
documents showed that from 1984-1986 the US provided the YAR government with 
commodity loans worth nearly $40 million.48 In 1985 and 1986 the Australians protested 
that the US was undercutting them by $2 per tonne of wheat but the US was undeterred, 
indicating a decision to use this economic weapon to exert influence on Sana’a at a time 
when YAR oil production had started49 US subsided wheat sales in the 1980’s were closely 
connected to Washington’s foreign policy towards the YAR.
On the occasion of his visit to Sana’a in 1986 Vice-President George Bush announced that 
the US government would increase its Food for Peace commitment to Sana’a, and said "our
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total assistance to Yemen under this program will be $10 million for 1986" in order to 
encourage "the use of local proceeds for lending to stimulate private enterprise." Bush 
stressed his country believed "strongly in private enterprise because that’s what built" the US, 
and expressed his hope "that as Yemen trusts the enormous energy of its people, and as it 
continues to encourage the private initiative of its people...Yemen will have prosperity in the 
years to come."50 He did not announce any commitment to undertake a big development 
project that some Yemeni officials had hoped for, but merely expressed willingness to 
promote trade with the YAR through facilitation. The US Commercial Office in Sana’a also 
revealed that Washington had prepared various programmes to facilitate trade with Sana’a.51
The Chairman of the YARCPO, Dr Muhammad al-’Attar, told this author in 1988 of his
hopes that trade between Sana’a and Washington would improve in the coming years. He said
that since Washington imported 70% of its textiles from Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea
or from Morocco and Lebanon as well as much of its needed transformer industries goods
from abroad, the YAR would have the capability to start its investments in this field in the
very near future. He believed that Washington was also committed to increase imports from
Third World countries. He added:
We are aware that distance is a barrier that constrains trade between our two states, 
but the existence of American petroleum companies in our country such as Exxon and 
Hunt, makes the US pay more attention to the YAR which means more cooperation 
in many fields. Partnership in oil production encourages American trade with our 
country. We used to import very little flour, wheat or poultry feed, but with the 
increase of our national income the US intends to increase this trade with our country, 
and intends to establish a kind of co-operation with the private, public and mixed 
sectors to the extent of forming Yemeni-American companies.52
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A summary of the trade relationship between Sana’a and Washington is as follows. 
Remittances from Yemenis working abroad began to improve YAR-US trade in early 1980s. 
Until 1986 trade between Sana’a and Washington showed a balance in favour of the latter 
showing that the YAR needed the US more than the US needed the YAR. A1-’Attar 
confirmed that "trade between the YAR and the USA had started to improve after the oil find 
in the country by American companies", and added that his country "used to get $5 million 
under the Food for Peace loans, but in 1988 this reached $20 million. In addition the US 
banks offer more facilities for trade with the YAR through setting up credits."53
OIL
US oil companies showed interest in the YAR from the beginning of 1980. During this year 
the Soviet presence was growing as it provided cheap arms, which the US had failed to do 
due to Saudi objections. Clearly, the oil prospects and the consequent US oil companies’ 
interest there offered the US Administration an opportunity to counter the growing Soviet 
presence.54 Washington, therefore, decided to use its unrivalled economic power to 
implement its foreign policy in the YAR. This interpretation is supported by the facts of the 
long-standing rivalry between Washington and Moscow in southwest Arabia, and because the 
Hunt Consolidated Incorporation perhaps did more for US prestige and influence in the 
country than the Soviet arms supply did for that of the Soviet Union. In this context, one 
should also take into consideration the political changes in the area, especially the 
developments in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, the overthrow of the local US "policeman", 
the Shah of Iran, and the announcements of the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran,
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Ayatollah al-Khomeini, who declared in early February 1979 his country’s willingness to 
sever all oil dealings with the US. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, also 
pushed the US to encourage oil exploration in the YAR in case the war lead to the loss of 
the oil from Iran and other countries of the Arabian Peninsula.
1980 witnessed the emergence of a new era in Yemeni history when an aero-magnetic survey 
of the whole country by the YAR government was completed. This survey showed 
sedimentary basins in areas north of Marib and in other parts of the YAR.55 According to 
the published official documentation, in the same year an independent oil exploration 
consultant, Moujib al-Malazi, who "happened to be in contract with the London Hunt 
office"56, arrived in Sana’a to enquire about oil prospects in the country and was welcomed 
to compare "geological information with the new aero-magnetic data."57 When asked about 
his visit al-Malazi stated: "I visited Sana’a in 1980 on my own and thought of seeing 
anybody in the Yemen Oil and Minerals Corporation (YOMINCO). I went there and was 
directed by the reception to see ’Ali Djabr ’Alawi, the Director of the Geological Survey 
Department. During our meeting I exclaimed ‘Oil is everywhere in the Arabian Peninsula and 
why is it not found in Yemen?’" He added, "It seemed that my question encouraged him to 
show me an aero-magnetic survey which the company had already undertaken and other 
studies which were done before. After studying this latest aero-magnetic survey I pointed out 
to Djabr that the survey showed many sedimentary basins and that these were different from 
the basement rocks that characterise most parts of the country."58
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Following several meetings with Yemeni officials, al-Malazi left Sana’a with the Yemen Oil 
and Minerals Corporation’s aero-magnetic survey. In London he reported to the Hunt 
Company office the possibility of the existence of oil in the YAR. This encouraged Hunt to 
start its search for oil in the country. Al-Malazi told this author that he shared his findings 
with Dr Ian Maycock, manager of the Hunt London office. Dr Maycock quickly become 
intrigued by the possibilities of oil in Yemen, and towards the end of the year, he briefed the 
Company’s head office in Dallas, Texas, on his findings and recommendations.59 Maycock 
stated that the company’s decision to pursue a concession in the west of the YAR was based 
on several considerations, amongst them the apparently favourable potential geological 
conditions, the presence of organic shales and salt at nearby Safer, and the chance to explore 
a virgin area of the Middle East with the cooperation of a friendly Yemen.60 Other 
considerations were based on existing information about the potential for oil in the 
neighbouring Shabwah area in the PDRY.61
In January 1981, The Hunt Consolidated Incorporation despatched a high-level team to
Sana’a to visit officials and scout the terrain. The team consisted of Hunt Senior Vice-
President Tom Meurer, Maycock and al-Malazi. Their trip ended badly:
After three days of waiting for official permission to visit Marib al-Djawf, Mr 
Maycock, the London director of our office, al-Malazi and I decided to visit the 
Marib-al-Djawf area to see what kind of rocks were available there. To see what the 
age of the rocks looked like. In the area we were caught by the army and were sent 
to jail in Sana’a, because we were not carrying our passports. We spent most of the 
day under arrest.62
YOMINCO intervened to release the prisoners and facilitated a tour to the western area: "Mr.
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Isma’il Musa from YOMINCO accompanied us to the area where we were able to check the 
age of the rocks, and so we got an idea what the area looked like."63 The team’s subsequent 
report was positive, and the company recognised it was involved in an area of great 
potential, that was "strategically secure, economically sound and politically reliable."64
Before an agreement was officially signed, a newly founded Yemen Hunt Oil Company 
(YHOC) conducted initial geological sampling and mapping.65 Discussions between 
YOMINCO and Hunt Consolidated Incorporation began in January 1981 in Sana’a, were 
continued in Dallas by the Yemeni officials, Ali Djabr from YOMINCO and al-Harazi from 
the YARCPO66, and resulted in a draft work programme. Between July 22 and July 28 the 
two parties successfully negotiated a Production Sharing Agreement signed by the Minister 
of State and Chairman of YOMINCO, ’Ali ’Abdul-Rahman al-Bahr, and Raymond E. 
Fairchild, the Hunt Consolidated Incorporation’s Vice-President of International Exploration. 
It covered "3.1 million acres stretching as long as from Dallas to Longvie."67 The concession 
became effective on 16 January 1982 when the YAR President, Colonel ’Ali ’Abd Allah 
Saleh, ratified it by issuing the Republican Law No. 4, 1982.68
This agreement specified that the Hunt Oil Company’s wholly owned subsidiary, YHOC, 
should commence geological and geophysical work in an area approximately 200 kilometres 
(124 miles) northeast of Sana’a at an elevation of about 3,000 feet. The agreement provided 
a six-year exploration period during which at least four wells should be drilled. Initially about 
half the oil revenue was to go to the Yemeni government with its share rising as production
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increased.69 Based on a projection that the discovery of commercial viability would lead to 
a 20-year development period, stressed that the agreement was to be dissolved if no 
exploration well had been established by the end of the sixth year.70 It was stipulated that 
more details about the contents of this agreement and other agreements relating to oil were 
not to be released.71
Following the ratification of the sharing agreement a seismic survey covering 1,845 km 
(1,146 miles) was finished by early December 1982. Additional survey later covered over 
12,000 km (7,457 miles). Maycock revealed that the computer processing of the data which 
continued in 1983 indicated at least 18,000 ft of sediment, and that further mapping and 
evaluation suggested that petroleum and reservoir rocks might be present.72 When drillable 
structures were located in April 1983, YHOC decided to drill a wildcut to obtain more precise 
information.
The first three drills were named Alef, Lam and Meem,73 and drilling in Alef began on 31 
January 1984. During the drilling a South Korean consortium (Yukong Limited, Sam whan, 
Hyundai and Korean Petroleum Development corporations), obtained a 24.5 % interest in 
YHOC’s concession on 29 February. Before reaching half its planned depth, Alef showed 
hydrocarbon. In March, drilling progressed through shale, limestone and several large beds 
overlying oil- and gas-bearing sandstone, and at about 13,700 ft, granite basement rock was 
reached.74 Well testing which ensued at the time showed that the first well was "where it 
should be."75 In October 1983 Hunt Oil Chairman, Ray L. Hunt, wrote to YOMINCO’s
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Chairman: "We are pleased by the progress and co-operation that have marked our 
relationship to date and hope that our forthcoming drilling operations will be the first step in 
establishing commercial oil production in the Yemen Arab Republic".76 A few months after 
YHOC had commenced its geological and geophysical field investigations, President Saleh 
pledged to the Yemeni people on 23 May "to continue by all efforts to extract the oil wealth 
from the depth of the Yemeni land so that Yemeni people could enjoy it through 
comprehensive development of our country".77
When the initial drill stem test in the Alef field was done on 4 July78 1984, the YAR’s oil 
flowed for the first time at a combined rate of over 7,800 bpd from two separate zones; 
several other perforations yielded natural gas at a combined rate of 55 MMcfd.79 The 
American press commented: "US interests in that country and...the development of oil was 
likely to reduce Sana’a’s financial dependence on Saudi Arabia."80 As the US imports of oil 
continued to grow every year, the importance of the YAR to the US also grew especially 
since, as Meurer confirmed to this writer, the Hunt Consolidated Incorporation believed there 
was more oil to be discovered in Yemen and that was why "we are spending more money"81 
in the country.
A nine-well Alef field programme was completed in 1985. The Alef reservoir was assessed 
to be approximately 300 million barrels. A feasibility study for a refinery, an export pipeline 
and other associated projects began.82 On 25 September 1985 Prime Minister ’Abdul-’Aziz 
’Abdul-Ghani laid the foundation stone in Marib for the first Yemeni refinery. At the
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ceremony Ray L. Hunt stated: "I am confident that this will be just the first of many similar 
ceremonies which will take place in the years to come as Yemen assumes its rightful place 
as an important supplier of crude to the world markets".83 When the Alef field capacity 
reached a level in excess of 100,000 bpd, the YAR government created the Supreme Council 
for Oil and Mineral Resources, to be chaired by Foreign Minister Dr ’ Abdul-Karim al-Iryani. 
In September 1985 YOMINCO was transformed into the YAR Ministry of Oil.
In late 1985, the Yemeni government approved an agreement between YHOC and a 
subsidiary of Exxon Corporation, Exxon Yemen Inc. Exxon was given a 49% interest in 
YHOC’s 75.5% share of the concession, but YHOC remained the main operator in the Marib- 
al-Djawf area. The joint venture was named Yemen Exploration and Production 
Company(YEPCO).84 As of the advent of Exxon it was announced in December that the 
Yemeni Ministry of Oil agreed with the Yemen Exploration and Production Company to 
construct a 263-mile crude oil export pipeline from the Marib fields to the Red Sea. 
Engineering and construction management contracts were awarded on 14 January 1986.85 
Refinery construction progressed rapidly. The YAR government built a 38-mile paved road 
from Marib to the refinery. On 12 April 1986, the YAR celebrated the inauguration of its first 
refinery attended by President Saleh, US Vice-President George Bush and President of the 
Hunt Consolidated Incorporation Ray Hunt.86 By this stage, 29 wells had been completed 
in the area. Oil production started at the 10,000 bpd level required for refinery operation. As 
Bush confirmed, the promise of large quantities of oil in the YAR, meant greater US 
eagerness to "be in partnership with the Yemeni people."87 In September 1986 work was
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begun on the YAR’s first oil pipeline to the Red Sea. YEPCO also bought a tanker, Esso 
Japan, renamed Safer which was converted for floating storage.88
In early 1987 it was confirmed by Hunt sources that 29 wells had been completed in the al- 
Djawf-Marib area and production was at the 10,000 bpd level required for refinery 
processing. President Saleh opened the tap of Yemeni oil to the world in November that year. 
Export flow started at 100,000 bpd, rising to 125,000 on January 1988, and to 175,000 by the 
end of the year. YHOC officials announced that the YAR would produce 150,00 barrels of 
crude a day and US $600 to $700 million was annually expected from the oil sale.89 The 
YAR Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister stated that "the new oil revenues will do 
little more than replace earnings the government has lost from the return of expatriate 
workers sent to the Gulf Arab states during the oil boom of the last decade."90 He added 
"YAR’s oil has entered the market at a time when oil prices are teetering at the $18 level set 
in 1986 by OPEC, some of whose members have disregarded production quotas designed to 
hold prices firm".91 According to some observers, the volume of the Yemeni oil find until 
1990 would not be big enough to affect global oil prices or the strength of OPEC, but they 
would be important for the economy of Yemen.92
The Texas Hunt Senior Vice President recently estimated the current reservoir of Yemeni oil 
as follows: 300 million to 480 million in Alef, 135 in Asad al-Kamel, 20 to 40 million in 
Azal, and 5 to 6 million in the smaller fields like bin Dhi Yazan and Thee Raydan93 Yemen 
Ministry of Oil publications stated that the Alef and Azal fields in the Marib-al-Gawf basin
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comprised 500 million barrels in proven reserves and 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.94 
The Azal field, ten miles north of Alef, was declared commercially viable on 15 April 
198795 and Ray L. Hunt, stated "the reserve figure could go much higher as Hunt, joined 
by Exxon Corporation and a Korean oil firm, continues its exploration in the northern and 
western offshore areas of the country".96 On 1 August 1989 the Asad al-Kamel field became 
the fifth commercially viable field. The reserve was estimated at 133 million barrels of oil 
and 2.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Out of the 16 wells of the field, nine were oil wells 
tested at rates of up to 3,935 barrels of oil a day. Five gas wells were tested at rates up to 
57.5 million cubic feet a day, with a condensate yield of about 30 barrels per million cubic 
feet.97 By January 1990 six commercially viable fields were operating: Alef, Azal, Saif bin 
dhi Yazan, Asad al-Kamel, Djabal Nukum and al-Shura.98
Concerning other US oil explorations in the country, US Hunt officials stated that their 
drilling in the sea had resulted in two dry holes.99 When Exxon drilled its first well in 
Dhamar, the central plateau, the result was also negative, but in September of 1988, it started 
drilling a well at Houth in the north of the country which was successful.
The Hunt Vice-President told this author that the Yemen "has a lot of gas" and "there are 
some ways which we can make gasoline out of it." As for the oil prospects, he said: "As the 
prices go higher we can produce more oil from the existing fields. Because we produce now 
around 35 percent of the oil underground. The new technology will help us to do that. Also 
many parts of Yemen have not been explored yet, especially the area between Shabwah and
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Marib.”100
To sum up the effect of oil on the YAR-US relationship in the 1980s: Oil exploration and 
discovery helped the US to preserve its presence and influence in the YAR and this enabled 
it to counter Soviet influence, as well as to secure a new oil source should the supplies from 
the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula be interrupted for political reasons; US interest in the 
Yemeni arena developed through the special relations that developed between US oil 
companies and the YAR government; Oil revenues helped the YAR to compensate part of 
the decline in its workers’ remittances and in Saudi aid which were affected by the Saudi 
objection to oil exploration in the YAR and the Iraq-Iran war. In addition to the economic 
benefits oil discovered in an area stretching southwards to the PDRY brought the question 
of Yemen unity to a serious turning point for the first time in modem history.
Yemenis in the US
Over several decades a Yemeni immigrant community emerged in the US centred in Detroit, 
California and New York. A US official report in 1980 pointed out that there were 3,094 
Yemenis working in Michigan, New York, California, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and other 
US states101 excluding those who had acquired US citizenship.102 Today, in Detroit alone 
there are an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 Yemenis working in the automobile industry, while in 
California Yemeni farmworkers compromise a considerable element of the agricultural labour 
force. The Yemeni-Americans and those Yemenis working in the US regularly send home
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part of their wages. This supports the Yemen’s domestic economy.
Private US Assistance to the YAR
Since the resumption of relations between the YAR and the US in 1972, a number of private 
US organisations provided the YAR with assistance during this period. These were: 
Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Africa; Catholic Relief Services - United States Catholic 
Conference; Darian Book Aid Plan; Family Planning International Assistance; the Pathfinder 
Fund; Save the Children Federation; Southern Baptist Convention; and the Stelios M. Stelson 
Foundation. In 1979, six of these organisations provided financial data indicating programme 
expenditure in 1979 totalling $2,590,815.103
In the field of US private investment, in addition to the investment in oil exploration, a 
private intermediate and secondary school called "The International School", was built and 
started to operate in early 1980s.
Assistance from International Organisations
In 1972 the YAR Prime Minister in 1972 stated that his country had benefited indirectly from 
the restoration of relations with the US that year, through US recommendation of the YAR 
to various international organisations.104 International organisations’ assistance to the YAR 
between 1973 and 1986 was as follows:
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Table 1-4: ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE YAR 
1972-1986 (Millions of Dollars)
Fund 1962-69 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
EFC 003.2 040 049 LL9
IDA 253.8 34.5 41.0 42.0 47.5 56.0 22.7 46.4 32.7
UNDP 028.6 06.1 00.1 03.6 02.1 02.3 00.4 02.0
Others 003.1 05.0 01.6 05.9
Total 288/7 40.6 46.1 45^6 516 583 29^6 603 306
Grand Total= $661.4 million dollars (excluding $.3 million of the UNDP for the period 1953- 
1961).
Source: US Department of Commerce, Highlights of Exports and Imports, Washington DC, 
1987.
The YAR benefited more from international organisations’ assistance than from the US itself, 
and it cannot be proved that this international aid was a result of US recommendation alone. 
The evidence for such an argument is the much smaller international assistance given to the 
PDRY, which had no relations with the US, during the same period; the same US source 
shows that the PDRY received $211.5 million assistance between 1962 and 1986 compared 
to the YAR total of $661.4 million.105 However, the difference in the amounts of 
international aid could be simply attributed to the difference in population (of five to one) of 
the two Yemeni states.
Investment Guarantees Agreement
After deciding to resume aid to the YAR after the restoration of relations in 1972, the US 
expressed interest in improving the YAR economy: an Investment Guarantees Agreement 
was concluded between the two states on 4 December 1972 which stressed that US
264
investment would promote the development of the economic resources and productive 
capacities of the YAR and at the same time insure and guarantee such investments.106
Despite this agreement the US did not invest any substantial capital in the YAR before 1980 
because of the political instability of the country during that period. In 1980, however, the 
oil indicators and subsequent discovery in a stable YAR promoted and guaranteed US 
investment in this sector of YAR economy.
Conclusion
Through the different types of YAR-US economic interaction, mainly aid, trade and oil 
partnerships, Washington aimed at countering the Soviet Union and the anti-US element in 
the oil rich Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states as well as protecting its large interests in Saudi 
Arabia.
The YAR received development assistance from the US before 1967 at a time when the 
USSR was enjoying a special position in the country. During the period 197.^ 1979 and 
because the YAR-USSR relations were constrained by the KSA, US and the PDRY, Sana’a 
received little economic assistance from Washington. At the beginning of the 1980s when 
Sana’a-Moscow relations improved, the US again showed interest in improving the YAR 
economy, and provided technical assistance. Subject to its global and Middle Eastern political 
concerns and interests, the low level of US aid to the YAR from 1962-1990 meant it had 
little impact on the YAR’s social and economic development. As foreign assistance is an
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economic tool used for strategic and diplomatic objectives it is not an effective instrument 
of development in many underdeveloped countries such as the YAR. It is unlikely that US 
aid to the YAR will increase in the 1990s, because, leaving aside political issues, the YAR 
became an oil producer and because the US foreign assistance budget is shrinking largely due 
to inflation.107 It is in the interest of the YAR not to follow in the steps of Burma, which 
rejected foreign aid and turned to the self-help policies108, but to continue its on-going 
efforts to convince the USAID of the need to finance some development project or projects.
YAR-US trade improved in the 1980s not because of the efforts made by the YAR 
government but because of the YAR workers’ remittances in the KSA and the oil discovery 
which was facilitated by the private US commercial sector. Constraints on YAR-US trade 
included the enormous distance between the two countries and the influx of goods at cheaper 
prices from East Asia. The YAR’s trade deficit with the US was large until 1990.
US oil companies found oil in the YAR in 1984 and this improved general American interest 
in the YAR. It is expected, unless political differences persist, that American industry, as 
George Bush stated in 1986, "is promising to play a large role in helping to build Yemen’s 
future."109 The discovery of oil meant that the US could look "forward to a close and 
enduring relationship"110 with the Yemen and its people.
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C O N C L U S I O N
FOUR MAJOR ISSUES
Before drawing conclusions about the major interrelated themes which recur in this thesis it 
is first necessary to refer to four major issues which dominated YAR-US relations between 
26 September 1962 and 22 May 1990. These were: the cold war; the role played by the KSA; 
US policy in the Middle East in general; and, to a lesser extent, the nature of the bilateral 
interaction itself.
Cold War
The revolution in North Yemen resulting in the declaration of the YAR developed into a 
regional crisis of serious dimensions which the limited presence of both the US and the 
USSR was unable to prevent. The subsequent civil war in the Yemeni arena allegedly 
threatened the stability of the conservative pro-Western countries in the Arabian peninsula 
as well as the flow of cheap oil to the Western world. The impact of this revolution, 
therefore, was not confined to Yemen but implicated Saudi Arabia, the Hashim^fe Kingdom 
of Jordan (HKJ), Egypt and Britain. The existence of the YAR offered the UAR the 
opportunity to promote revolution in the region under the flag of Arab nationalism and 
provided the USSR with the chance to challenge both US and UK influence there. Thus the 
Yemeni civil war in the 1960s led to an internationalised crisis, and the involvement of the 
superpowers themselves.
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When the KSA decided to supervise and support a counter-revolution in a YAR which 
depended on UAR support and protection, the YAR sought USSR backing as well as US 
recognition to prevent the KSA and the UK from restoring the deposed ruling family. 
Moscow recognised the Republic and offered it political support, something that antagonised 
Washington. The US government also feared that Sana’a would join the Arab nationalist 
movement, which was connected with the Soviet bloc, in its drive to counter Western 
dominance. When the civil war in the YAR started, as a consequence of the revolution and 
the counter-revolution backed by Saudi Arabia, US policy was greatly influenced by the 
Soviet, Egyptian, British and Saudi policies. Since the Americans saw the Yemeni Revolution 
as a Communist threat in the peninsula, they chose to support the Saudis and other 
conservative states in the Arab world. Though it recognised the Republic, Washington decided 
to contain the Revolution. In doing so it indirectly supported the counter-revolutionary forces. 
US support for the conservative element in the Yemen was achieved through bolstering the 
defences of the KSA and providing protection to this rich ally. To achieve its policy 
objectives, the US intervened to reduce UAR influence in the Peninsula by curtailing Nasser’s 
policy of nationalist expansion, prevent the USSR from having any real influence, and contain 
the Yemeni revolution so that it would not affect American friends in Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan.
When Israel defeated the UAR in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt was forced to withdraw 
its troops from the Yemeni arena and reconcile itself with the KSA. Consequently, the US 
alliance with the KSA and its indirect support for the Northern Yemen Royalists led in mid-
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1967 to the weakening of the pan-Arab and the pro-Soviet elements in the YAR. This brought 
Sana’a under KSA and US influence. As a result the YAR lost the ability to playing off 
Moscow against Washington for several years. During the late sixties, despite Sana’a’s 
eagerness to restore relations with Washington, the US saw no need to do so. In 1971 the 
British completed their withdrawal from the Persian Gulf creating, thereby a serious security 
issue for the US because of the increasing importance of oil to the world economy. This 
coincided with the emergence of the pro-Soviet PDRY which pledged its support for what 
it termed the "people’s revolution" in the Gulf.
When Washington eventually restored relations with Sana’a in 1972, it did so largely because 
of these factors. Because of deteriorating relations between Sana’a and Moscow which 
resulted from internal social struggle, strong Saudi influence, and Moscow’s alliance with 
Aden, the YAR tried to play off the US against the USSR in order to get military and 
development aid from the US as well as to reduce the role of the PDRY and KSA in its 
internal affairs. Washington grasped the opportunity to confront directly Soviet penetration 
in the Yemeni arena, aiming to turn the YAR into a buffer zone between the Marxist South 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Because the US had no direct economic or military interests in the 
YAR itself, it left Sana’a’s security needs for the KSA to deal with. However, since Sana’a, 
under KSA influence, was unable to improve relations with Moscow between 1972 and 1978, 
relations with Washington were minimal; the US was not concerned about events within the 
YAR as long as its interests in the KSA were not threatened.
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The tension between the Yemens which increased greatly from 1978-79 once more 
encouraged Sana’a to attempt to use the threat of Aden to exploit Cold War rivalry; this time 
it succeeded. The YAR obtained US arms, financed by Saudi Arabia, as well as US 
protection, which helped Sana’a to defeat the leftist element in the Yemeni arena. Moreover, 
the US position and the YAR’s military and political alliance with it in this period resulted 
in the USSR re-evaluating its policies towards the two Yemeni states. Direct US arms 
deliveries to Sana’a ceased following the termination of the 1979 border war between the 
Yemens, and the KSA withheld important spare parts. This made Sana’a contact Moscow to 
obtain the military equipment it needed. The Soviets took the opportunity to restore their 
position in the country: they did not want the YAR to be completely dependent on the USA.
While YAR relations with Moscow improved, Sana’a-Washington relations sank to a low 
level between 1979 and 1984. Contacts were confined to USAID technical projects, largely 
because there was no longer any imminent threat of attack from the PDRY. One of the 
factors that eased US concern was that the Soviet Union did not encourage further tension 
between the Yemeni states that would comprise any threat to the KSA; although the period 
was characterised by economic cooperation alone, after 1979 and until 1990 the YAR-USSR 
military relationship persuaded the US to deal directly with Sana’a, rather than through the 
KSA, as it had from 1972-1979.
Throughout its lifetime the YAR was obliged to exploit the superpowers in order to survive. 
In this it achieved a fair degree of success, managing to survive and develop, although it was
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often used at times by these powers for their own objectives.
The Role of the KSA
North Yemen-KSA relations up to 26 September 1962 were characterised by barely veiled 
mutual suspicion and distrust, the product of the longstanding rivalry between the two 
monarchical families and of territorial disputes. The YAR revolution was achieved with the 
assistance of revolutionary Egypt. The UAR with its Soviet backing was seen as the enemy 
of the conservative governments in the Arab world, especially of the Saudi royal family, and 
was perceived to be a serious threat to the security of the ruling Kings and Sheikhs in the 
area. Realising that it could not survive without forming alliances with all the foes of the 
UAR, of the Arab nationalist movement, and of Communism, the KSA reacted promptly to 
the 1962 YAR revolution: it organised and supervised a counter-revolution and pledged to 
restore the deposed Yemeni monarchy. The KSA sought British and Jordanian advice and 
assistance as well as US advice and protection. Riyadh also prepared itself for a long 
encounter with the Nasserite and revolutionary element in the YAR. This situation inevitably 
involved the US, which had economic and political interests in both the KSA and the UAR.
To safeguard the Republican regime against any British or Saudi-Jordanian aggression, the 
UAR supported Sana’a’s request for American recognition. Washington insisted upon a 
declaration that the Republic would honour existing international obligations. It also 
demanded that Cairo publicly declare its support for the full content of the communique 
which was released by the YAR government in December 1962. Three months later the US
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formally recognised the new Republic and proposed a disengagement plan to end the civil 
war. The Kennedy administration had calculated that the civil war in the Yemen would stir 
a wider military conflict between the UAR and the KSA - a confrontation which would 
involve the US not least because of American interests in Saudi oil; it therefore decided to 
recognise the revolutionary regime in the hope of stabilising the situation in Yemen. 
American recognition thus aimed at keeping the US as part of both the solution and the 
problem and at trying to solve the growing problem through diplomatic channels. It also 
aimed to persuade the UAR to withdraw from the YAR.
When initial US efforts failed to contain the Nasserite threat against Western interests in the
Arabian Peninsula and the YAR became committed to the nationalist movement in the region,
Washington reassured the Saudi monarchy of its commitment to the preservation of the
Kingdom’s integrity by despatching a number of jet fighters, a destroyer, and paratroopers
to the KSA, backed up by an aerial demonstration over Saudi Arabia in mid-January 1963.
The State Department declared at the time:
The United States, as an impartial friend of all governments involved, remains 
convinced that the best interests of the Yemeni people will be served by the 
disengagement of foreign military forces and termination of the external intervention.1
Because US mediating efforts failed to persuade either the UAR or the KSA to leave the 
Yemeni arena to the Yemenis, the Yemeni civil war expanded and the US gave indirect 
support to Royalists by bolstering the Saudi regime and by supporting Israel. After its defeat 
by Israel in 1967, Egypt was no longer able to provide military and economic support to
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Sana’a. As a result the YAR became virtually defenceless, unable to resist the strong 
pressures and influence exerted by the KSA. During the period 1967-1972 when relations 
between Sana’a and Washington were broken off completely the US was content to accept 
the KSA’s policy towards the YAR and ignore Sana’a’s initiatives to restore relations. By 
1972, however, mostly due to US needs to contain any influence from the pro-Soviet PDRY, 
Washington decided to restore relations with Sana’a.
Although Riyadh eventually announced its support for restoration of Sana’a-Washington 
relations, Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth and its special relations with the United States prevented 
the development in YAR-US relations to the extent that was demanded by the YAR, out of 
fear that a stable and strong YAR would constitute a threat to Saudi hegemony. This led to 
very limited US-YAR dealings through US economic assistance. Sana’a wanted direct 
dealings with Washington and suggested bilateral development projects in the hope that a 
closer YAR-US relationship would lessen Riyadh’s heavy hand in internal YAR affairs. This 
KSA policy towards the YAR meant that any significant YAR-US military cooperation was 
blocked until 1979. In that year the pro-Western YAR government faced a military and 
political threat from the Marxist South. The KSA reacted by financing the promised US arms 
package. Both the US and the KSA provided military protection to the government in Sana’a, 
and PDRY attempts to unite Yemen by force had failed before the end of the year.
As the PDRY threat to the YAR ceased and the USSR took a neutral stand between the two 
Yemeni states, it became clear to the Saudis that they no longer needed to deliver the rest of
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the arms package. They believed that organising and arming the YAR would result in a threat 
to themselves. The US adopted KSA policy, and YAR approaches to Washington for further 
military equipment failed. This meant that YAR-US interaction in the early eighties was 
minimal.
The improvement in YAR-US relations in the mid-1980s created difficulties for the KSA. 
American oil companies found oil in 1984. For the first time in history this attracted some 
US economic interest in the YAR amidst reports that there was a large oil reserve in the 
YAR and that Sana’a was moving towards unification with the South to form a moderate 
state, President Saleh visited Washington in January 1990. It was subsequently reported in 
Sana’a that the KSA objected to Yemeni unity and to oil exploration in the country, on the 
grounds that oil wealth and unity would constitute a threat to Saudi hegemony in the 
peninsula.
At the time of unification in 1990 among clear indications of much more oil, the relationship 
between the two neighbouring Arab states had deteriorated to an all-time low. Yet again this 
adversely affected the Sana’a-Washington relationship. As has consistently happened since 
1960, the ability of Sana’a to achieve freedom of manoeuvre was constrained to certain extent 
by the historically stronger Riyadh-Washington relationship.
US Middle Eastern Policy
US interest in the YAR was always a reflection of its greater interests elsewhere in the
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Middle East. By recognising the Republic and maintaining a presence in both the YAR and 
the UAR the US hoped to preserve its interests in the area - mainly in the KSA and the UAR. 
The need for cheap oil, concerns for Israeli security and a commitment to contain Soviet 
influence were the dominant factors underlying US policy towards all states in the Arabian 
Peninsula in the period of this study. When the Arab nationalist movement faced a setback 
as a result of the 1967 Israeli victory in the Six Day War, the YAR was gradually forced to 
endure increasing KSA influence; yet the US showed no interest in the YAR, because it did 
not constitute any threat to existing US interests in the region. When, in 1972, Washington 
eventually restored relations with the YAR. It did so in an attempt to weaken Arab hostility 
to both itself and Israel. US policy towards the YAR at this time received only limited KSA 
support but was thought necessary in Washington because of the vacuum left by the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf and because of the emergence of the pro-Soviet PDRY as well as 
anti-imperialist popular fronts in other Arab Gulf states.
A sense of US concern in the area can also be observed during the 1979 inter-Yemeni war, 
partly because Saudi Arabia felt directly threatened. But a greater cause of US anxiety was 
the fact that this war came in the wake of the April 1978 revolution in Afghanistan, the 
signing of an Ethiopian-Soviet treaty in November of that year, the assassination of US 
ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul in February 1979, and the fall of the Shah. These events 
had created the impression in the area that America had lost all capacity to control regional 
events and that the oil states would have to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union in 
order to protect themselves.
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In a prompt response to a YAR appeal, Washington provided Sana’a with Saudi-financed 
arms, as well as moral and political support. It also moved a naval force close to Aden and 
made a show of air-power over and around it, to demonstrate its determination to protect 
Sana’a from a PDRY invasion. The 1979 inter-Yemeni war provided the US with an 
opportunity to reassure Saudi Arabia and other US friends in the region of its resolve. In 
addition to the military measures undertaken to warn Aden, by arming Sana’a and bolstering 
Saudi air defences, Washington issued a warning to Moscow which was taken seriously. 
Throughout the seventies YAR-US relations served the interests of both the US and the KSA 
by helping prevent the fall of the YAR government to the leftists supported by the PDRY.
1980 witnessed a novel form of cooperation between the superpowers. Moscow restored its 
position in the YAR by providing Sana’a with arms. At the same time it tried to normalise 
relations between the two Yemeni states. In 1984 US companies discovered oil in the YAR, 
and in 1986 an internal power struggle in the PDRY took place which destroyed the PDRY’s 
ability to threaten its neighbours. These events convinced Washington that the security of its 
Gulf allies and its own interests were no longer under threat. The discovery of oil indicated 
that US interest in the Yemen might become tangible, and lead to a direct bilateral 
relationship.
In general, US concern in the YAR between 1962 and 1990 was based not on specific YAR 
considerations, but rather on its Middle Eastern objectives in the context of the general state 
of Washington-Moscow relations. As the US continued to have huge strategic and economic
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interests in Saudi Arabia, it could only "view the YAR from the Saudi comer"2 because 
"every country when it decides its policy with a foreign country puts into consideration its 
relations with other partners."3
The Discovery of Oil
The nature of the bilateral interaction shows that US interest in the YAR during the period 
of study was little more than a reflection of US interest in other states in the Middle East. 
It was only in 1984, after the American company Hunt found oil in the west of the country, 
that the US Government showed tangible bilateral interest in the YAR for the first time. 
Consequently the relationship improved a little because a "private relationship promotes the 
official relationship."4 The oil discovery and reports that there was more oil in the country, 
promoted the YAR into a different category in the eyes of the US Department of State and 
led to a new foreign policy involving the doubling of US aid. Vice-President George Bush’s 
1986 visit to the YAR, reinforced by President Saleh’s early 1990 visit to Washington, was 
considered in the YAR as marking the beginning of direct bilateral relations between Sana’a 
and Washington, as the old Saudi role between the YAR and the US was reduced.5 Dr 
’Abdul-Karim al-Iryani, the YAR Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in 1988, 
assured this author that the US attitude changed after the oil find and added, "the YAR has 
become more careful to preserve and sponsor these relations at present than at any time 
before."6
The oil explorations in the YAR and the oil find on its borders with the PDRY led to the US
283
cautiously welcoming the formation of a United Yemen in 1990. In addition to the oil find 
in the country, it is evident that "the growing importance of the Red Sea as it appeared during 
the eight years of the Iraq-Iran war"7 provided chances for cooperation between Washington 
and Sana’a. Sana’a continued to be in greater need of Washington than vice versa, but the 
US wanted in the YAR a pro-Western and pro-US government. Aware of Washington’s 
objective the YAR benefited from the bilateral relations with the US.
RECURRENT THEMES
YAR influences on regional and US policies
An important theme of this study is how the policies of the YAR affected the region, and 
how in turn regional problems and relationships in the Middle East region affected the US 
and its policies. In 1962 the revolution forced the YAR to depend on the UAR and the USSR. 
This dependency led the YAR to adopt UAR foreign policy and, to an extent, the anti-US 
policy of the USSR. From the moment the YAR became a government committed to 
republican, revolutionary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist policies it sided with the so- 
called progressive Arabs against the monarchical and conservative Arabs as well as against 
the West. This created concern in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Middle East as a whole, 
and opened up the area for an encounter between the so-called "conservative" and 
"progressive" fronts in the region. The revolution in the YAR led to a subsequent change in 
the government of KSA and its internal policies: Crown Prince Faisal became the Prime 
Minister and initiated reform in both the internal and external policies.
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Reconciliation between North Yemeni Republicans and Royalists and the establishment of 
closer relations with the KSA in 1970 alarmed the PDRY, which turned to the USSR for 
arms and protection. Sana’a’s ability to defeat the radical element in the YAR in 1968 led 
to the advent of a more radical government in the PDRY. Restoration of YAR-US relations 
in 1972 had a similar effect. The negotiations following the inter-Yemeni war in 1972 on the 
issue of uniting the two Yemens led to Saudi alarm which in turn led the KSA to seek US 
and Western military equipment and advice. The reunification discussions of late 1979 again 
created alarm in the KSA. Military cooperation and closer relations with the PDRY 
throughout the 1980s led to greater KSA dependency on the US and Western protection.
The 1962 YAR revolution tempted the UAR to involve itself in Arabian Peninsula politics 
and to challenge Western influence. This involvement drained Egyptian capabilities and 
adversely affected its military capacity against Israel. In this respect the YAR indirectly 
contributed to the defeat of the Arab nationalist and radical elements in Egypt and the Arab 
world.
YAR policies clearly affected the region, and, in turn, the regional problems derived from or 
caused by the Yemeni revolution themselves affected US policy towards the YAR and the 
region as a whole. YAR alliances with the UAR and the USSR in the 1960s, which Sana’a 
deemed necessary for its survival, were perceived in Washington to be aggressively anti- 
American. Washington therefore supported its existing allies in the region and counteracted 
potential YAR influence by bolstering the defences of US-friendly states. UAR success in
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constraining and severing YAR-US relations in 1966 and 1967 lay behind US neglect of the 
YAR for the five years following the UAR withdrawal from the country. The defeat of the 
anti-US element in the YAR in 1968 made Sana’a of less concern to Washington. Regional 
developments, of which the most important were the withdrawal of the British from the Gulf 
in 1971, the rise of a pro-Soviet South Yemen in 1969, severance of the two-year old PRSY- 
US relations in 1969, and the pro-Nasser revolution in Libya on 1 September 1969 which was 
followed by the Libyan nationalisation of US oil companies, all paved the way for US 
political interest in the YAR. YAR-US diplomatic relations were therefore restored on 1 July 
1972 and USAID projects were resumed.
Saudi Arabian ability to influence the YAR throughout most of the 1970s made the US deal 
with the YAR through the KSA. It continued as a trilateral relationship until 1984 when the 
YAR was able to reconcile with the PDRY, cooperate with the USSR, and when US oil 
companies discovered oil. YAR-PDRY rapprochements in the 1980s and deterioration of 
YAR-KSA relations during this period persuaded the US to give more attention to bilateral 
relations with the YAR. When YAR-PDRY unity took place on 22 May 1990, the US showed 
some caution, though it congratulated the Yemenis on their achievement. This caution was 
mainly due to KSA reservations because it saw Yemen unity as a threat to its own security.8
In conclusion, it was clear that the YAR did upset the regional balance of power, but that the 
US as a great power was able to contain it within its own overall Middle Eastern policy.
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US in YAR overall foreign policy
A further theme is that of how the YAR’s relations with the US fitted into the former’s 
overall foreign policy especially as regards Saudi Arabia and South Yemen first under the 
British and then under the NLF and YSP. US recognition of the Republic did not fulfil these 
Yemeni hopes of ending KSA and British support for the counter-revolution because of the 
YAR government’s commitment to the Arab nationalist movement which was a threat to the 
security of the KSA, and perceived as a potential threat to the British position in Aden and 
the Protectorates.
As the American record of relations with the moderate Republicans during the first phase of 
diplomatic relations show, the YAR, though under UAR influence, attempted to use the US 
diplomatic presence to counter UAR domination. In 1972 the YAR sought an alliance with 
the US to resist the KSA and PDRY influence. This alliance proved fruitful because it 
prevented the defeat of the YAR by PDRY-supported Leftists. In a prompt response to a 
YAR appeal that coincided with events in Iran and Afghanistan, Washington provided Sana’a 
with the military, moral and political support to protect it from a potential PDRY invasion.
The YAR-US relationship deflected PDRY pressure until 1979 and convinced the USSR in 
the 1980s to adopt a friendly attitude towards the YAR contrary to the wishes of its PDRY 
ally. While it obtained military equipment from the Soviets to strengthen its army, the YAR 
tried to acquire more economic aid from the US. Economic cooperation between Washington 
and Sana’a resulted in the 1984 discovery of oil in commercial quantities by an American
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company, an event which created the start of serious US economic investment in the YAR. 
Although at times the YAR’s policy towards the US was forced upon it by both regional and 
international events, it did achieve a degree of freedom of manoeuvre in determining its own 
foreign policy towards the KSA and the PDRY. The YAR also eventually achieved economic 
benefit from its relationship with the US.
YAR in US Middle East policy
The place of US policy towards the YAR within overall US policy in the Middle East is an 
important theme running through the thesis. As has been seen US concerns in the Middle East 
were to prevent the oil resources of the Persian Gulf falling under the domination of forces 
hostile to the US and the West, and thus to protect the KSA and other Arabian Peninsula 
states as well as to counter the Communist penetration in the region, and to protect Israel. 
In the 1960s, US policy towards the YAR was a step-child of its policy towards the UAR and 
the KSA. In the 1970s, the US restored relations with Sana’a in the light of the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf and the appearance of the pro-Soviet PDRY as well as the 
flourishing of pro-Moscow fronts which were willing to overthrow the pro-Western 
governments of the Arabian Peninsula. In this period, Washington became interested in 
Sana’a in order to use it as a buffer zone between its economic interests in the KSA and the 
political hostility of PDRY. This became more clear in 1979 when Washington provided the 
YAR with arms as well as moral, political and military support to help it counteract a PDRY 
invasion. Apart from the oil discovery in mid-1980s US interest in the YAR throughout the 
1980s continued to be a reflection of US interest in the KSA. From this perspective, the YAR
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played only a small part in US foreign policy towards the Middle East.
YAR exploitation of superpower rivalry
Another dimension of this study is how global strategic rivalries and intersections affected 
the YAR, and how it tried in varying ways and at different times to gain benefit from these 
rivalries. In 1962 the YAR sought both US and USSR recognition and support to bolster its 
position against British and Saudi opposition. The USSR and the Communist bloc provided 
assistance, military equipment and training. Its efforts with the US failed at first because of 
the Republic’s commitment to the Arab nationalist movement which, the US believed, opened 
the area to Soviet influence, and was thus a threat to US-Western interests in the region.
The Soviet Union, influenced by the Yemeni Left, hesitated in providing the YAR with arms 
after the 5th of November coup d’etat of 1967. A Yemeni delegation to Moscow returned 
empty handed, but when Republican Sana’a warned Moscow that the country was due to fall 
under the US influence if the Royalist seige captured the capital, a YAR delegation was 
headed by Yemeni Vice Premier, Hassan Makki, was invited to Moscow in early December 
and achieved full success. The USSR provided the YAR that month with arms including 24 
MiG 19s and many Russian pilots and military experts who with Syrian pilots operated the 
new arms and bombers.9 In 1968 when the YAR government launched a war against the 
leftist opposition and relations with the USSR deteriorated the YAR tried to replace Moscow 
with Beijing: it was reported that Premier Al-’Amri cancelled a scheduled visit to China in 
early March 1968 after a meeting with the Russian Ambassador in Cairo.
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Following the defeat of this seige which was supported by the KSA and the US, Sana’a tried 
to benefit from its relations with the USSR. Increasing KSA influence, however, weakened 
Sana’a-Moscow relations. In 1972, amidst deteriorating relations between Sana’a and Moscow 
and the latter’s alliance with Aden, the YAR tried to exploit the Cold War superpower rivalry 
in order to get military and development aid from the US. It failed because Washington’s 
response was to turn the YAR into a buffer zone between the Marxist South Yemen and pro- 
Western Saudi Arabia, therefore dealing with Sana’a trilaterally through Riyadh.
The tension which hardened from 1978-79 between the two Yemens pushed Sana’a to play 
off Washington once again against Moscow and Aden. This time it succeeded, obtaining 
American arms financed by Saudi Arabia as well as US protection, which played a decisive 
role in helping Sana’a survive an attack from the Marxist and Arab nationalist opposition 
movement. Though US military sales to Sana’a ceased once the inter-Yemeni war was over, 
by the end of 1979 the YAR persuaded the USSR to provide it with an arms package to 
strengthen its army and achieve security. The Soviets were responsive because they did not 
want the YAR to fall completely under US influence.
The YAR used its position between its southern neighbour controlled by the British before 
1967 and the PDRY after 1970, and its northern oil-rich Saudi neighbour to acquire political 
support, military assistance and economic aid from both the USA and the USSR and 
successfully maintained this policy throughout the 1980s.
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The Yemeni people’s impact on world politics
The role played by the Yemeni people in affecting domestic, regional and international 
policies also merits examination. To a considerable extent the 1962 revolution was the result 
of the widespread determination of the Yemeni people to improve their living conditions by 
supporting the overthrow of the socially and politically backward monarchy. Throughout the 
lifetime of the YAR the majority of Yemenis in the Republic were influenced by pan-Arab, 
anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist ideas. This clearly influenced the YAR 
government in the early-mid 1960s, when it embraced the Arab nationalist and pro-Soviet 
ideology of Nasserite Egypt. In turn the YAR gave large amounts of military and economic 
assistance to the YAR in order to weaken the hitherto united front of conservative pro- 
Western monarchies and sheikhdoms in the Arabian peninsula. This drained UAR resources 
and, after the defeat by Israel in 1967, it lost its position as leader of the Arab nationalist 
movement. The UAR’s defeat meant in effect, the defeat of Arab nationalism in the Middle 
East; thus served US interests at the expense of USSR interests. Having lost its Egyptian 
foothold in the region, the USSR was forced to turn to the PDRY. Strengthened by Soviet 
military assistance the PDRY became the source of ten years of instability within the YAR. 
From 1967 the YAR begun to make overtures towards the USA. But it had to work hard to 
quell internal criticism of its pro-Westem initiatives from the strong nationalist and socialist 
elements in the country and the government itself.
After the restoration of relations with the US in 1972 all YAR governments tried to distance
291
themselves from a public alliance with the US because of popular support for the Palestinian 
and other Arab nationalist issues. The geo-political position of the YAR between the anti-US 
PDRY, and the anti-USSR KSA, directly influenced YAR foreign policy. In 1979 US military 
and political assistance helped Sana’a to deter a PDRY invasion, but this did not prevent the 
YAR from obtaining Soviet arms partly because of the nationalist and anti-KSA element in 
the country which sought to resist the Saudi influence. This continued until the very end of 
the Republic’s life. Unification in 1990 which was achieved despite initial opposition from 
the KSA and only cautious support from the USA, brought with it not only an end to 
internecine war but also the opportunity for the Yemeni people to benefit from foreign 
economic aid and investment and the possibility of greater freedom to determine Yemeni 
foreign policy. It also brought a greater degree of democratic freedoms than had ever been 
experienced before.
Thus the economic and political aspirations of the Yemeni people may have played only a 
relatively small part in affecting the foreign policies of the various countries involved in the 
Yemeni arena during this period but their voice could never be completely ignored by the 
YAR governments.
Religious differences and YAR-US interaction
Religious differences within the Yemeni arena and within the Arabian Peninsula also merit 
attention. Religious sectarianism played a hidden yet important role in determining the nature 
of the YAR-US interaction. In the 1960s the Shafi’is (a Sunni sect of Islam) through their
292
contacts with the Sunni Egyptian leadership, played a major role in organising the revolution. 
They had paid a high price hitherto, since they were deprived of all their rights as citizens 
under the pre-Republic Zeidi Imams and during their exile to the colony of Aden. Zeidi 
attempts in the mid-1960s to reconcile the YAR with the KSA and the Royalist camp were 
undermined by the majority Shafi’is, who considered such a reconciliation as anti-Shafi’i; 
most of the Shafi’is joined Arab nationalist and Socialist parties because they saw that allying 
with these forces would best serve their interests. This religious conflict added further 
constraints on YAR-US relations throughout the 1960s. Though the Shafi’i element was 
defeated in the YAR in August 1968 when the Zeidi government crushed the Nasserite and 
the Arab Nationalist Movement, the religious factor continued to act as a constraint on YAR- 
US relations. In June 1969 the Arab Nationalist Movement’s radicals seized power in the 
PDRY. Some of the key leaders of the new government in Aden were originally Shafi’is from 
Northern Yemen. This cannot be separated from what happened eight months earlier in 
Sana’a, on 23-24 August 1968. That year the Marxist Shafi’is in Aden severed relations with 
the US. They also supported a guerrilla warfare in the central areas of the YAR. Their 
influence inside the politically unstable YAR made the US cautious in its dealings with the 
YAR throughout the seventies and the eighties. In the 1970s and 1980s Zeidi-Wahhabi10 
differences between the YAR and the KSA, which restored diplomatic relations in 1970, 
formed a barrier to YAR-KSA cooperation and trust. The Saudis used their stronger alliance 
with the US to constrain YAR-US interaction. It is in this context that religious factionalism 
differences within the YAR and within the Yemeni arena influenced the YAR’s as well as 
the PDRY’s foreign policies towards the US throughout the period of this study.
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Superpower-small state relations
The main comparative dimension of this study is that of Superpower-Small State relations: 
the role small powers play in the diplomatic, economic and foreign policy of larger ones, and 
the degree of freedom of manoeuvre which small states have in determining their own foreign 
policy. By examining the YAR’s foreign policy throughout the period 1962-1990 it is evident 
that it was shaped by domestic, regional and superpower influences. The backwardness of the 
country, its weak economy and large population, religious differences and political and 
economic aspirations of the people, and its geographic position in a highly volatile and 
unstable Middle East, one of the main battle-grounds of the Cold War, all influenced the 
foreign policy of the YAR. This was also shaped by the nature of the Yemeni decision­
making process. But the external policies of the post-1962 Republic, were, to an extent, 
similar to those of the pre-1962 monarchical, conservative Yemen.
In 1962, the new Republic tried to develop contacts with modem industrialised Western 
society, especially the US. This was only partly successful. Egyptian intervention, civil war, 
a close military relationship with the USSR, an alliance with the Arab nationalist movement, 
a commitment to fight colonialism, imperialism and Zionism, and border and ideological 
disputes with the KSA, all affected the YAR’s interaction with the USA. In 1962 the YAR 
had no other choice but to ally itself with the UAR and the USSR. Without Egyptian 
assistance and protection and subsequent Arab and Soviet military support it was unlikely that 
the Republic would have survived. In the seventies it was seriously threatened by both the
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monarchical pro-US KSA and the radical pro-Soviet PDRY. Though the YAR was destined 
to fall under Saudi influence, the pressure from the PDRY on its southern borders forced it 
to adopt a more consistently balanced policy towards the US and the USSR. In 1979, Sana’a 
was expected to fall to the PDRY and NDF invading forces, but this was prevented by the 
assistance and protection of both the KSA and the US. The new USSR policy towards the 
YAR from late 1979 gave the YAR a limited ability to manoeuvre and maintain relations 
with both the US and the USSR: it received economic cooperation with Washington and 
military assistance from Moscow. This enabled the YAR to achieve political stability and 
economic development throughout most of the 1980s.
The YAR emerged in a period of high-level international and regional instability, and during 
a period of Cold War when the Arabian Peninsula was penetrated by the two superpowers. 
Internal YAR political instability was mostly the result of superpower penetration in the form 
of massive military aid to their client states in the area. The superpower presence and their 
influence on the regional powers’ policies, therefore, placed constraints on the foreign policy 
of the YAR and other small states of the region.
The domestic environment played a major role in determining the nature of YAR-US 
interaction between 1962 and 1990. For example, the large YAR population in comparison 
to that of the PDRY and other pro-Western states of the Arabian Peninsula was one of the 
considerations in the minds of Washington’s policy-makers in their dealings with Sana’a. The 
YAR, as the most highly populated country in the Arabian Peninsula, with a Republican, anti-
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monarchical, pan-Arab, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist orientation in the 1960s, created 
fear in the surrounding less populated and more conservative Arabian Peninsula states. It also 
caused UK and US concern for the security of their interests in the Gulf region. These two 
major powers and their allies in the Arab world, all collaborated to defeat the Republic 
whether by restoring the Royalist government or, at the very least, to moderate the YAR 
government to prevent it from supporting UAR threats towards Western interests in the 
region. Once this objective was achieved (after the UAR defeat by Israel in 1967) Sana’a fell 
under the influence of the KSA, and as the USSR developed its support to the PDRY, 
military cooperation with both the US and USSR became more difficult because of PDRY 
and KSA fears of a more populated and better equipped YAR.
The YAR’s geographical position also affected its foreign policy. In the sixties the YAR, 
which controlled the southern entrance of the Red Sea, lay between the KSA, a US ally, and 
the South Arabian Federation (SAF), a colony of the UK. Once the YAR formed an alliance 
with the UAR it faced war from both northern and southern fronts. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the YAR had the pro-Soviet PDRY and pro-American KSA on its southern borders. This 
placed constraints on the YAR’s ability to interact freely with both the US and the USSR. 
US policy-makers saw the YAR in this period as only a suitable buffer zone between the 
PDRY and their interests in the KSA.
More than anything else the weak YAR economy affected its foreign decision-making. The 
Yemeni civil war in the 1960s had a negative effect on agricultural activity in the YAR. The
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country became dependent on aid from the UAR. The budget of the YAR was provided by 
the UAR throughout most of the sixties. UAR economic capabilities were drained by the 
Yemen civil war and were strained yet more by its defeat in the Six Day War. It was forced 
to withdraw its forces from the YAR thus pushing the Republic in the 1970s into becoming 
highly dependent on the KSA. This dependency inevitably put limits on YAR foreign policy. 
Throughout the seventies, military and political YAR-US interaction was largely dictated by 
KSA-US dealings, and a trilateral relationship was forced upon the YAR. Because of its weak 
economy the YAR had no option but to accept a Saudi-financed US arms package during its 
second war with the PDRY in 1979, because this served the security purposes of the KSA. 
When Sana’a applied for additional US supplies to reorganise and re-equip its army this was 
denied largely because both the KSA and the US both used their aid to influence the foreign 
policy of the YAR.
In conclusion, despite the beginnings of tangible US participation in the economy of the 
country after the discovery of oil, as a small state the YAR attempted to maintain 
independence and stability and develop its economy based upon its own resources. 
Throughout the period 1962 to 1990 it was forced to accept "limits to its options from larger 
regional powers as well as the ‘great power’ allies of its regional neighbours and the 
limitations of these great powers’ interests."11 Dependence and reliance on the developed 
world for expertise, trade and capital means that the independence and freedom of manoeuvre 
for a small state although severely circumscribed, was not entirely impossible.
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A P P E N D I C E S
Appendix I
Text of Commerce and Friendship Agreement between the US and Yemen, signed in Sana’a 
on 4 May 1946:
Article I. The United States of America and the Kingdom of the Yemen will exchange 
diplomatic representatatives and consular officers at a date which shall be fixed by mutual 
agreement between the two governments.
Article n. The diplomatic representatives of each party accredited to the government of the 
other party shall enjoy in the territories of such other party the rights, privileges, exemptions 
and immunities accorded under generally recognized principles of international law. The 
consular officers of each party who are assigned to the government of the other party, and 
are duly provided with executors, shall be permitted to reside in the territories of such other 
party at the places where consular officers are permitted by the applicable laws to reside; they 
shall enjoy the honorary privileges and the immunities accorded to officers of their rank by 
general international usage; and they shall not, in any event, be treated in a manner less 
favorable than similar officers of any third country.
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Article III. Subjects of His Majesty the King of the Yemen in the United States of America 
and nationals of the United States of America in the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be received 
and treated in accordance with the requirements and practices of generally recognized 
international law. In respect of their persons, possessions and rights, such subjects or nationals 
shall enjoy the fullest protection of the laws and authorities of the country, and shall not be 
treated in any manner less favorable than the nationals of any third country. Subjects of His 
Majesty in the United States of America and nationals of the United States of America in the 
Kingdom of the Yemen Shall be subject to the local laws and regulations, and shall enjoy the 
rights and privileges accorded in this third Article.
Article IV. In all matters relating to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with importation or exportation or otherwise affecting commerce and 
navigation, to the method of levying such duties and charges, to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation or exportation, and to transit, warehousing and other facilities, 
each Party shall accord unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment to 
articles of growth, produce or manufacture of the other Party, from what ever place arriving, 
or to articles destined for exportation to the territories of such other Party, by whatever route. 
Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity with respect to any duty,charge or regulation 
affecting commerce or navigation now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America 
or by the Kingdom of Yemen to any third country will be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the commerce and navigation of the Kingdom of Yemen and the United 
States of America, respectively. The advantages relating to customs duties now or hereafter
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accorded by the United States of America to the Republic of Cuba shall be excepted from 
the provisions of this agreement.
Article V. There shall be excepted from the provisions of Article IV of this agreement 
advantages now or hereafter accorded: by virtue of a customs union of which either Party 
may become a member, to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic; and by the 
United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another or to the Panama 
Canal Zone.
The last clause shall continue to apply in respect of any advantages now or hereafter accorded 
by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another irrespective 
of any change in the political status of any such territories or possessions.
Nothing in this agreement shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by either party within 
the area of its jurisdiction: of measures relating to the importation or exportation of gold or 
silver or the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and, in exceptional 
circumstances, all other military supplies; of measures necessary in pursuance of obligations 
for the maintenance of international peace and security or necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of such Party in time of national emergency; or of status in relation to 
immigration and travel. Subject to the requirement that, under like circumstances and 
conditions, there shall be no arbitrary discrimination by either Party against the subjects, 
nationals, commerce or navigation of any third country, the provisions of this agreement shall
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not extend to prohibitions or restrictions: imposed on moral or humanitarian grounds; 
designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; relating to prison-made goods; or 
relating to the enforcement of police or revenue law.
Article VI. The provisions of this agreement shall apply to all territory under sovereignty or 
authority of either of the parties, except the Panama Canal Zone.
Article VII. This agreement shall continue in force until superseded by a more comprehensive 
commercial agreement, or until thirty days from the date of a written notice of termination 
given by either Party to the other Party, whichever is the earlier. Moreover either Party may 
terminate Articles I, II, III or IV on thirty days’ written notice.
If the above provisions are acceptable to the government of the Kingdom of the Yemen this 
note and the reply signifying assent thereto shall, if agreeable to that government, be regarded 
as constituting an agreement between two governments which shall become effective on the 
date of such acceptance (The Middle East Journal, Volume 1, No. 1, 1947, pp. 86-88).
302
Appendix II
Author’s interview with Ambassador George Lane 
US Ambassador to the YAR 1978-1981 
Worcester MA, 16 February 1990
Q. You were, Your Excellency, the US Ambassador in the YAR during the period of the 
second inter-Yemeni war of 1979, when the US supported the YAR government against a 
threat from the leftist South. I believe you have a lot to say about YAR-USA relations 
especially in that period of time.
A. I was the first American ambassador to present credentials to President ’Ali ’Abd Allah 
Saleh after he became the President, so I am very proud of that. I think there are interesting 
stories through the history of US-Yemen relations: the period after the Yemeni revolution 
when some aid people had a very bad time and were thrown in prison and other sorts of 
things during that period when the US-Egyptian-relations were very bad. This is funny again, 
I guess I am saying the same thing, that the US-Yemen relations have been a sort of a step 
child of US relations with some other country whether Egypt or Saudi Arabia. First, when 
I first went to Saudi Arabia in 1962 before the revolution in Yemen, the US Ambassador 
Hurt was also the US Ambassador to Yemen.
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Q. What did you do during this visit?
A. I was commercial officer. That was when we had a Charge d’Affaires, Robert Stookey in 
Ta’iz. Then there was that period after the Revolution when the US did recognize right away 
and Yemen was the scene of struggle between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, between Nasser and 
Faisal at that period. So US-Yemen relations were really again a step child of the relationship 
of those two bigger countries. Then, after 1967 the civil war began to settle, but the country 
broke relations with the US, as a result of the 1967 war, so there was no sort of relationship 
at all. Then when it picked up again in the 1970s, again, it became very much tied up with 
the growing importance of Saudi oil to the US.
Q. But why do you think the relations did not grow after 1972? Did the Saudi oil boom after 
1973 affect these relations negatively?
A. Yes. Faisal played his cards very well. One of the great tragedies to the Saudis was the 
death of Faisal. No country can afford to lose leaders like that. And remember in 1978 we 
were just about to open relations with South Yemen. We were talking about it when al- 
Ghashmi got blown up and Salem Rubayye’ ’Ali was overthrown. Actually that happened 
after Scotts left and before I got there. I think Scotts left in April and al-Ghashmi was blown 
up in June, and then I got there in September, just after ’Ali ’Abd Allah became the 
President.
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In fact my number 2 at the time, the DCM as we call him, the Deputy Chief of Mission in 
the Embassy , his name is Edward Gnehm, he is about to become a US ambassador in the 
area very soon. He became a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, was working in the 
Pentagon and he was on a trip to the Middle East and he went to Yemen about year ago. 
There, he went to Ambassador Charles Denbar and said "You know I would like to call 
President Saleh and tell him I am here and just if I could drop by him for 10 minutes to pay 
my respects", and the ambassador said "I am not sure if you could do that. It’s very hard to 
see President Saleh, he’s very busy." Gnehm said "I am going to do it anyway." So he got 
through to the President, and the President said "Come right over." so he went over to him 
and the President said just exactly what I thought: "Remember those stories when used to 
come out of New York Times when you and Lane were here which said ’Ali ’Abd Allah 
won’t last six months...." Frankly I never said that. I always said "Some people say that, he 
may last a lot longer than most other people think." President Saleh was a lot frustrated 
during that period when I was there. On the occasion of the annual anniversary of the 
revolution in 1979, they had a fly-over of the F5s which were in Yemen and I think they got 
twelve F5s and they had pilots of four different nationalities who don’t have a common 
language flying in the air show. They had Saudis, Yemenis, Americans and Nationalist 
Chinese, Taiwanese, there were nine pilots: three Saudis, two Yemenis, two Americans and 
two Taiwanese. So the Saudis and the Yemenis would have to speak in English and of course 
the Nationalist Chinese understood the English, but it was the only language they had in 
common, and some of the Yemenis were a little weak in English, because they hadn’t been 
trained in English so they had to speak to the Saudis in Arabic and the Saudis would repeat
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in English.
Q. Prime Minister ’Abdul-’Aziz ’Abdul-Ghani visited the White House in 1979. What was 
the outcome of the visit?
A. Yes. I was with him, We called on Brzezinski, as an envoy from President Saleh.
Q. About the arms?
A. Basically the whole relationship, the direct relations and the arms of course. Obviously 
from the US point of view we hope for good relations between the Saudis and the Yemenis. 
There is no reason there shouldn’t be. I mean there are bigger problems in the area than the 
ancient views over ’Asir and some thing...
Q. Concerning the Middle East. Do you think that the American interest in the Middle East 
will change as a result of the change in East Europe?
A. Yes. It already has .America as you know has had for 45 years three basic interests in the 
Middle East. They have always been the same and continue ’till to-day: block Soviet 
penetration; make sure we have access to oil at as low prices as we can; and protect Israel. 
Those have been US interests since 1948 and our policies were affected by these three. The
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Yemen is a little bit different. One of the reasons we went to Yemen was because the Soviets 
were in Yemen. Yemen has nothing to do much with oil and Israel because Yemen hasn’t 
been relevant to those issues too often and up till now. Still the major oil producers are 
Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia. Yemen is not in that league yet. We will see whether it will 
happen or not... As far as the Middle East is concerned, the Arab-Israeli problem...Are any 
of those three US interests threatened? That’s the question the President asks. Then he looks 
after the Soviet penetration. As you said the Soviets have plenty to worry about at home and 
about their future.
Q. Do you think American aid will continue to North Yemen despite the shift of interest to 
eastern Europe?
A. It will be very hard to get aid money to Yemen. When I was there Yemen was getting 
more money per capita in aid from all the countries in the world than any country in the 
world partially, because Abdul-Karim is so smart. He is a wonderful man... The UN, the 
Danes, the Germans, the Swiss, the US were all spending lots of money.... Everybody was 
having an aid program in Yemen....but Yemen finding oil and the great pressures on the aid 
program for other countries that are worse now than Yemen it is probably going to be hard 
for Yemen to get aid.
Q. Some Yemenis think that the US is never concerned with political development in the 
third world.
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A. Depends on what you are talking about. Nicaragua, Salvador. There we are trying very 
hard to influence the politics of those countries, but do you really want us to do that in 
Yemen...I am not sure that the United States should be going around the world telling other 
people how to run their country...
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Appendix III
John Kelly
US Assistant Secretary of State
Press conference, Washington DC, 24 January 1990
Yemen is a relatively small country at the southern end of the Red Sea, has a population of 
about 10 million people. They produce a modest amount of oil. US oil companies are active 
there and in fact Hunts participated in the first discovery of oil in Yemen in commercially 
interesting supplies about 5 years ago. Yemen is a non-aligned state, a member of the Arab 
league. The Republic of Yemen is not to be confused with its neighbour the PDRY, a more 
radical Arab state with its capital of Aden just to the South of the YAR. Saleh has been in 
office 11 years. President Bush met him in 1986 when then Vice-President (he) visited 
Yemen. The Vice-President in 1986 helped to inaugurate a refinery in the Yemen and invited 
Saleh to visit the US. This is the state visit that flows from our invitation, and I’ll be happy 
to answer your questions.
Q. What is the US assessment of the unification prospects between the two countries?
A. President Saleh publicly proposed several months ago the idea of unification between the 
YAR and the southern neighbour, the PDRY, and the two sides have been talking about a
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joint constitution which is now under discussion in both capitals. Obviously what the two 
countries wanted to do is depend on their wishes. We will, be sure, be talking to President 
Saleh about the subject and how he thinks it’s going while he is here.
Q. Could you explain more about the US position. Would it be more to the direction of South 
Yemen or would it be more with the US?
A. Because North Yemen has a population of 10 million people and the south has only about 
2 million, and because North Yemen is already producing oil and South Yemen is not, I think 
that the weight of influence in a unified country would be with the North. We have had good 
relations with the North for quite a while and we have not with the South. I don’t think a 
union would do any damage to US interest, but as I said, ultimately they are going to decide 
what they want to do.
Q. Is there going to be any appreciable movement, one way or another in North Yemen’s 
East-West orientation of the last years since Bush got there? I remember on his trip that was 
the big question.
A. There hasn’t been anything dramatic. North Yemen still gets the bulk of its military 
assistance from the Soviet Union. We are very modest supplier on the military side. We got 
a military training program. I meant international military education, a training program of 
about $ 1 m a year and had military sales. So our offer is pretty modest.
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Q. What about Development Assistance?
A. We provide assistance to North Yemen. The last fiscal year was about $20m.
Q. US-South Yemen relations?
A. We’ve had meetings this fall in New York at the UN between Ambassador Pickering, the 
US representative, and the South Yemen representative to talk about possible restoration of 
diplomatic relations between the US and South Yemen. I am not exactly sure whether 
Pickering had three meetings or four, it’s certainly not more than half-a-dozen. We haven’t 
had any in a couple months as I do know and we have exchanged views with the South 
Yemen representative about the restoration of diplomatic relations. We talked with them about 
the problems they have with their support for terrorism and some of their international 
positions over the years.
Q. How much do we get back from the $20 m every year, what gain?
A. Oh, yes. Well I think over the years, the US there has tended to dilute the Soviet 
influence.
Q. $20m every year for how many years?
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A. This has been up and down. That was the most recent year’s figure.
Q. We don’t get anything back?
A. I think we are, I think we are getting access among other things, good access for 
American oil companies and firms which have an interest there.
Q. Oil companies should pay then. Should they?
A. ...we’re helping a country that needs some help and development. It is in the geopolitical 
interest of the US.
Q. What subjects the President will be talking about here?
A. We are going to talk about the range of the Middle East issues: the peace process. The 
Yemenis are not involved but they are interested in it. What is going on in the Gulf, the role 
of Iran, changes in the Soviet Union. And I am sure the issue of Armenia and Azerbaidjan 
will come up. Again, as a country in that part of the world Yemen has interest in what is 
going on.
Q. Any particular bilateral problem?
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A. No particular bilateral problem between us.
Q. Any progress on discussions about relations with South Yemen?
A. We will be discussing the subject with the President of North Yemen while he is here. We 
have talked and will be talking with Saudi Arabia, with Omanis and other people in the 
region and making our own calculations whether or not it is in the US interest at all We have 
to think forward.
\
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Dr Robert Stookey
US Charge d’Affaires in North Yemen 1959-Early 1963 
Austin-Texas, 30 January 1990
Q. From your numerous writings on Yemen I feel that you had special interest in Yemen, 
even before arriving in it.
A. I spent two 2 years before leaving to Yemen in 1959 as the Arabian Peninsula officer in 
the Department. When I was appointed as Charge d’Affaires in Yemen, I told several people 
that I expected to see a revolution in Yemen during my tour, and it happened.
Q. I came to Texas to hear from you personally something you remember about the earlier 
contacts between the governments of the YAR and the US which led to US recognition on 
December 19, 1962.
A. As you know it took a quite long time for formal relations to be established between the 
US and the new government, because the principal preoccupations in Washington were the 
positions and status of the British in the Arabian Peninsula at least generally, as well as the 
security of Saudi Arabia. And one principle issue was the claim of North Yemen to
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sovereignty over all South Yemen. And this took a long time, many trips by myself from 
Ta’iz where the legation was to Sana’a where the government headquarters was, before some 
formula was worked out that was formally satisfactory to us so that we could go ahead and 
recognise. Our government was concerned about the attitude of the government of North 
Yemen towards Saudi Arabia, what course had to be taken because the Egyptians were really 
in substantial control of the Yemeni government, because the Egyptians were not at all 
friendly with Saudi Arabia. Eventually this was worked out and the recognition took place. 
Meanwhile of course Prince Hassan had left New York [to go] back to Yemen by way of 
Saudi Arabia where he persuaded King Saud to back the Royalists with an ordinary force. 
And that, of course, was not palatable to us. So there was, mainly, I think, through our 
initiative, a UN decision to send an international force to maintain the boundary between the 
Royalist and the Republican forces.
Q. That was in 1963.1 want to concentrate on the contacts, that were going on between you 
and the Yemeni government on the issue of recognition. When did these contacts start and 
from which side?
A. Well, immediately after they took control of Sana’a, very early, within the first week, 
particularly because of the shaky situation, since we had about a hundred American engineers 
and technicians building the road from Makha to Ta’iz and Sana’a. My concern of course was 
the security of this American community for which I was responsible. Since we were 
foreigners allied with the British, we were not on good terms with the new Revolutionary
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government. There were no violent incidents but sort of incidents where Americans were felt 
under threat of some force of some sort, so that was a preoccupation of mine throughout this 
uncertain period before our government decided to set up normal relations. It, as I said, 
involved my travelling between Ta’iz and Sana’a every time to exchange telegrams between 
me and Washington on the subject of recognition. It was not a very comfortable situation for 
me because I had no faith in the ancient Yemeni planes that flew between Ta’iz and Sana’a, 
so I travelled back and forth by jeep every time and I was always received by the new 
leaders very cordially and the negotiations were very pleasant on both sides but it was on 
impediment to full cooperation on both sides.
There was one period, quite early after the revolution, when I was not sure of the new 
government’s ability and willingness to ensure the safety of our American community and 
I spent hours making out evacuation orders for the Americans all over the country, signing 
these orders, if I decided that the time had come to order these people to leave. Then, I 
arranged for an American destroyer, a warship, to be just beyond the horizon of Makha, and 
the general plan was that we would all pile into jeeps and rush to Hudaidah for evacuation 
hoping that no organized force would stop us. Of course I didn’t tell the details of the plan 
to the leaders in Sana’a, but made it clear that I was concerned about the safety of Americans 
who would leave if they proved to be in danger. Nothing came of it. Yemen generally is not 
a resentful place, they don’t hate foreigners, like some people in Saudi Arabia do for 
example. So there was no need to carry these evacuation plans out.
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Q. Do you remember who first contacted you from the government’s side concerning 
recognition?
A. Al-Sallal and then No. 2, al-Baidani. Frequendy I talked with al-Baidani. When the 
recognition was approved, I presented the Act to al-Baidani, but with any other important 
matter, in fact, I usually saw al-Sallal and my conversations with him took place either in his 
headquarters which was swarming with Egyptian advisors or at the hotel at night were we 
could talk with very few other people around. And it was very apparent at me, how resentful 
al-Sallal was at the close control the Egyptians were attempting to maintain over him. At the 
end of one of our conversations in Sana’a, he accompanied me from his office to the front 
door, and one of the Egyptians was designated to interpret... Of course I was talking with him 
in Arabic and during our walk down to the door the Egyptian soldier attempted to interpret 
some remarks, so al-Sallal said to him "yetkallam ’Arabi ahsan minnak" (he speaks Arabic 
better than you do)....
Q. Did you keep any personal notes or records of your meetings with Sallal and al-Baidani?
A. There were telegrams to the Department of State. There was no aeroplane service into 
Yemen at that time. And the contact was, therefore, through telegrams, which are all available 
at the Department of State. The Department was worried of course about the safety of my 
legation and the American community and they kept urging me to report every day by 
telegram. But at that time, telegrams sent from Yemen were the most expensive in the world.
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A two to three page telegram cost $1500 for just one message, and of course I was not 
paying by a cheque or paper money. Only the Maria Theresa dollars. A bag of 1000 weighs 
651bs. A three or four page telegram cost 2000 of these dollars.
Q. Al-Baidani claimed that you delivered to him a list of 17 Yemeni names whom you 
thought were Communists occupying key posts in the government and that you suggested 
they should be removed as one of the conditions to improve the relations.
A. I don’t remember details but it sounds straight forward.
Q. You mean the list of the names?
A. Could well be. That is always a sensitive point with us. We still have not got it. We see 
Communists behind every bush and so forth. Such information should be in the files of my 
intelligence officer in my legation.
Q. Concerning your daily telegrams could you recall their themes?
A. In my telegrams I was arguing for recognition, naturally. I was aware there were pockets 
of resistance to the new Republican regime.
Q. Are these ideas found in your books now echoes of the same ideas during your service
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in Yemen?
A. These were very much my ideas of the time.
Q. You said you see a Communist behind every bush. Do you mean the recognition’s main 
purpose was to encircle the Soviet influence in the country and to secure the rich peninsula?
A. That was one of my talking points to the Department of State, to get the decision of 
recognition out of Washington within the global context - was one factor.
Q. From your works on Yemen, I believe that you used to think that a republican US would 
prefer a republican Yemen which takes care of the welfare of its people and at the same time 
does not threat the US interests in the peninsula.
A. Exactly. Also by recognizing the new regime and conducting normal relations with it we 
will have a better chance of furthering our own interests of concern...as well as the British 
position. We could influence the new YAR government to maintain decent relations with the 
British across the border in South Yemen. Normal relations would make it possible for any 
official to plead their case in Yemen. Without recognition we would be of no influence at all. 
The British who had a very rigid government refused to follow our example and therefore 
the YAR forced them to close their diplomatic office.
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Q. Dr al-Baidani mentioned also some argument with you concerning Kennedy’s present of 
wheat in November 1962 , something about the American emblem of foreign aid.
A. The food supply was in a very crucial state at this particular time. He was a little put out 
that the wheat was being shipped in bags with the emblem of our foreign aid. No practical 
way that we can do otherwise. Because the Chinese food supply arrived in one of their bulk 
ships when our bags with the American emblem were empty - our bags arrived 1 month 
earlier - the Yemeni officials in the port of Hudaidah filled our bags with the Chinese flour 
and so a lot of the Yemeni people thought this was still American wheat. This was symbolic. 
It was ironical rather than amusing for me.
Q. Did you feel that al-Baidani was keen to extend relations with the US at that period?
A. In his position at that time he was doing what he was told. I was never convinced of his 
sincerity, but I am sure that he represented to me the position of al-Sallal’s Egyptian mentors.
Q. From your writings on the politics of the YAR, I feel that you were glad to see the 
Yemeni revolution.
A. I was glad to see the revolution because the Imams did very little for the people. They did 
not have much to work with, but they could have done more.
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Q. Why do you think President Kennedy chose to intervene rather than to confront Egypt 
from the very beginning as President Johnson did later?
A. Well, I think because of the factors we were discussing: the Communist element, the 
British factor and the general impulse to be helpful to less fortunate peoples.
Q. What exactly do you mean by the British factor in this context?
A. We didn’t want to see the British kicked out of South Yemen at that time, even though 
the British were having second thoughts about their position in east of Suez generally. We 
still wanted to encourage them to stay on to defend Western interests in that part of the 
world. Eventually they had to pull out, nevertheless. But that’s what we thought at that time.
Q. It seemed they were having their own calculations?
A. Yes very much. One emotional factor - I tend to be more sympathetic to the Republic 
rather than the Monarchy. The Saudi monarchy is under no threat, no matter how shaky some 
people imagine it to be. But generally our relations are close with Saudi Arabia in spite of 
its formal government. There were no obligations from the part of the rulers to promote the 
welfare of the people, when the revenues became higher they spent them in selfish ways. I 
think they have now come to improving the welfare very substantially... this didn’t happen 
in Yemen under the Imams.
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Q. As far as I can remember you left in early 1963, but maybe you can tell me why the 
relations did not improve following the recognition if that was your understanding?
A. After the revolution, the embassy in Djiddah had no more authority over my legation 
because our ambassador in Djiddah was accredited to Imam Ahmad as Minister to Yemen. 
For security we burnt all our files in Ta’iz, in case our legation was overrun by government 
soldiers or a civilian march, but that did not happen. I left in February and James Cortada 
replaced me. What happened was that when the British were expelled we were in charge of 
their interests and there were incursions from the territory of the Sherif of Beihan across the 
border into the Yemen and things of that sort, problems. Generally speaking relations were 
normal from then on.
Q. Do you think the relations will develop from now onwards?
A. Well. The principal element in the relationship of the Yemeni government is economic aid 
and because of the condition government finances are in, it’s unlikely that aid will increase 
further than the ongoing projects in Yemen.
Q. Do you think the Soviets had encouraged any adventure from the South against the North?
A. I don’t think the Soviets had encouraged any of the adventures against North Yemen or 
against Oman. I don’t think the Russians are thinking of any chance of making a Communist
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bloc in any Arab country because of the strength of the Islamic principles and the sense of 
Arab solidarity. I don’t think the North will unite with the South...from my historical 
perspective South Yemen’s very different from the North... The Yemens should avoid 
reunification and pluralism to improve their relations with Saudi Arabia.
Q. Why was the US very much concerned in 1979?
A. Because there was a real threat and the North Yemenis didn’t show well during the fight.
Q. Do you feel that the Soviets, under Gorbachev, came to the conclusion that the PDRY 
cannot become a socialist nation? Did they encourage PDRY subversion of the YAR?
A. I have the distinct impression that the Soviets have come to the conclusion, on the basis 
of their historical experience in various apparently radical Arab countries, that no Arab 
country, including the PDRY, is a realistic candidate for membership in their community of 
socialist nations, given the persistent strength of Islamic and Arab nationalist traditions. They 
therefore now seek to cultivate mutually beneficial relations with Arab countries regardless 
of their political complexion, rather than attempting to turn them into communist societies.
The USSR has provided South Yemen with the military strength to challenge the governments 
of its neighbours, the YAR and Oman, but I know of no evidence that they have encouraged 
these activities. The USSR’s relations with North Yemen date from the 1920s, and it has been
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a major arms supplier to the YAR. The Soviets attach some importance to their position in 
neutralised North Yemen, and it is unlikely that they have encouraged South Yemeni 
subversion of the YAR.
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David Ransom
Director, Arabian Peninsula affairs 
Department of State 
Washington DC, 8 February 1990
Q. You were, Your Excellency, in Yemen when Yemen-US relations deteriorated in 1967.
A. This happened when 56 Yemeni officials in two aeroplanes were held in Cairo and never 
came back. One day I went to the Ministry of Finance and I found only two officials; they 
were Egyptians and if you wanted something done they had to stamp it. When you think 
about that time you have to remember that what we were trying to do in the Middle East as 
a whole was to prevent a split between the conservative Arab countries and the progressive 
Arab countries, a split between the Soviet Union on one side and us on the other. It was 
called at that time a pluralization, which means that any dispute could become a broader, very 
serious dispute. And in Yemen we tried with recognition to stand with one foot in either 
camp. And in fact what was happening, the Saudis were not happy, neither were the 
Egyptians, each kept pulling us. The situation was difficult for the US. Yes, because the 
situation was difficult in the Arab world. You have to remember the attacks from Egypt on 
Saudi Arabia and on Jordan. Anyway the policy failed, because, we think, the government
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of Egypt went too far, and ,in my mind, and this is a speculation, after we were thrown out 
of Yemen, the British had announced that they were leaving South Yemen, and the Egyptians 
were very confident and decided to stay. They also felt that they were coming into a new era 
where they have the backing of the Soviet Union, no Arab could oppose them, they would 
be able to expand their influence in the Arab world. I think Nasser made a terrible mistake 
when announcing that he was closing the Strait of Tiran and putting his forces into the Sinai. 
Everybody knows what happened after that. I am not saying anything about who fired the 
first shot, but those two moves by Nasser were a great mistake. After the defeat in June, 
Nasser withdraw from Yemen. This was part of the price for dealing with Saudi Arabia, but 
it was also necessary, because his dreams were finished. After the withdrawal, the friends of 
Egypt in South Yemen lost and the people who won.... Those decisions created the modem 
situation of Yemen, I think, between the most radical state in the Arab world and the most 
conservative state. When you say you don’t have a direct relationship with the US, my reply 
is that, you had the influence of many states, and you were reacting in this context.
Q. According to the market?
A. Yes. After the war the most sensible thing I thought for Yemen was to renew relations. 
Q. I think, the Yemenis tried but the US wasn’t interested.
A. I dont think that’s true.
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Q. Some Yemeni officials thought at the time that the US disinterest was based on the fact 
that its interests were not threatened from the side of North Yemen.
A. In 1967-68 maybe. But at that time the situation was very unclear. The security of Sana’a 
was very bad.
Q. According to my own notes the YAR Foreign Minister, ’Ali Lutf al-Thawr, met his 
American counterpart in the UN and discussed the possibility of the restoration of the 
diplomatic relations. Several statements by President al-Iryani and Prime Minister ’ Abd Allah 
al-Kurshmi showed clearly that Sana’a was very much interested in the re-establishment of 
relations with the US.
A. We were interested from the beginning as soon as it was clear that the Republic was going 
to survive as an independent government from attacks from both the south and the north - 
we were interested. The Yemeni government took steps slowly, step by step, and at the end, 
Yemen took the step on its own initiative. It was the first step by Arab country to renew 
relations with the US after the 1967 rupture, but I think it was in the interest of Yemen to 
do that.
Q. Was the American response, Your Excellency, to the Yemeni initiative in 1972 a result 
of the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf?
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A. Not completely. The American reasons... There were always several reasons: what was the 
Soviet Union doing in the South, the Soviet success in getting military facilities in the South. 
We watch this sort of thing very carefully. Second: in the Peninsula we have many friends, 
but the Saudis have always been the most important friend for the US. We did not want to 
see another challenge come to Saudi Arabia from Yemen. We wanted good relations and 
that’s why we argued very hard with the Saudis after relations were renewed with Yemen 
through recognition, and we were largely very successful. The Saudis have their own 
diplomacy and made their own moves. Third: as you know in diplomacy there are personal 
elements that sometimes play important roles and everybody who ever worked in Yemen was 
interested - wanted to try to help. So there always people who said "We need to improve our 
relations with Yemen." We started an aid program. We worked hard with neighbouring states 
on aid. It was a good move, I think, for now it is a very good relationship. Four: We also 
wanted in 1972 to break the front in the Arab world against us. We have relations with Saudi 
Arabia of course and many of those countries, but we have always wanted relations with all 
the countries of the Middle East and we don’t like to be trapped in the Arab-Israeli struggle, 
because we have other interests: aid, trade, culture...local different disputes, alliances and 
things like that. It seems to us that the Arabs had got caught in their rhetoric: "No. No. No." 
And it was hard for them to change. Privately they will tell us something and publicly 
something else. So we wanted to begin to create new choices for ourselves and the Arabs 
after 1967. That was another big reason that relations with Yemen occurred. We went to 
some other Arab states and said: "We think Yemen is going to be this, would you be 
interested [in restoring relations with US]? And the Algerians and the Sudanese said yes. The
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Sudanese did it and the Algerians did not. So at that time, that was important.
Q. And when were you in the Yemen desk?
A. I was the Yemen desk officer at the time when the relations were renewed in 1972. So, 
I did that. They were my recommendations that led to that. I brought Rogers to Sana’a. I was 
first in Yemen in 1966 till 1967 and then as the second man in the Embassy from 1975 till
1978. In 1979-80 I was in the Pentagon where it has a small office for the Department of 
State and I was responsible for that office when we shipped the arms to Sana’a and now 
again with ’Ali ’Abd Allah Saleh I am in charge of the Arabian Peninsula affairs.
Q. How do you view the relations from that time?
A. Well, as you know the most important initiatives of the US towards Yemen were in 1979 
and 1980. When the South invaded. After the death of al-Hamdi and al-Ghashmi, the army 
in the North fell apart. There were very few men, they were not completely under control and 
training was very weak. It looked to us that the South which was in a strong period was 
trying with Soviet help to push over the new government. To take it over. And the Saudis 
were also concerned. We did more for Yemen in those months than ever before. When the 
war started, I was working at that time in the Pentagon. I was more senior in rank than an 
ambassador. I was a State Department person working over there, advising the Secretary of 
Defence. There was some request from Yemenis for help, but most from Saudis and also
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from other Gulf states. Do something. And we did.
Q. You mean politically?
A. You think so! Military and political. We sent the Constellation. We sent planes over Aden 
so they won’t make any mistake over our seriousness. And we sent a message to the head 
of the Soviet Union privately, warning them that we saw no cause, justification, for problems 
from the South to the Arabian Peninsula. It was not a threat, but it was very unusual to send 
a message like this.... We also went into the UN. We coordinated with the Arab League. We 
shipped weapons, advisors very quickly. We supplied intelligence about who was where. It 
was a very large package of diplomatic and military efforts, and it succeeded.
Q. On the arms, was there one package or two after the US promised aid in 1976?
A. There was only one package. It was the $400 million package or less. I want you to 
understand that we also airlifted tanks in 1979. This was so amazing. We had never ever 
lifted tanks to anywhere before. One tank one aeroplane. That was a symbol but an important 
symbol of what we were preparing to do if the situation got worse.
The package of arms was worked out with Saudi Arabia because they paid and because lots 
of support came from Saudi Arabia. It’s
a very complicated package. It’s better if I say it was a very successful package. After the
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war the Soviets got very worried because they had done nothing to help the North only the 
South.
Q. They supplied the YAR with arms they asked for in late 1979?
A. They felt they were in danger of losing their position in the North, so they offered a very 
big arms package to Yemen.
Q. Because the Americans didn’t?
A. Yes. And the Yemenis accepted, but the Soviets gave more weapons and more aid to the 
South then the North, and provided more advisors until 1986. In 1986, 1987, 1988 the curves 
cross. Now the Soviets provide more to the North than to the South. So this is a switch on 
their part, because the South is a failure - it failed completely.
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Appendix VI
Author’s interview with Ambassador Muhsin al-’Aini
First YAR Foreign Minister, Prime Minister in 1972, and YAR Ambassador to the US in 
January 1990.
Washington DC, 7 February 1990
Q. Your Excellency was in Baghdad when the revolution took place in Sana’a and when you 
were appointed as the first YAR Foreign Minister; what were your first diplomatic moves to 
secure international recognition of the new-born Republic?
A. I flew at once to Cairo where I met President Nasser. During this visit to Cairo I met 
ambassadors of the UK, the US and Italy. The Yemeni Charge d’Affaires attended these 
meetings.
Q. What was your argument to the American ambassador to the UAR?
A. I explained to him the story of the Revolution, its motives, its objectives and our hopes 
in Yemen that the superpowers would welcome the change and hence recognise the 
Republican regime. Ambassador John Badeau’s reply was 'We are looking into the matter
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and we will inform our government of your wish."
Q. When you returned to Sana’a following this visit did Your Excellency initiate any contacts 
with the US Charge d’Affaires in the country?
A. I only stayed one day, subsequently I travelled to the United Nations. As you know the 
annual meeting of the UN starts in the second week of September and the Royalist delegation 
was occupying Yemen’s seat as on the 17th of the month. It was necessary, therefore, to 
move quickly to represent the Republic. I arrived there to face this problem especially since 
the Committee of Credentials discusses the papers on the last few days of the session to 
deliver its report recommendations to the General Assembly in the last session. That’s why 
everything continued to be the same till the end of the session. So we used the time to 
present our cause outside the hall where we succeeded in getting a lot of Recognition. 
President Ahmad ben Bella helped us. And at the end of the session the US who recognised 
us on the 19th of December helped us to regain the seat of Yemen. There were many Latin 
American countries who were neutral, but when the US recognised the Republic they 
followed in its path. During the last session we took over Yemen’s seat. Despite its strong 
connection with Saudi Arabia, the US stand was unforgettable compared to France or Britain 
who recognised us only in 1970. We consider this American stance very symbolic in the 
history of YAR-USA relations.
Q. While waiting to replace the Royalist delegation, did you initiate any special contacts with
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some American officials to explain further the Yemeni cause?
A. Before recognition I made great efforts to contact the Department of State. I succeeded 
in meeting Mr Talcott Seelye who was in charge of Arabian Peninsula affairs. But we met 
in a restaurant which used to be in the place where the Watergate complex now is, because 
they wouldn’t do that officially before recognition. I used the opportunity of being in the UN 
to take this initiative. In this unofficial meeting, I tried to convince him that if the US wants 
stability in the Arabian Peninsula, that would be achieved through recognising the Yemen 
Arab Republic and that Saudi Arabia and Great Britain should do the same thing. "That’s the 
only way to avoid the escalation of struggle, dispute and the Egyptian presence", I argued. 
I also told Seelye: "If the complaint is because of the Egyptian troops in the Yemen which 
was surrounded by enemies from south and north, it is natural that the YAR will do anything 
to protect itself and would seek help from any source". That’s why the Americans found that 
withholding their recognition would force Sana’a to seek the help of any power. At the UN 
in early December, I also used the opportunity to meet the American ambassador where I 
pleaded the Yemeni people’s cause.
Q. Following the American recognition in 1962, why does Your Excellency think we didn’t 
benefit more from relations with the United States?
Q. That period was very difficult, and the Saudi attack was strong. The Egyptian forces’ 
operations in the country were at their maximum, and hence Cairo was the real ruler. Our
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government did not want to lose the support of Egypt naturally while the relations between 
Cairo and Washington were strained. There was a severe attack by President Nasser - 
"yeshrabu min mayyatalbahr" (Let them drink water from the sea.)
Q. But as we know the Egyptians worked hard in the beginning to secure American 
recognition for the new-born Yemeni Republic?
A. Recognition is one thing and Egypt-US relations are something else, despite the fact that 
Kennedy was trying to improve these relations.
Q. Kennedy supplied lots of arms to Saudi Arabia immediately following the recognition?
A. Of course that was after the raids of the Egyptian air force that bombed some of its areas, 
when it came under real threat. The US even sent its planes for display over Djiddah. The 
most important thing was Saudi Arabia because of US interests there on one hand and Egypt 
and the Arab revolution on the other. American recognition aimed essentially at encircling 
the problem, to be part of the solution. They tried to solve the problem through Egyptian 
withdrawal and Saudi withholding their support to the royalists.
Q. But the Saudis refused to accept the American mediation.
A. We didn’t make use of the American recognition, because of the very high tension that
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characterised the area in that period. There was a war between the royalists and the Saudis 
supported by the US on one side and Sana’a, Egypt and the Soviet Union on the other. In 
1967 the relations were severed because of the Ta’iz incident, and then they were cut 
completely between the US and the Arab world following the Arab-Israeli war. Relations 
were only reestablished in 1972. At that time I was hesitant to undertake any action in
this direction because the other Arab countries were all boycotting the US. I was thinking: 
how can we alone resume these relations? The others in the Yemeni government were very 
enthusiastic to restore relations with the US especially now that relations with Aden were 
deteriorating. I was always also asking myself: what is the importance of Yemen to the US?
There were those who used to say America will support us and give us a lot because our 
economy is in very bad state, but I told them the US won’t do anything. I still remember that 
the late Muhammad Nu’man and Mr. Ahmad Nu’man his father used to tell President al- 
Iryani: "When the relations are restored our government would get $30 million." They even 
decided the amount. My reply was "If you get a million Buksha (cent) then I know nothing 
in politics. You’re wrong." In the mean time the Italian Ambassador who was in charge of 
the American interests in the country paid the President a visit and told Kadi al-Iryani "If you 
restore relations, you will get lots of aid". A few days later I received three letters: from the 
national assembly, from the army and from President al-Iryani. All three letters urged me to 
restore relations. I called a Cabinet to meet. I explained the situation to them. I told them, "I
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am not anti-American. America is represented by the Italian Embassy and, therefore, we don’t 
need to be in a hurry." But the Cabinet insisted on re-establishing diplomatic relations with 
the US. Then I told them to give an excuse to face the fellow Arabs with.
At that time the Secretary of State of the US was visiting Australia, so I told the Italian 
Ambassador that he could also visit Sana’a." "You have no formal relations", he replied. But 
I convinced him on the basis that he had already visited China which did not have formal 
relations with the US.
Rogers visited Sana’a and at a dinner party we announced the re-establishment of relations. 
They didn’t give us anything. I summoned the Saudi Ambassador and told him, "I can say 
that those who advised the Yemeni government to restore relations in return for aid have 
mocked at us." However, I was aware that supeipowers do not pay in return for restoring 
relations.
But afterwards, we benefited from these relations despite the fact no direct aid was received. 
The International Monetary Fund, the International Food Program and other international 
institutions for which the US provides most of the finances provided our country with lots 
of aid. The fact is that following his visit to Sana’a, Mr. Rogers directed letters of 
recommendation to these institutions asking for help to Yemen, and these letters opened the 
way for the flow of international aid.
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Q. Were there any American conditions for the restoration of relations, or promises?
A. The American government didn’t promise anything. Promises came from others. And from 
my side I was aware that to get paid for restoring relations with a big country is degrading 
for the small country. As if they had paid for these relations.
Q. What in your view was the direct outcome of the restoration of relations with the US?
A. First: relations returned to normal as they should be. Second: aid came through 
international institutions.
Q. Dr al-Iryani sees that the American aid following 1972 as technical help, not, as it used 
to be before the severance of the relations, as development assistance?
A. This became the character of US assistance to the developing countries. This is their 
decision. We need technical assistance. When Bush visited Sana’a in 19861 accompanied him 
on his visit to/ school, and when we left the Institute I whispered to him: "Your 
Excellency, we didn’t have anything else to invite the US Vice-President to visit except this 
school. The Soviet Union, East and West Germany, China all had big projects in the country 
like roads, hospitals, airports, harbours, schools, a university etc." When his visit was over 
I suggested that Washington assist our country with a big project. But their reply was, "This 
is not US policy. Our concern is to help your country in building the cadres of development
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through training, scholarships, and other basic things like water, health and agricultural 
projects. This is the policy of the US."
Q. As far as I can remember, Your Excellency, the restoration of Sana’a-Washington relations 
was followed by tension between the two parts of Yemen.
A. In the South there were many bad thoughts about us none of which were true. There never 
has been a very clear and direct foreign policy like that of the YAR. We restored relations 
with Saudi Arabia and they said it’s a conspiracy. We restored our relations with the US, they 
interpreted it the same way. On the other hand, the Saudis see any attempt for reunification 
with the South as a conspiracy against them. And the fact is that when we negotiate with the 
Russians we are not anti-Americans and when we meet our fellow Southerners we are not 
anti-Saudis. All we say publicly is the truth, the whole truth. As you know our institutions 
are very simple. No secret can continue to be unrevealed. There is no invisible government 
in the YAR.
Q. Does Your Excellency consider that our relations with US witnessed a turning point as 
result of the American arms package of 1979?
A. It was only one event, involving one package of about $400 million. Parts of the same 
package are still held up till now. There was nothing else before 1979 despite many promises.
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Part of the package was delivered during the war and the other part was abandoned by Saudi 
Arabia when the war was over. There is still about $30 million frozen by the Saudis. When 
the President enquired about the $30 million during his visit, he was told Riyadh was freezing 
it. He argued: "But this is ours. We need to buy spare parts with the remaining amount." But 
the American reply was, "This was the decision of the financiers." Later on the military aid 
consisted of the maintenance of the F5 planes and the training of some officers.
Q. What about economic assistance. Do you think it will develop?
A. Unfortunately, the US is in a situation that doesn’t enable her to give more assistance. The 
US is now cutting its aid to many countries. What we achieved during the President’s visit 
was that we succeeded in maintaining the same level of aid and with a very slight increase.
Q. $45 million?
A. Around that amount.
Q. Do you think a reunited Yemen is more important to the US?
A. The position on reunification is not yet clear. There are reservations from the side of Saudi 
Arabia and Oman; they suspect a United Yemen. From their side, the Americans are 
sceptical.
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Q. ’Abd Allah al-Ashtal, the PDRY representative in the UN, has said to me that the 
American view is that the reunification is a Yemeni matter.
A. This is the official stand. All foreign countries are sceptical not only concerning 
unification but regarding everything in the area. I told a foreign Ambassador, "All borders 
in the Arab world are artificial."
Q. Does Your Excellency think that the visit of the President to the US in January 1990 is 
significant? I mean, does it mark the end of the Saudi impact on US-Saudi relations?
A. I think that Bush’s visit to Sana’a marked the beginning of direct relations. He emphasized 
that theme in Sana’a very clearly in his statements. But I say every country, when it decides 
its foreign policy with a foreign country puts into consideration its relations with the other 
partners, the other countries of the area.
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Appendix VII
Author’s interview with Dr ’Abdul-Karim al-Iryani 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the YAR 
Sana’a, September 1988.
Q. How are the relations of the YAR with the USA developing at present?
A. Yemen’s relations with the United States are dynamic and not static as is the case with 
all countries. Therefore relations are developing with Washington and the other capitals with 
whom we conduct relations.
Q. Can we say that our relations with the United States are better now than they used to be?
A. They went through some ruptures. A rupture between 26 September 1962 and 19 
December 1962 when American recognition took place. Another rupture from April 1967 to 
July 1, 1972. Our relations with the US were restored with some harmful legacies. Even one 
aeroplane or two was retained. But, anyhow, it was restored according to mutual interest. 
They were restored following a problem and as in the case with West Germany we overcame 
that problem.
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In the political context I can say YAR-USA relations witness continuous development and 
growth. But there is always something that constraints these relations, namely U.S.-Arab 
relations in general, and that is why our leadership says to them at every opportunity: "we 
welcome the growth in our mutual relations but your stance in the Palestinian cause has and 
would continue to hinder US relations with Arab nations." For example the US expresses its 
annoyance at media campaigns against US policies whether from the side of Yemen or of 
other Arab countries. And we reply "You must listen to what we say concerning the issue of 
Palestine. What you listen to in whispers from others you listen to publicly from the Yemen 
because we have only one, clear, policy. We don’t have a secret one. Our policy is publicly 
stated." So I say that, though bilateral relations are good, I believe the US-Israel connection 
constrains US relations with the Arab nations.
It is true that our media campaign against the US is very strong because their accusations 
concerning Iraq hurt us. They bear responsibility for their positions. US policy opens fire on 
itself. It is clear that Israel involves the United States in such policies against the Arabs.
Q. On the economic cooperation with the US. Do You see, Your Excellency, that the oil 
discovery by an American company developed direct YAR-US relations?
A. As a researcher you can say it is impossible that US interest in the YAR before and after 
the oil discovery could be the same. No. American interest after the oil discovery changed. 
The logical thing is to say that Yemen is more careful to maintain these relations at present
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than before. That is very logical.
Q. What about US assistance and trade between the two states?
A. There are obstructions that stand in the way of the development of trade between the US 
and the YAR. Trade has improved during the last few years not because Yemen sought it but 
because the US facilitated trade especially in the agricultural field. Before it was weak due 
to some constraints, not as a result of a political decision. Certainly the chances for the US 
are good as long as there are facilitations, but the distance constraint, is still great. That is, 
the neighbouring countries of East Asia provide us with most of the substitute commodities 
and goods at cheaper prices. Apart from oil the trade balance, I expect, would continue to be 
far below our balance with East Asia.
Q. And in terms of US assistance to our country?
A. We can consider US assistance as being in the form of technical assistance up till now. 
It is not development assistance in the sense that it is structural or industrial. The USAID 
agencies see that Yemen only needs technical assistance and not development assistance. That 
doesn’t mean in any way that the US assistance is not of value to us. But the Yemeni people 
does not see it as being of value. The Yemeni people see the material value of the German 
and Dutch assistance more than they see in the American assistance, because the Dutch and 
the German assistance includes development as well as technical assistance. And this is
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within the context of the evaluation of these packages of aid and though the US aid program 
reaches nearly to $45 million, very much more than Germany’s and Holland’s when we 
exchange the Mark or the Guilder totals to US Dollars. If you asked any of the Yemenis who 
helps your country more they will say Germany and Holland. Concerning this we called their 
attention many times to the fact that we consider the training assistance and training very 
important. But you must bear in mind, I said this even when I was the Chairman of the 
Central Planning Organization, that the Yemeni public would never appreciate this assistance 
unless you connect it to some development assistance.
Until now this advice has gone unheeded. As a researcher you can undertake a questionnaire 
and ask the public who of the three states helps the YAR more despite the fact that the US 
dollars are more. We told them choose two or three projects. I told them personally, "You 
are in a very disadvantageous situation now coming with technical assistance alone", because 
the Yemeni people did not know development assistance until you undertook the Kennedy 
Water Project in Ta’iz and the Makha-Ta’iz-Sana’a road, because nobody did anything like 
that in Yemen before. The Kennedy project was simple but in the eyes of the people was 
great. Many Yemenis were trained and worked and got salaries from that project and this was 
reflected in the standard of living of many families. And the same thing came from the road 
project. That was a historical development. When I founded the Tihama project I remember 
that I could not find any technicians except those who were trained by the US Development 
Agency who worked in these two projects in surveying, mapping and topography. By the 
way, I am still dealing with some of those at present. In today’s terms that number of
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technicians is nothing, but in their time that was great. They have created in the minds of the 
people the idea that when America comes into the Yemen there will exist projects, training 
and new jobs, but after the rupture of 1967-67 the US returned to the Yemen with a new 
philosophy.
I can say that the Yemeni government certainly appreciates US assistance, but this assistance 
does not get the same appreciation from the Yemeni public. It does not speak and express 
itself.
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Appendix VIII
Author’s interview with Thomas E Meurer 
Senior Vice President/Director 
Hunt Consolidated, Inc.
London, 22 May 1990
Q. I would appreciate, Mr Meurer, if you could tell me the story of Hunt in Yemen from the 
beginning.
A. We first were interested in Yemen in 1980, following the visits of an independent Syrian 
geophysicist, Mou’djib Al-Malazi, who contacted our office in London and expressed his 
belief that there might be some oil in your country. Dr Ian Maycock and I visited Sana’a in 
January 1981, and Mr al-Malazi accompanied us. We met many Yemeni officials. The subject 
of the meetings was that the aeromagnetic survey, which was undertaken by the Yemen 
government, might indicate the existence of sedimentary basins in the country. After three 
days of waiting for official permission to visit Marib-al-Djawf area Dr Mycock, the Director 
of the London office, Mr al-Malazi and I, decided to visit the nearby mountains to see what 
kind of rocks were available and what age the rocks appeared to be. In this area we were 
caught by the army and sent to jail in Sana’a, because we were not carrying our passports.
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We spent most of the day under arrest. Mr Al-Malazi explained to the officer that we were 
not spies or criminals but representatives of an oil company. After contacting with the 
Yemeni authorities (YOMINCO), we were released. On the next day, Mr. Isma’il Musa from 
the Yemen Oil Corporation accompanied us to the area where we were able to look over the 
area and check the age of the rocks. The visit also offered me a chance to talk to some other 
expatriates who were doing business in Yemen. We had a very positive and encouraging 
meeting with YOMINCO officials. As a result of this visit, Hunt Oil Company decided to 
negotiate a contract. This was done in September 1981. We "spudded" our first well in 
January 1984 and it was a discovery which is very unusual. An interesting note is that the 
discovery was on July fourth of that year, which is the American independence day and a 
national holiday in America.
When you drill for oil and you find oil, you do not know whether the quantity is commercial 
or not. You must drill many wells in order to determine if you have enough oil to finance 
the infrastructure. On September 26, 1985, with number 11 well, we realised that we had 
300 million barrels of reserve, which was enough to go forward. That was on your 
revolutionary day. Another piece of symbolism was that it was May of 1984, when Mr. Hunt 
and I took a cab from the Sana’a airport and the driver told Mr. Hunt, "You’re going to find 
oil, because it is raining since morning today and when it rains in the morning, it means good 
luck."
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Appendix IX 
Ambassador William Stoltzfus 
US Charge d’Affaires in MKOY 1959-1961 
London, 1 June 1990.
Q. Your Excellency was the first US charge in my country?
A. Before me there was a man called Charles Fergusson who stayed only for few months.
Q. Do you remember when you arrived in Ta’iz as US Charge?
A. I think in June.
Q. Before 1959 there was no US legation and I assumed you were the first.
A. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between Yemen and the US, our 
Minister in Saudi Arabia was also Minister to Yemen. Some time later the Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia became the Minister to Yemen, Mr. Parker T. Hart, who visited the Imam in 
1960.
Q. In your view, what was the importance of the US legation in the Yemen as of 1959?
A. To implement the Eisenhower Doctrine. This doctrine aimed at providing assistance to 
those countries which need such assistance in order to keep them neutral if not pro-Western
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countries. And Yemen at that time had active Chinese and Soviet missions. Eisenhower 
Doctrine implementation in Yemen meant that we should counter the Soviets and the Chinese 
which were interested in Bab al-Mandab and southwest Asia.
Q. Were the means to implement the doctrine some USAID projects?
A. Yes. USAID started in that year, a water project in the city of Ta’iz, smoothed the road 
between Ta’iz and Makha before starting the road project of Makha-Ta’iz-Sana’a and an 
agricultural project in Wadi Zabid.
Q. Do you have any idea why the Imam approved your undertaking such projects in Ta’iz 
and not in the capital or the northern areas?
A. Ta’iz was Imam Ahmad’s diplomatic capital. In Ta’iz there were the British, the 
Americans, the Italians, the West Germans and the Soviets. He used to spend most of his 
time in al-Sukhnah. He used to feel more secure there than Sana’a where his father was 
assassinated by the northern tribes. We chose Ta’iz as a stage for our projects, because we 
wanted the Imam to see what we were doing. He never trusted foreigners. If we did 
something in the north he would feel that we were supporting his enemy. He never trusted 
these tribes because they used to get Saudi money.
Q. So the aid was political?
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A. Yes aid is political.
Q. You said Imam Ahmad never trusted foreigners. Do you mean all foreigners?
A. Well, the Chinese were the least mistrusted foreign power in the country.
Q. What were the main events in bilateral relations during your two years in Yemen?
A. First of all our relations were good for we proved to be helpful to the country. In 1959 
and 1960 the drought and fire created lot of problems to the Hudaidah province and its 
surroundings. Therefore, an American warship, which was the first warship to enter the city 
harbour the Soviets had built, was able to provide emergency assistance to the Yemeni 
people.
On the other hand, my wife started the first regular school in the city of Ta’iz for the children 
of the foreign diplomats. The children of the Foreign Minister Abutaleb and of the Chief of 
the Police joined this school. Imam Ahmad called me to see him in Sukhnah because of the 
school and I was able to convince him that it would not be against him and so he accepted 
it. I promised him that my wife alone would be doing the teaching and that is why he 
accepted it.
Q. Do you feel that the Eisenhower Doctrine achieved its objectives in Yemen during your
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two years in the country?
A. Yes. The primary objective was to have a presence there and not to leave it for others. 
The second objective was to satisfy the Saudis. The Saudis were concerned about the 
situation in Yemen and were glad that we were there. In fact the Saudi role in Yemen was 
limited because, I think, the Imam had never trusted the Saudis who were then influencing 
his northern tribes by paying them money.
Q. I heard from some of your colleagues that you had accompanied President Eisenhower’s 
envoy who had waited to see the Imam in 1957. Is it true that the envoy waited three days 
to meet the Imam who was asleep?
A. I don’t think that he waited that long.
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